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Building trusted applications on SAP Business AI Platform by design
Building cloud applications on SAP Business AI Platform with security and compliance built in: the identity, connectivity, governance and security services SAP groups under the platform, secure-by-design development, and authorisation and access controls for AI agents. The edges are to AuthorizationAuthorizationDeciding who may read or change what, at service, entity and instance level — role checks, forwarded user context, and restrictions evaluated as query filters rather than after the fact.SAP and community, unassessed and to Tool governanceTool governanceControlling what an agent may call, with which authorisations, and leaving an audit trail of what it did. The authorisation question that MCP exposure raises but does not answer.SAP and community, unassessed, the concern of what an agent may call with which authorisations; the abstract names the service categories and no service by name. A TechEd 2026 session (Wednesday 28 October, Berlin), presented by Christian Cohrs and Regine Schimmer, written here from SAP's abstract; the recording is not yet published.
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AuthorizationAuthorizationDeciding who may read or change what, at service, entity and instance level — role checks, forwarded user context, and restrictions evaluated as query filters rather than after the fact.Tool governanceTool governanceControlling what an agent may call, with which authorisations, and leaving an audit trail of what it did. The authorisation question that MCP exposure raises but does not answer.
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Developing authorizations for business users in SAP Business AI Platform, ABAP environmentDeveloping authorizations for business users in SAP Business AI Platform, ABAP environmentA Devtoberfest 2026 session that walks the places an authorization check has to be written when a RAP business object is implemented, which is the whole of the authorization edge: read restrictions as DCL access controls that become a filter at query time, a child entity inheriting its parent's conditions through an association, the projection layer inheriting rather than changing them, and the same check repeated on the draft side. The ABAP CDS edge holds on that draft half — until 2608 a draft query view was needed above the draft table so a DCL had something to attach to, while a draft table entity is already on CDS level and takes the DCL directly, as long as the associations used in the inherited conditions are redefined on it. Create, update and delete are then taken handler by handler, including the trap that instance authorization reads the buffer and so cannot see the new value a pre-check would reject, and the session closes on in local mode and privileged EML calls.published 2026-10-12
Powering Enterprise-Ready Agentic AI with SAP Integration SuitePowering Enterprise-Ready Agentic AI with SAP Integration SuiteA Devtoberfest 2026 session (INT-31) from SAP Integration Suite product management on the MCP gateway. The demo creates an MCP server in a design package from an API already deployed on the tenant, exposes two of its 300-odd resources as tools, attaches authentication and quota policies on a policies tab, and publishes the deployed endpoint as an AI product in Developer Hub of API Management, where an agent subscribes and receives a token, URL, key and secret; the calls then show up in monitoring, in message processing logs and in the analytics dashboard, which is the MCP exposure and the tool governance the edges rest on. Three AI features inside Cloud Integration follow: a content migration agent that converts a PI/PO Java mapping into a Groovy script and generates a second integration flow for its lookup, memory profiling during a flow simulation, and root-cause analysis on a failed message processing log.SAP Developers, published 2026-10-07
