Everything in the atlas

Only on SAP S/4HANA 2023 and 2025, on premise or private cloud: [SAP S/4HANA Cloud, Public Edition](external:sap-s4hana-cloud-public-edition) and the [SAP BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment) are listed as coming soon, and a 2023 system has to leave out `ZABAP_PRC_EVENTS_SE_2025`, whose event-based side effects rely on APIs released with S/4HANA 2025. Not for a system that already carries a copy, because object names are global and two versions cannot live side by side, and not for a productive system by way of the `ZABAP_PRC_DEMO*` packages, which the README states are not intended for one and whose init classes delete and rebuild their own tables on every run. While the major version is 0 the public API is not stable: minor bumps carry breaking changes with no deprecation period, so productive use means pinning a tag and reading the CHANGELOG before every upgrade.

Alerting by mail is not telemetry — if you need traces and metrics correlated across handlers, that is a different layer. It also publishes no repository, so the package is the only thing to read.

There is nothing here for ABAP for Cloud: the requirements name Standard ABAP releases only, and a CDS/SADL based OData service for `ABAP for Cloud` compatibility stands under Limitations & Todo.

Not a system to run a business application on: there is no business application in it, and what it implements of the language, the dictionary and Gateway is a stated subset of each. It is a clean-room reimplementation of the `/IWBEP/` interfaces that bundles no SAP source and no standard DDIC, so a service that reads standard objects has nothing to read, and `ANORMALIES.md` records every place the runtime differs from SAP before any workaround is written.

The project states that until v1.0.0 is reached, breaking changes may occur without prior notice. Rule items do not chain: every rule operates on the original input string, so a format whose second step needs the result of the first needs a custom logic class. A REPLACE rule whose replacement produces the exact same string as the input is reported as `no match`, which the documentation records as a known limitation.

Stateful apps cannot be operated: a stateful session lives in one HTTP request and an MCP call is one request, so `app_start` refuses them. The repository carries no release yet and states the addon has not been run in production use, the 7.02 downport is lint-only with no 7.02 system having run it, and the ABAP Cloud HTTP service setup is written down but still to verify on your own system.

Server side only, and deliberately: the author states there is no realistic way to support the SSE streaming a client needs, so there are no notifications, no `listChanged`, no `subscribe` and no logging. It is also frozen — protocol versions up to 2025-11-25 and no further, with everything after that in a separate V2 SDK, so starting here today is starting on a closed branch.

Stateless by design: with no `Mcp-Session-Id` and no SSE, notifications of any kind, `resources/subscribe` and stream-close cancellation are excluded, which the author states are protocol-level impossibilities on stateless ICF rather than gaps to be filled later within this design. ABAP Cloud is not supported and not planned, the stated reason being SAP pushing its own MCP strategy and features in BTP; the first iteration targets 7.5x classic, with 7.02 to 7.4x served from a separate generated downport repository. No authorization object and no default auth check are delivered, so a user who may call the ICF node may call every `AREA`/`SERVER` registered under it until `check_authorization` is redefined.

Not reachable Not reachable since 2026-10-20.

Functional boundary What it exposes is whatever somebody put in the configuration table, which moves the governance question inside the SAP system and out of the server — an advantage if that table is controlled and a hazard if it is not. The web management interface is a second surface to secure alongside the MCP one.

It stops at the `AuthInfo` and the raw bearer token, and the README lists what stays with the consuming server: rate limiting, the scope and tool policy, the MCP transport, the SAP HTTP client's headers, and helmet-style hardening. The one piece of hardening it constrains rather than defers is the cross-origin opener policy, which it deliberately leaves unset because popup-based OAuth breaks under it. It is ESM-only on Node 22 or later and shares the host's Express and MCP SDK instances as peer dependencies, so a server on Express 4 cannot take it.

Last released January 2022 at 0.0.21, against a passport strategy Microsoft has since deprecated.

It is a bundle rather than a plugin with one job, and a single release from March 2026 — depending on it for the query helpers brings the auth and validation layers too.

Not where the system must not trust whatever the source trusts: the README states that you must trust the source, currently Mozilla, because the system can then reach every website holding a certificate generated by a root CA that source supplies. It installs those root CAs automatically, and the maintainer marks the tool use at own risk.

Not for anything important, which is the maintainer's own instruction: the README's Warning section calls it stupid to write your own encryption or PGP library, says abapPGP will most certainly contain severe bugs, and points instead at established PGP software such as [OpenPGP](http://openpgp.org/). Signing is the only scope it states.

It is a bundle rather than a plugin with one job, and a single release from March 2026 — depending on it for the query helpers brings the auth and validation layers too.

It audits through npm: a project that resolves its dependencies with another package manager, or has no `package.json`, has nothing for it to run. What it reports is what `npm audit` knows, so a vulnerability outside the npm advisory data is not in its table.