Everything in the atlas

Not a system to run a business application on: there is no business application in it, and what it implements of the language, the dictionary and Gateway is a stated subset of each. It is a clean-room reimplementation of the `/IWBEP/` interfaces that bundles no SAP source and no standard DDIC, so a service that reads standard objects has nothing to read, and `ANORMALIES.md` records every place the runtime differs from SAP before any workaround is written.

BUSL-1.1 rather than node-rfc's Apache-2.0, so a product you distribute has to be read against the licence and its Additional Use Grant first, and the source is closed: the GitHub repository is the issue tracker and the documentation, nothing else. `RfcServerOptions.bgRfcHandlers` raises instead of accepting handlers, so a server receiving inbound bgRFC units is outside what this does. An ABAP `MESSAGE`-raised failure still arrives with its T100 template rather than the rendered sentence, and the dump name is not reported as `key` for that case.

A descendant rather than a distinct idea: if what you need is the ADT surface itself, its ancestors are entered here too and one of them may already be in your stack.

Commercial Its maker offers it commercially.

Functional boundary The MIT licence covers the connector only: connecting to SAP needs a licensed ABAPilot backend installed in your system, so this is a commercial decision wearing an open-source badge on one half. Its own published checks did not cover writes, activation, transports or authorisation boundaries.

A system that reports itself productive, or whose role the probe cannot prove non-productive, is write-locked with no override, so changing code in production is not something this does. The permission ladder constrains the package, object name and transport request the server itself passes on a write, and is not a sandbox around ABAP it executes: `abap_run`, `abap_test` and the opt-in `core.eval` run under the connected technical user's SAP authorisations, which is where the boundary actually sits. Data preview, dump variable contents and driving a transaction by batch input stay off in every mode, `admin` included, until each is named explicitly.

Single-tenant today, one technical user, with per-user principal propagation on the roadmap — so a shared deployment cannot yet act as the developer who asked. The sibling edition [ARC-1](artifact:arc-mcp-arc-1) speaks ADT directly if you would rather not depend on the language server.

Built and last touched in the same week of March 2026, so the maintenance reading is what it is — the authentication work is the reason to look, and a stalled repository is the reason to read it before depending on it.

Freestyle SQL and `abap_run` mean an agent can read data and execute code, which is well past reading source. Neither is something to grant on a system where the distinction between development tooling and business data matters.

Two licences, by which package you install: the standalone server, `@mcp-abap-adt/core`, is AGPL-3.0-only, a licence to read before shipping anything built around it; the library, `@mcp-abap-adt/lib`, is Apache-2.0. The destination model also expects service keys sitting in a local directory, which is a secrets decision to make deliberately.

Development and sandbox systems only: the README warns against pointing it at production. Transport release is never executed, since the tool exists to show the policy stopping it, and separation of duties is checked against the `identity.approvers` list in the policy file rather than against SAP authorisations, so it holds as far as that file does and no further. The write path has been tested with ABAP classes and other object types may need adjustments, there is deliberately no tool that creates or deletes an object, and one server instance serves one SAP system.

Its own README opens by calling the server experimental. It also writes: locking, editing and activating in a system an agent can reach is a permissions decision before it is a tooling one.

Every tool its README lists reads — Get and Search, nothing that writes. Locking, editing, activation and transports are the other server, [mcp-abap-abap-adt-api](artifact:mario-andreschak-mcp-abap-adt-api), and mixing the two is how you end up with two MCP servers pointed at one system.

Read-only in practice, and the documentation is Korean; the tool names are English but the guidance around them is not.

A system that reports itself productive, or whose role the probe cannot prove non-productive, is write-locked with no override, so changing code in production is not something this does. The permission ladder constrains the package, object name and transport request the server itself passes on a write, and is not a sandbox around ABAP it executes: `abap_run`, `abap_test` and the opt-in `core.eval` run under the connected technical user's SAP authorisations, which is where the boundary actually sits. Data preview, dump variable contents and driving a transaction by batch input stay off in every mode, `admin` included, until each is named explicitly.

Development and sandbox systems only: the README warns against pointing it at production. Transport release is never executed, since the tool exists to show the policy stopping it, and separation of duties is checked against the `identity.approvers` list in the policy file rather than against SAP authorisations, so it holds as far as that file does and no further. The write path has been tested with ABAP classes and other object types may need adjustments, there is deliberately no tool that creates or deletes an object, and one server instance serves one SAP system.

Not reachable Not reachable since 2026-10-20.

Functional boundary The Level A–D grade merges SAP's two published files in the tool's own engine: it is an orientation rather than an ATC result and is left out of the signed audit pack, and the repository documents state by state where the grade is expected to differ from what the clean core ATC check reports. Nothing here runs ABAP Unit — on the RAP track that result is recorded from your own SAP system, and generated CAP tests run against mocks in an isolated runner rather than in a real SAP S/4HANA system. Tenants, organisation accounts, single sign-on, a self-hosted edition and write access through an API are deliberately not built, and one account has five analysis runs before a Gemini API key of its own is needed.