From APIs to Agent Tools: How MCP Gateway changes what Integration meansFrom APIs to Agent Tools: How MCP Gateway changes what Integration meansThe opening session of the Devtoberfest 2026 integration track, in which two product managers for SAP Integration Suite set out why the suite puts an MCP gateway between agents and backend systems, and then build one. The demo turns an HTTP endpoint and its OpenAPI specification into MCP tools on the integration cell runtime, does the same on top of an existing API-centric integration, and shows the policies tab where authentication through an external provider, quotas, spike arrest and IP filtering sit, plus the trace of the JSON-RPC calls in monitoring and the agent they are earmarked against in analytics. That is where the serve your application over MCP and tool governance edges hold; RFCs and BAPIs as sources are stated as supported, and MCP federation, custom domains and edge integration cell as roadmap.SAP Developers, published 2026-09-23
No-Code MCP Servers with SAP Integration Suite: From REST API to AI AgentNo-Code MCP Servers with SAP Integration Suite: From REST API to AI AgentWalks through turning a deployed API artifact into a no-code MCP server in SAP Integration Suite's MCP Gateway: the API artifact's OpenAPI spec must be version 3.0.0-3.0.3, since Swagger 2.0 is rejected, and its backend is reached through a BTP Destination using OAuth2ClientCredentials so the agent calling the server never sees the backend secret. The API artifact's own Authorization policy sets an OAuth scope and Trust Upstream MCP Authorization, and the gotcha list traces a 403 on a valid token to that policy rather than to authentication, before the finished MCP server is published through Developer Hub and connected to Claude Code.eddiedu, published 2026-09-15
Building and Consuming an MCP Server in SAP Integration Suite - Connecting it to Claude and JouleBuilding and Consuming an MCP Server in SAP Integration Suite - Connecting it to Claude and JouleA hands-on walkthrough of building a native MCP server artifact on SAP Integration Suite's Integration Cell runtime: an API artifact built from an OpenAPI 3.0 specification (the author converted the SAP Business Accelerator Hub's Swagger 2.0 OData spec) through API Management policies, with the MCP artifact's own Authorization policy set to the api.invoke scope for Developer Hub credentials or a custom role such as ESBMessaging.send for BTP OAuth credentials. The same server is then wired to Claude as a custom connector over an OAuth redirect, and to a Joule Studio agent through BTP destinations carrying the sap.mcp.tools.enabled property, with three worked agents (CPI monitoring, a SuccessFactors testing flow, IDoc reprocessing) run from both.Padmanathan_Vijayan, published 2026-09-11
ABAP + MCP: Let AI Do Real Development in Your SAP SystemABAP + MCP: Let AI Do Real Development in Your SAP Systemabap-adt-mcp is an open-source MCP server that gives an AI agent full ABAP development capability over ADT: it searches, reads, edits, activates and unit-tests objects, and runs ATC checks, on a connected S/4HANA Cloud or on-premise system, acting as the signed-in developer. It runs on abap-adt-api, the same REST client Eclipse's own ADT tooling uses, and sits beside SAP's own ADT MCP Server, shipped with ADT for VS Code and Eclipse under a different server key, and marianfoo's abap-docs, a read-only server over the ABAP Keyword Documentation and Clean ABAP. Each destination carries a policy — read-only, allowed packages, denied tables and tools — the server checks before every call, and an optional audit file logs each tool call with its outcome and policy gate.Willian_Saez, published 2026-09-03
Running AI agents against SAP ECC 6.0: lessons from building an in-system MCP serverRunning AI agents against SAP ECC 6.0: lessons from building an in-system MCP serverNicolasHernandez recounts building and running, over two years, an MCP server written in plain ABAP behind a single ICF node, for SAP ECC 6.0 and S/4HANA on-premise customers that the ADT MCP Server and SAP Joule for Developers, ABAP AI capabilities do not reach. Authorization runs as the calling user rather than a technical RFC user, a choice forced by a customer security team after an earlier version used a technical RFC user, and a later security review found a display-authority check applied uniformly across every write endpoint. The failure modes that cost the most time sat in RFC connectivity itself: RFC_READ_TABLE's empty-table exception collapsed into a false success, a where-used filter was applied only after the row limit, and BAPI calls treated an empty string and an absent parameter as different, silently wrong inputs.NicolasHernandez, published 2026-08-28
