Everything in ABAP / ABAP Cloud

Not an end-user app: it reads from any table the user names and writes into tables of the Z/Y namespace, with no authorisation check of its own, so the README asks a project to add its own checks on `S_TABU_DIS`/`S_TABU_NAM` and to restrict who may run it before it is used beyond a development system. XLSX upload and download are not ready for ABAP Cloud yet, and of the upload apps only the JSON one writes the file's rows back to the database.

The app writes to whatever table is passed in the URL parameter `table` and carries no authorisation check of its own, so past a development system it needs authorisation checks added and a restriction on who may run it.

Knowledge with no reach: without an MCP server connected it can tell an agent what to write and cannot let it read or run anything. The rules target the ABAP Cloud development model, so a classic on-premise codebase is not what they are written against.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

Host-specific: outside Kiro the automatic context activation is the part that does not come with it, and what remains is prose you would have to wire in yourself. Breadth over depth by design — thirty-five skills across six product areas is an orientation layer, not a substitute for the focused sets in each.

GPL-3.0, which is a licence to read before vendoring any of it into something you ship. Forty plugins is also a lot of always-available surface — the ledger is there because breadth and verification pull in opposite directions, and it does not resolve that so much as report it.

It is a plugin for one server — its own — so it is a stack rather than a component. And the guard is only as good as the profile labels: a production system registered as `DEV` is a production system with the safety off.

It says so itself, in bold, and the atlas repeats it: not legal advice and not a compliance decision. Only SAP, your contract, or SAP support can answer bindingly, and the skill routes legal, commercial and roadmap questions there rather than guessing at them. Treat the output as evidence gathered, not as a verdict.

It is a plugin for one server — its own — so it is a stack rather than a component. And the guard is only as good as the profile labels: a production system registered as `DEV` is a production system with the safety off.

It sees [abap2UI5](artifact:abap2ui5-abap2ui5) only: the figures come from the framework's HTTP handler, its monitor hook and its draft table, so nothing outside abap2UI5 appears in them. The usage, error and performance tabs stay empty until the handler line is in place or the user exit sets `check_monitor_active`. Recording which employee used which application, when and how fast, is subject to works council co-determination in Germany (§ 87 (1) no. 6 BetrVG); user tracking is `HASH` by default, `NAME` stores user names, and the request recorder keeps the complete request and response of every roundtrip for two days by default.

Not as it stands on a system past development: it reads the contents of any table the user names without an authorisation check of its own, so access is bounded only by whatever restrictions exist on the underlying handler or service. The README asks for your own checks first, naming `AUTHORITY-CHECK` on `S_TABU_DIS`/`S_TABU_NAM`, and for a restriction on who may run the app. There is no 7.02 downport either, because the selection-screen dependency has no `702` branch.

It runs whatever SQL a user types without an authorisation check of its own, and the native path additionally uses ADBC, which bypasses ABAP authorisations and client separation; the README asks anyone running it beyond a development system to add authorisation checks and restrict who may start the app. The native console needs Standard ABAP, so on ABAP Cloud only the Open SQL console is available.