Everything in the atlas
Type
Domain: 3
Origin
Signals
More: 2
Group by: Capability
Maven bill of materials pinning CAP Java module versions
Ten short CAP Java references, one document per topic
Generates Open Resource Discovery documents from a CAP Java model
OData V2 protocol adapter built into the CAP Java runtime
OData V4 protocol adapter for CAP Java Application Services
Calling an unbound CAP Java function from freestyle UI5
Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.
CAP Java service calling role collection APIs via a generated client
Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.
Maven bill of materials pinning CAP Java module versions
Eclipse plug-in turning JSON or XML into ABAP types and DDIC objects
On an [SAP BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment) system only the generated code is left: DDIC creation is not supported on ABAP Cloud, because classic DDIC object creation over REST is not available there. Create DDIC is also disabled where ADT is not installed in the same Eclipse, and Insert into Editor then works with any editor implementing `ITextEditor` instead of the ABAP one.
MCP adapter turning a CAP Java service into an MCP server
SAP prohibits gateway/proxy use for SAP Application APIs; the Atlas separately excludes CAP wrappers around those APIs from its assessed scope. Data changes require application-defined unbound actions, and the adapter supplies no rate limiting, agent-action audit logging, approval workflows or policy enforcement.
MCP server publishing SAP functions as tools from config tables
Not reachable Not reachable since 2026-10-20.
Functional boundary What it exposes is whatever somebody put in the configuration table, which moves the governance question inside the SAP system and out of the server — an advantage if that table is controlled and a hazard if it is not. The web management interface is a second surface to secure alongside the MCP one.
AWS's ABAP MCP server for Amazon Q Developer and Kiro
Written for Amazon Q Developer and Kiro, and the central deployment path is ECS Fargate — the further you are from AWS, the more of it is scaffolding you do not need. Python rather than the Node most of this group uses. Its README says the repository is no longer maintained and that the latest version of ABAP Accelerator is shared after registering with AWS for [Modernization Agents for SAP on AWS](https://github.com/aws-for-sap/Modernization-Agents-for-SAP-on-AWS).
MCP server turning a transport request into a WRICEF specification
Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.
Eclipse plugin bringing Claude into ABAP Development Tools
MCP server for ABAP on the ADT session, in Eclipse or standalone
In the Eclipse mode the server lives in a developer's IDE, binds to 127.0.0.1 and answers any request carrying an `Origin` header with HTTP 403, so a pipeline or a remote agent has nothing to reach; the standalone mode on the runtime of the ADT for VS Code extension is the documented route with no IDE open. A new connection starts in write mode, so the 11 write tools are live against a connected system until someone presses Toggle Read-Only. The dropins route for the two bundles is documented as untested.
MCP server calling RFC-enabled function modules behind an allowlist
Real SAP calls need the proprietary [SAP NetWeaver RFC SDK](external:sap-nw-rfc-sdk) and the `pyrfc==3.3.1` release the README calls archived and yanked, on Python 3.11, so without those only the demo backend answers. Not over HTTP as it stands: credentials are read from the environment for stdio, and the README says not to expose the server over HTTP without implementing the MCP authorization specification and deployment-level rate limiting. Multi-tenant auth and RBAC beyond the one server-wide policy, rate limiting, metrics and tracing, and deployment packaging are listed as not built. The result limits protect the client and not the system, since the README states they cannot reduce work already performed inside SAP, and the MCP tool annotations that describe read and write risk are advisory metadata rather than an authorisation boundary, so the service account's `S_RFC` and table authorisations are still what decides.
ADT-to-MCP bridge in Go reaching past what ADT exposes
Reach is the reason to use it and the reason to be careful: reading cluster tables and spool output goes well past what a development tool is normally pointed at. Decide what an agent may reach before granting it, not after.
Python MCP server fetching sales orders from SAP's business data graph
Python MCP server for SAP Gateway OData operations
Go binary bridging any OData v2 or v4 service to MCP
Universal mode trades discoverability for size: one generic tool is harder for a model to pick correctly than a named one, which is why it is not the default. On a small service, standard mode is the better answer.
MCP server calling RFC-enabled function modules behind an allowlist
Real SAP calls need the proprietary [SAP NetWeaver RFC SDK](external:sap-nw-rfc-sdk) and the `pyrfc==3.3.1` release the README calls archived and yanked, on Python 3.11, so without those only the demo backend answers. Not over HTTP as it stands: credentials are read from the environment for stdio, and the README says not to expose the server over HTTP without implementing the MCP authorization specification and deployment-level rate limiting. Multi-tenant auth and RBAC beyond the one server-wide policy, rate limiting, metrics and tracing, and deployment packaging are listed as not built. The result limits protect the client and not the system, since the README states they cannot reduce work already performed inside SAP, and the MCP tool annotations that describe read and write risk are advisory metadata rather than an authorisation boundary, so the service account's `S_RFC` and table authorisations are still what decides.
MCP server managing Delta shares in SAP Business Data Cloud
On ECC the S/4HANA `API_*` services that the three convenience readers default to do not exist, so each one has to be pointed at a Z service of your own or replaced by the RFC tools. `read_table` inherits `RFC_READ_TABLE`'s 512-byte row, so a wide table needs an explicit field list and some fields cannot be selected at all, and the bridge starts a Node process and a fresh logon per call, with no pooling. The audit log is one line per call that includes the call arguments, so every filter and WHERE clause sent to SAP is written to a file that then has to be handled as sensitive.
A2A adapter turning a CAP Java service into an LLM-backed agent
Hands-on building an AI agent with the SAP Cloud SDK for AI
Bridge from CAP Java to SAP AI Core, with Fiori field recommendations
Hands-on building an AI agent with the SAP Cloud SDK for AI
MCP server calling RFC-enabled function modules behind an allowlist
Real SAP calls need the proprietary [SAP NetWeaver RFC SDK](external:sap-nw-rfc-sdk) and the `pyrfc==3.3.1` release the README calls archived and yanked, on Python 3.11, so without those only the demo backend answers. Not over HTTP as it stands: credentials are read from the environment for stdio, and the README says not to expose the server over HTTP without implementing the MCP authorization specification and deployment-level rate limiting. Multi-tenant auth and RBAC beyond the one server-wide policy, rate limiting, metrics and tracing, and deployment packaging are listed as not built. The result limits protect the client and not the system, since the README states they cannot reduce work already performed inside SAP, and the MCP tool annotations that describe read and write risk are advisory metadata rather than an authorisation boundary, so the service account's `S_RFC` and table authorisations are still what decides.
Java implementation of the capire/bookstore composite app