Agentic AI & AI AgentsAgentic AI & AI AgentsSAP's target picture for AI agents: Joule as the engagement layer — Joule Work, Joule Assistants, Joule Agents — with custom agents from customers, partners and SAP teams connecting through A2A for agent-to-agent collaboration and MCP for tool connectivity, on the SAP Business AI Platform. It says up front that parts are not generally available yet, in particular bidirectional communication with third-party agents through the Agent Gateway, so it reads as direction with the building blocks named rather than a design to copy today.published 2026-08-27
Named-User Attribution Across BTP Subaccounts: A Two-Hop IAS Token Exchange for Cloud IntegrationNamed-User Attribution Across BTP Subaccounts: A Two-Hop IAS Token Exchange for Cloud IntegrationA central BTP application that manages Cloud Integration across subaccounts with client_credentials collapses every user into one technical service principal: target subaccounts' role collections are bypassed and the audit log names a service key instead of a person. The post works through a two-hop exchange — an IAS app-to-app hop, then the target subaccount's XSUAA jwt-bearer hop — that carries the calling user's own identity across the subaccount boundary through a shared Cloud Identity Services tenant, so the target subaccount enforces the user's own role collection and records their identity in the audit log. It walks through the IAS app-dependency setup, the AppRouter and SAP Destination service configuration the exchange needs, and states the pattern applies to any XSUAA-protected service in a separate subaccount, not only Cloud Integration.agnissh, published 2026-08-24
MCP Servers are the New Z-TablesMCP Servers are the New Z-TablesA single CAP service exposed as three overlapping MCP servers tools, queried by the same prompt nineteen times, returned the same tool every time — evidence, the author argues, that tool selection rests on the resemblance between a prompt and a tool's description rather than on any binding a where-used list could enumerate before retiring it. It contrasts that setup with @cap-js/mcp, which exposes a whole service as three generic tools instead of one per operation, and quotes the adapter's own beta documentation admitting no rate limiting, audit logging, input validation or approval workflow, and no use as a gateway to SAP Application APIs. From there it names four small Tool governance practices it has adopted: an owner recorded in the tool's own metadata, logging every invocation, deprecating inside the description, and exposing fewer tools.published 2026-08-21
Connecting a Custom MCP Server to Joule Work Desktop: A Seamless and Secure Authentication FlowConnecting a Custom MCP Server to Joule Work Desktop: A Seamless and Secure Authentication FlowWalks through connecting a custom MCP server to Joule Work Desktop: a Dynamic Client Registration handshake (RFC 7591) followed by an Authorization Code + PKCE flow through the organisation's SSO via XSUAA or IAS, so authentication establishes the human identity that Joule then attaches to every subsequent tool call. That forwarded identity lets the BTP backend apply its existing authorization checks and row-level data filtering instead of a second permission model, and a role change in XSUAA revokes access on the next token refresh.published 2026-08-17
RAP - Feature Control (Part 2)RAP - Feature Control (Part 2)Implements a reusable AUTHORITY-CHECK wrapper class and wires it into a RAP behaviour implementation's Feature Control, both the static global check on Create and the instance-based, partner-scoped checks on Update and Delete, so that an authorization decision greys out an action in the Fiori UI rather than only rejecting it after the save. Part two of the author's Sales App series, it also flags a newer, more strictly typed Feature Control flag SAP introduced since the first article, since using the older type produces a warning and can leave a flag silently without effect.Björn S., published 2026-08-14
