sap-mcp-server

sap-mcp-server

An MCP server that gives Claude (Desktop, Code, API) read access and approval-gated write access to SAP ECC and S/4HANA through OData and RFC/BAPI, without the proprietary SAP NetWeaver RFC SDK. The OData side talks to the SAP Gateway over HTTP. The RFC side runs through a small Node bridge on open-rfc, an Apache-2.0 licensed package that implements the RFC protocol without the SAP SDK. Every call is written to an audit log.

Why

SAP Joule ships with S/4HANA Cloud and with recent S/4HANA on-premise releases connected to BTP. ECC 6.0 has no Joule, and the only supported route to one is a migration. This server is the sidecar pattern: SAP stays as it is, the model runs where you choose (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, the Claude API, Amazon Bedrock), and the only thing between them is this process. It uses the two interfaces most SAP systems already expose, OData on the Gateway and RFC on the application server, and writes every call to an audit log.

Tools

Requirements

• Python 3.10 or newer
• Node.js 22.14 or newer for the RFC tools (open-rfc requires it). The OData and TED tools work without Node
• An SAP user with the authorizations you intend to grant: Gateway service access for OData; S_RFC plus S_TABU_DIS or S_TABU_NAM for read_table
• Network access from the machine running this server to the Gateway HTTP(S) port and to the application server RFC port (33NN, where NN is the system number)

Install

Clone the repository (git clone https://github.com/romankorim/sap-mcp-server.git), then:

cd sap-mcp-server
python3 -m venv .venv
.venv/bin/pip install -r requirements.txt
cd rfc-bridge && npm install && cd ..
chmod +x run.sh

Configure

cp .env.example .env

Edit .env:

.env is re-read on every tool call, so a changed host or password takes effect without restarting the client. Values in .env take precedence over the process environment. Single-quote values that contain spaces or shell characters.

Run

./run.sh

run.sh loads .env, picks .venv/bin/python when it exists (otherwise $PYTHON or python3) and starts server.py on stdio. MCP clients start it the same way; you only run it by hand to see startup errors. On Windows call the venv interpreter directly with server.py as the argument; the server reads .env itself.

Claude Desktop

Quit Claude Desktop completely before editing the config file. The app rewrites claude_desktop_config.json from memory when it quits, so it overwrites any edit made while it is running.

File location: macOS ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json, Windows %APPDATA%\Claude\claude_desktop_config.json.

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "sap": {
      "command": "/absolute/path/to/sap-mcp-server/run.sh",
      "args": []
    }
  }
}

Start the app again. The sap tools appear in the tools list; sap_ping and rfc_ping are the first calls to try.

Claude Code

claude mcp add sap -- /absolute/path/to/sap-mcp-server/run.sh

Security model

• Read-only by default. All OData tools use GET. All RFC tools call read-only function modules.
• bapi_call accepts only names in the READ_BAPIS set in rfc_tools.py. Extending the list is a code change, not a runtime option.
• read_table reads whatever the RFC user is authorized to read, except tables that hold credentials, secrets or personal data: USR*, USH*, RSEC*, SEC*, PA0*, PA9*, HRP*, T77*, RFCDES, USRBAPI, SECSTORE and the SSF_PSE tables are refused unless SAP_ALLOW_SENSITIVE_TABLES=1 is set for an audited admin session. Restrict the user with S_TABU_DIS or S_TABU_NAM on the SAP side as well.
• Writes are two-step. create_purchase_requisition returns a proposal unless confirm=True is passed; the intended flow is that a person reviews the proposal and the client calls again with confirm=True. The SAP write itself is not implemented yet.
• Credentials come from .env or the environment; the server never logs them. The audit record stores the SAP user name, not the password.
• TLS certificate verification is on by default.
• The audit log is one JSON line per call, appended to AUDIT_LOG_PATH:

{"ts": "2026-10-01T09:12:44+00:00", "user": "SAPUSER", "tool": "read_table", "args": {"table": "MARA", "fields": "MATNR,MTART,MATKL", "where": "MTART = 'FERT'", "max_rows": 20, "skip_rows": 0}, "status": "ok", "ms": 412, "note": "rfc_user=SAPUSER"}

Fields: ts (UTC), user (SAP_USER), tool, args (the call arguments, so filters and WHERE clauses end up in the log), status (ok, error, proposed, not_implemented, or http_<code> for failed OData requests), ms, note. Treat the file as sensitive: it contains every query sent to SAP.

Known limits

• RFC_READ_TABLE returns each row as one character line of at most 512 bytes. Wide tables need an explicit field list. Selecting RPRCTR from FAGLFLEXT fails on the systems we tested.
• The where argument is split into 72-character OPTIONS lines on whitespace. A single token longer than 72 characters is rejected.
• odata_query caps top at 200.
• On ECC the S/4HANA API_* OData services do not exist. Point SAP_SVC_* and SAP_ES_* to your own Z services, or use the RFC tools.
• create_purchase_requisition does not write to SAP yet.
• The TED API answers with HTTP 429 above roughly 10 requests per minute.
• OData V2 only.
• The RFC bridge starts a Node process per call, with no connection pooling. Each call opens a new logon, which adds latency.

Roadmap

• BAPI_PR_CREATE write path behind the existing confirm=True gate
• S/4HANA API_* style read services on ECC through Z Gateway services
• OData V4

Pinned install and SBOM

requirements.txt states the ranges; requirements.lock is the exact set the maintainers tested (Python 3.12, pip install -r requirements.lock). sbom.cdx.json is the CycloneDX 1.6 software bill of materials for that lock, regenerated with every tagged release. The Node bridge pins its dependencies in rfc-bridge/package-lock.json.

Further reading

• Claude on SAP through MCP: the service and the pilot
• Claude through MCP vs SAP Joule on ECC (2026): conditions, hosting, cost
• Connect Claude Code to SAP ECC 6.0 with sap-mcp-server in 20 minutes
• Security and data handling: identity, masking, audit, writes, SNC/TLS
• AI operating system: scheduled agents with gates and an audit trail

Maintainer

Maintained by iteractive.ai, AI implementation for SAP and enterprise systems, remote and end to end for companies in Europe and North America. Commercial support and production deployments: https://iteractive.ai/services/claude-sap-mcp

License

MIT, see LICENSE.