It answers about the object catalogue, not about your code: nothing here reads your system, so it will tell you a table is not released and not that you used it. That check is ATC's, and this is what makes ATC's answer actionable.

No published releases; repository quiet for 45 months.

A system that reports itself productive, or whose role the probe cannot prove non-productive, is write-locked with no override, so changing code in production is not something this does. The permission ladder constrains the package, object name and transport request the server itself passes on a write, and is not a sandbox around ABAP it executes: `abap_run`, `abap_test` and the opt-in `core.eval` run under the connected technical user's SAP authorisations, which is where the boundary actually sits. Data preview, dump variable contents and driving a transaction by batch input stay off in every mode, `admin` included, until each is named explicitly.

Driving the GUI reaches whatever a user can reach, which is business data and not a development surface. Decide what an agent may do in a session before granting one, not after. Windows only. The HTTP transport is meant for team use but binds to localhost, and unattended multi-user operation is listed as not yet available — a limitation and also the safer default.

Driving the GUI reaches whatever a user can reach, which is business data and not a development surface. Decide what an agent may do in a session before granting one, not after. It has also not been touched since February 2025, which the maintenance reading states — the three later entries here are where the CI, the Web GUI and the testing framing went.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

What adt-ls cannot do headless the maintainer puts out of scope, so a consumer that needs an ADT call the language server does not expose is back to speaking ADT itself. The README states the current runtime compatibility as verified on macOS arm64, against adt-ls 1.1.2 as the minimum and `1.1.2.202608131517` as the version tested. An Eclipse installation does not supply that runtime: SAP versions the two separately, so the VS Code extension has to be installed even where nobody opens VS Code.

Not a tool a developer runs: it is a library to build one with, and it ships no editor, command line or interface of its own. Its sample connects with a plain HTTP URL, a user and a password, so a system that does not expose the adt ICF service that way is out of reach.

Not a system to run a business application on: there is no business application in it, and what it implements of the language, the dictionary and Gateway is a stated subset of each. It is a clean-room reimplementation of the `/IWBEP/` interfaces that bundles no SAP source and no standard DDIC, so a service that reads standard objects has nothing to read, and `ANORMALIES.md` records every place the runtime differs from SAP before any workaround is written.

Not reachable Not reachable since 2026-10-20.

Functional boundary The Level A–D grade merges SAP's two published files in the tool's own engine: it is an orientation rather than an ATC result and is left out of the signed audit pack, and the repository documents state by state where the grade is expected to differ from what the clean core ATC check reports. Nothing here runs ABAP Unit — on the RAP track that result is recorded from your own SAP system, and generated CAP tests run against mocks in an isolated runner rather than in a real SAP S/4HANA system. Tenants, organisation accounts, single sign-on, a self-hosted edition and write access through an API are deliberately not built, and one account has five analysis runs before a Gemini API key of its own is needed.

Not a system to run a business application on: there is no business application in it, and what it implements of the language, the dictionary and Gateway is a stated subset of each. It is a clean-room reimplementation of the `/IWBEP/` interfaces that bundles no SAP source and no standard DDIC, so a service that reads standard objects has nothing to read, and `ANORMALIES.md` records every place the runtime differs from SAP before any workaround is written.

LISA does the translation step only: it does not discover objects or manage transports, and its README pairs it with [an ADT MCP server](artifact:sap-adt-mcp-server) for those. Every write needs a transport request, and which object types it can write differs between public cloud or [the SAP BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment) and on-premise or private cloud, and by release. Running it locally is meant for development and testing, not production.

Not reachable since 2026-10-20.

Not reachable Not reachable since 2026-10-20.

Functional boundary The Level A–D grade merges SAP's two published files in the tool's own engine: it is an orientation rather than an ATC result and is left out of the signed audit pack, and the repository documents state by state where the grade is expected to differ from what the clean core ATC check reports. Nothing here runs ABAP Unit — on the RAP track that result is recorded from your own SAP system, and generated CAP tests run against mocks in an isolated runner rather than in a real SAP S/4HANA system. Tenants, organisation accounts, single sign-on, a self-hosted edition and write access through an API are deliberately not built, and one account has five analysis runs before a Gemini API key of its own is needed.

The Markdown is a snapshot of whatever help.sap.com served when the pipeline last ran, and the Standard library is scraped from the `latest` index, so which release a page describes follows from the scrape date rather than from anything the corpus states. `package.json` states ISC and the repository carries no LICENSE file, so what the copied SAP documentation may be used for is not stated in it.