BTP - Restriction TypeBTP - Restriction TypeWalks through creating a Restriction Type and Restriction Field for an ABAP RAP authorization object, so the values an IAM app would otherwise fix as static entries can instead be maintained per Business Role in the Fiori Launchpad. Read and Write access on the restriction still follow the activities defined on the authorization object itself (03 for read, 01/02/06 for write), and the piece shows the effect end to end: a Fiori app narrowed to only the business partners assigned on the role. This is the ABAP door's authorization mechanism made dynamic — an access decision moved from the IAM app's fixed values onto the role, without touching the underlying CDS access control.Björn S., published 2026-08-11
BTP - Authorization ObjectBTP - Authorization ObjectWalks through building a classic ABAP authorization object for the ABAP environment — an authorization field, the object itself created in ABAP Development Tools rather than the classic SU21 transaction, and its activities (01 create, 02 change, 03 display, and others) — then wires it into a CDS role's access control with the pfcg_auth aspect on the WHERE condition, which is authorization's ABAP form: CDS access control limiting what a view entity returns to the conditions in a CDS role. The check inherits down to a consumption view and even the Data Preview, and the piece notes the WITH PRIVILEGED ACCESS addition developers use in the SQL console to bypass it while testing.Björn S., published 2026-08-07
Securing a CAP Node.js App with SAP AMS on BTP Cloud FoundrySecuring a CAP Node.js App with SAP AMS on BTP Cloud FoundryThe end-to-end version: a CAP Node.js project from cds init, role-based access through the Authorization Management Service and Identity Authentication Service, and an MTA deployment to Cloud Foundry. The prerequisite list is the useful part to read first — HANA Cloud, an IAS tenant and an AMS entitlement — because it says plainly what this path costs before you are three steps into it.Jacky Liu, published 2026-07-17
From SAP Integration Suite iFlow to MCP Tools: Exposing OData APIs to AI AgentsFrom SAP Integration Suite iFlow to MCP Tools: Exposing OData APIs to AI AgentsBuilds an MCP Server artifact inside SAP Integration Suite's Integration Cell runtime that fronts a Northwind OData V4 API through a Cloud Integration iFlow, turning each OpenAPI operation into a tool an agent can call. Walks through the OAuth2 client-credentials flow against XSUAA and the authorization policy scope — ESBMessaging.send in place of the default API.invoke — that gates access to the MCP server, then tests the server from Claude Code.published 2026-07-14
Building MCP Servers with SAP Integration Suite: What to Design, Not Just How to ConnectBuilding MCP Servers with SAP Integration Suite: What to Design, Not Just How to ConnectArgues that the tool design, not the connection, is the hard part of putting an API in front of an agent. Works one request — create a customer — through eight endpoint-shaped tools, where the agent carries ids between calls and rebuilds the business rules each run, then through a single intent-shaped create_customer that hides the sequence; and says what separates the two: a business operation for a name, parameters a caller can supply without a lookup, the rules in the server rather than the prompt, and a description written for an agent choosing a tool. The SAP Integration Suite half is short — three creation paths, an iFlow behind the API artifact when a tool has to cross systems — and it closes on a checklist to run before publishing.published 2026-07-07
HANA AI Toolkit — Local MCP ServerHANA AI Toolkit — Local MCP ServerAn MCP server that turns the hana-ml Python library into governed tools an agent can call against a HANA Cloud instance, shipped in the hana-ai toolkit and exposed over stdio, SSE and streamable HTTP. Its one firm rule is attributable execution: an audit module writes the MCP-side identity — agent, model, session, tool, redacted arguments — into the HANA connection before any SQL runs, and fails the call if that write fails. A worked example of governance on an MCP tool surface, from SAP's data side rather than CAP's.published 2026-06-15
Effective from June 30th 2026 - XSUAA Deprecation of GET Method for OAuth Token RetrievalEffective from June 30th 2026 - XSUAA Deprecation of GET Method for OAuth Token RetrievalEffective June 30th 2026, the SAP Authorization and Trust Management service (XSUAA) deprecates the HTTP GET method for retrieving an OAuth access token from its /oauth/token endpoint, leaving only POST supported in line with RFC 6749. A client still requesting a token via GET with grant_type and credentials in the query string stops working after the cutover and must switch to a POST request with form-encoded body parameters.Yogananda, published 2026-06-14
From XSUAA to AMS: Architecting S4HANA CAP Extensions with Policy-Based AuthorizationFrom XSUAA to AMS: Architecting S4HANA CAP Extensions with Policy-Based AuthorizationWhy scope-based authorization runs out, argued from enterprise extension work rather than from the documentation: XSUAA handles roles well, but real requirements are business-context restrictions — country, company code, organisational unit — and expressing those as scopes does not scale. The migration to policy-based authorization is presented as an architectural move for S/4HANA extensions rather than a configuration change.Avinash Vaidya, published 2026-05-27
How to Restrict CRUD Operations in SAP CAPM Using @Capabilities, @readonly and Test APIs with .httpHow to Restrict CRUD Operations in SAP CAPM Using @Capabilities, @readonly and Test APIs with .httpEntities are exposed with full CRUD by default, and this is how to take operations away again — @Capabilities for Insert, Update and Delete individually, @readonly for the blunt version. Tested with .http files rather than a UI, which keeps the check on the service.DeepaRagho, published 2026-05-22
Dynamic authorisation with user attributes in SAP CAP and AMSDynamic authorisation with user attributes in SAP CAP and AMSThe same argument as the XSUAA-to-AMS piece, opened from a concrete failure: an acquisition puts 500 users on sales data restricted by division, and role-based access control answers it with Sales_Manager_EMEA, Sales_Manager_APAC and so on until the roles multiply past managing. Attribute-based authorisation replaces the set with one policy carrying a restriction, and the post walks through defining it in AMS against Cloud Identity Services. The clearest statement of role explosion among the three AMS pieces here.pedro_iranzo, published 2026-05-04
Agentic AI on BTP: a Single Agent with LangGraphAgentic AI on BTP: a Single Agent with LangGraphA CAP TypeScript agent puts a LangGraph StateGraph in front of AzureOpenAiChatClient from @sap-ai-sdk/langchain, reaching SAP AI Core's Generative AI Hub, and lets its tool-calling loop draw on five deployed MCP servers — OData MCP Proxy, CI MCP Server, AI Core MCP Server, BTP MCP Server and BTP CF MCP Server — through @langchain/mcp-adapters' MultiServerMCPClient. Because agent, servers and APIs share one XSUAA tenant, the chat service forwards the signed-in user's own JWT instead of a service account, so each downstream server enforces that user's own authorizations. Past roughly a hundred combined tools the single prompt slows down and stops separating concerns, which is why the author's next post splits it into one specialist agent per MCP server behind an orchestrator.published 2026-05-03
ARC-1 on SAP BTP: Secure ABAP Agentic Development Beyond the LaptopARC-1 on SAP BTP: Secure ABAP Agentic Development Beyond the LaptopThe BTP deployment of ARC-1: one Cloud Foundry app per SAP system, reached by MCP clients through XSUAA and reaching the backend through the SAP Destination service, the SAP Connectivity service and Cloud Connector, with a BasicAuth destination for startup probing and a Principal Propagation destination for per-user requests, and SAP_PP_STRICT=true so a propagation problem fails instead of falling back to the shared user. Tool governance is the three gates it spells out, the server ceiling set by environment variables, the user's permission from XSUAA role collections, OIDC scopes or API-key profiles, and the SAP backend authorisation, all of which must allow an action, and the staged rollout from read-only to writes in $TMP, then selected packages, then transport writes. It recommends the MTA deployment over Docker on Cloud Foundry or a buildpack push, treats BTP ABAP Environment as a separate service-key scenario with no Cloud Connector, and is not a full setup guide: the commands are left to the ARC-1 deployment docs.published 2026-04-29
ARC-1 on SAP BTP: Secure ABAP Agentic Development Beyond the Laptop
arc-1 has been through 3 major lines since this was published: 0.8 (2026-05), 0.9 (2026-05), 1 (2026-07). Affects A recipe.
Introducing ARC-1: A Secure ADT MCP Server for Enterprise SAP DevelopmentIntroducing ARC-1: A Secure ADT MCP Server for Enterprise SAP DevelopmentWhy ARC-1 exists beside earlier ADT MCP servers such as vibing-steampunk, fr0ster/mcp-abap-adt and dassian-adt: one centrally deployed instance per SAP system instead of a server on each developer laptop, with the MCP client to ARC-1 hop and the ARC-1 to SAP hop authenticated separately. It sets out the restrictive defaults (read-only, no free SQL or named table preview, writes confined to $TMP), the layering in which ARC-1's configuration, the user's role and SAP's own authorisation must all allow an action, Principal Propagation so SAP sees the real user, and audit events to the SAP Audit Log service; that is tool governance as much as agent access to your code. It leaves the BTP setup to the next part, and places ARC-1 beside SAP's ADT MCP Server, which SAP's configuration guide describes as a local HTTP server hosted by the IDE, and beside SAP API Policy 4.2026a, where ARC-1's stated position is to stay close to documented ADT behaviour and ask SAP before production use.published 2026-04-27
ABAP and Agentic AI: The Hidden Problem in Real ProjectsABAP and Agentic AI: The Hidden Problem in Real ProjectsAI in SAP development splits on three questions, how the model gets context, where writing happens and who controls the setup: UI5 and CAP work in local files where git, reviews, tests and pipelines already gate a change, while on-stack ABAP writes land directly in a shared development system. Six patterns follow, framed after a paper by Lars Hvam, from AI in the IDE to off-stack development with abapGit, and the post settles on a hybrid where the agent reads the system over ADT or MCP and writes through a gated git flow. Read access alone is put at maybe 80 percent of the work, and what agent access to your code still lacks is named as tool governance: read-only defaults, package restrictions, blocking free SQL, per-user identity and auditing.published 2026-04-22
Building an Enterprise-Ready SAP AI Agent with Open SourceBuilding an Enterprise-Ready SAP AI Agent with Open SourceA self-hosted chat agent for SAP systems: LibreChat as UI and orchestrator with Entra ID sign-in and SharePoint connected, a local LLM through Ollama, and two MCP servers, mcp-sap-docs for public documentation and the ADT MCP server vibing-steampunk for the system itself. The ADT server runs in its read-only mode under a technical user with display authorisations only, so the agent can find a function module and pull its source, or locate a RAP business object with its behaviour definition and projection view, but cannot change anything. Two workflows show it, explaining what BAPI_DISPUTE_CREATE does in one system and planning a RAP action from a PDF specification, where the generated ABAP is copied into Eclipse by hand; the full setup is in the marianfoo/llm-client-sap-system-integration-sharepoint repository.published 2026-03-03
SAP BTP XSUAA Security Configuration Comparison: Attribute-Based vs. Authority-Based ApproachesSAP BTP XSUAA Security Configuration Comparison: Attribute-Based vs. Authority-Based ApproachesTwo shapes of the same xs-security.json set against each other, with the resulting JWT printed for both. The consequence for application code is what makes it worth reading: under the attribute-based configuration a CAP handler reads req.user.attr.department, and under the authority-based one it does not, because the attribute is not there. Carries a migration guide between the two.rajeshkputumbaka, published 2026-02-18
Securing CAP Applications with SAP Cloud Identity Services and AMSSecuring CAP Applications with SAP Cloud Identity Services and AMSIdentity Authentication and AMS together as the current answer for a CAP application — authentication, single sign-on and the identity lifecycle on one side, policies on the other.gopalanand, published 2025-12-04
Authorization management with OpenSearch's Document Level Security - SAP Cloud LoggingAuthorization management with OpenSearch's Document Level Security - SAP Cloud LoggingWhere the predecessor SAP Application Logging service reused CF space permissions for read-only access, SAP Cloud Logging integrates with SAP Cloud Identity Services (IAS) and controls per-document visibility through OpenSearch's Document Level Security: an IAS group becomes a backend role, mapped to an OpenSearch role that carries a DLS query filter, so a search request only ever returns documents whose indexed field (space_name, organization_id, or another keyword field) matches what that role's filter allows. It walks through fixed per-space roles, a shared multi-space role using a terms query, and a single dynamic role that substitutes ${user.roles} into the filter so the match is against the caller's own groups, then lists operational pitfalls — wildcard index patterns breaking Dashboards, DLS roles that also hold write access creating log entries nobody can read back, and match queries against a .keyword field being non-deterministic where term queries are exact.Hariharan-Gandhi, published 2025-11-24
How to Check Fiori Apps Related Authorization Object MassHow to Check Fiori Apps Related Authorization Object MassA structured, table-driven method for mass-checking which authorization objects back a set of Fiori apps: map each Fiori App ID to its OData service, look up that service's hash in USOBHASH, then resolve the hash to its authorization objects (S_SERVICE, S_RFC, among others) in USOBTC. The author reports the method's limits in practice — apps built on a transaction code are already findable directly in USOBTC, and the same approach resolved only 5 of 300 Web Dynpro apps, which needed a manual catalog-and-hash workaround instead.MehmetSaidDemir, published 2025-10-07
Joule Studioがリリースされたので早速CAPアプリを自然言語で操作するカスタムスキルを構築してみたJoule Studioがリリースされたので早速CAPアプリを自然言語で操作するカスタムスキルを構築してみたA walkthrough of building a custom Joule Studio skill on a CAP bookshop app: cds add sample and cds add mta scaffold the project and its deployment descriptor, cds compile srv/ --to xsuaa generates the role template behind the @requires: 'admin' check on AdminService from the SAP Authorization and Trust Management service (XSUAA), and mbt build packages the app for deployment to the SAP BTP, Cloud Foundry Runtime. The skill reaches the deployed OData API through the SAP Destination service, configured with the OAuth2 Client Credentials grant using the client ID, secret and token endpoint from the app's XSUAA service key, so Joule answers a natural-language question about a book by its ID.takayuki_tanaka, published 2025-07-30
Securing SAP CAP Applications: XSUAA, Roles, and Authorization Best PracticesSecuring SAP CAP Applications: XSUAA, Roles, and Authorization Best PracticesWalks through securing a CAP service end to end: declaring scopes and role templates in xs-security.json for the SAP Authorization and Trust Management service (XSUAA), restricting CDS service definitions with @restrict per role, and dropping into handler code where a rule needs custom logic, with a @sap/cds Node.js example that tests roles through req.user.is and a Java one that tests scopes through hasScope. It closes in the BTP cockpit, where a role collection is assigned to users so that their JWT carries the scopes those checks read.Soumya-Pirlamarla, published 2025-07-14
How to Control the Visibility of CRUD and Custom Actions in Fiori Elements Based on AuthorizationHow to Control the Visibility of CRUD and Custom Actions in Fiori Elements Based on AuthorizationHiding Create, Edit and custom action buttons according to what the user may actually do — the join between the authorisation model and the annotations, which is where the two usually fail to agree and the UI offers something the service will refuse.published 2025-05-14
SAP IAM integration with SAP Cloud Identity ServicesSAP IAM integration with SAP Cloud Identity ServicesIdentity and access management for SAP SaaS in a landscape where SAP is one vendor among several: SAP Cloud Identity Services as the designated interface, single sign-on over SAML 2 and OIDC, identity lifecycle through SCIM 2 replication of users and groups, and authorization designed per domain — an S/4HANA role and a BTP role collection are different objects that both have to reach the user. Drawn from customer projects, and the source of what authentication here says about Cloud Identity Services.published 2025-05-13
CAPM Basics - Part 4CAPM Basics - Part 4Part 4 of a CAPM Basics series binds the deployed XSUAA and SAP HANA Cloud service instances with cds bind and runs the project against them from a laptop via cds watch --profile hybrid, the hybrid-testing loop @sap/cds-dk provides. It then restricts the service with @restrict (READ granted to a Viewer role, full access to Admin) and adds OData Capabilities restrictions plus @odata.draft.enabled so a Fiori elements client renders create, update and delete without UI code. It closes by adding a UI module with the SAP Fiori Generator, wiring an approuter via cds add approuter to forward the auth token, and updating the SAP Authorization and Trust Management service instance with the generated redirect URI before redeploying.archisman92, published 2025-05-10
CAP-JAVA implementation for Authorization Management Service (AMS)CAP-JAVA implementation for Authorization Management Service (AMS)Short and deliberately narrow: the author defers the concepts to kevin_li's post and writes only the CAP Java part — the development flow, designing the authorization model, and assigning and checking a policy. Read the other one first; this is the half that touches the code.Harvey_Yao, published 2024-12-27
Enabling Authorization Policies in SAP Cloud Identity Services - IAS with AMS/CAPEnabling Authorization Policies in SAP Cloud Identity Services - IAS with AMS/CAPAuthorization policies defined in Identity Authentication and consumed by a CAP application through AMS — the configuration half of the move away from XSUAA scopes, from the identity service's side rather than the application's.Yogananda, published 2024-12-27
Enabling Authorization Policies in SAP Cloud Identity Services - IAS with AMS/CAP
Authorization changed in CAP Java 3.7.1, 2025-01-30. Affects A recipe.
CAP for nodejs安全的暴露接口练习CAP for nodejs安全的暴露接口练习Starting from the risk-management sample, the walkthrough adds an open ExternalAPI service beside the existing RiskService, then moves every security annotation into a separate service-auth.cds file: @requires: authenticated-user on one entity, role-scoped @restrict grants for RiskViewer and RiskManager on another. It tests the unprotected action locally with cds watch, calling it from Postman with the session cookie read out of SAP Business Application Studio's preview tab. It then deploys to BTP and reads Risks with a client-credentials OAuth token fetched from a service key of the cpapp-auth instance, after changing that entity's READ grant from RiskViewer to authenticated-user, which the post, citing capire's CDS-based Authorization page, describes as a grant for a technical user integrating systems rather than for access from a front end.ArthurYang, published 2024-12-10
Authorization Management Service in SAP Cloud Identity ServiceAuthorization Management Service in SAP Cloud Identity ServiceStates the direction of travel plainly — BTP moving authorization management from XSUAA to AMS inside SAP Cloud Identity Service — and then explains what a policy is, which is the unit that replaces a scope. Split between authorization for Cloud Identity itself and for custom business applications, and it is the concept post the CAP Java write-up refers back to.kevin_li, published 2024-10-17
XSUAA Local TestingXSUAA Local TestingAdding XSUAA to a CAP project two ways, and then the part that is usually missing: getting the authorisation to behave on a laptop rather than only after deployment. The default authentication mechanism is the easy half; testing it without a landscape is the reason this exists.ManasaManu, published 2024-10-17
XSUAA Local Testing
Authorization has changed twice since this was published, most recently in CAP Java 3.7.1, 2025-01-30. Affects A recipe, Runnable code.
SAP CAP(Cloud Application Programming)开发框架概述SAP CAP(Cloud Application Programming)开发框架概述A Chinese-language walkthrough of CAP built mainly from CAPire's own "About CAP" page: CDS entities, associations, compositions and aspects for data modelling, with an extend Books with @restrict: [{ grant:'WRITE', to:'admin' }] aspect as its authorization example; CQL and CQN queries shown against both a local service and OData's $select/$expand; and the service-and-event model — this.on, this.emit, srv.on — that carries CAP's async processing. It closes with the author's own setup: installing @sap/cds-dk, scaffolding a bookshop project with cds init, and running it with cds watch against local SQLite, mocked authentication and file-based messaging standing in for HANA Cloud, IAS and Kafka.ArthurYang, published 2024-01-07
XSUAA Based Authentication - Using Managed ApprouterXSUAA Based Authentication - Using Managed ApprouterOne half of a pair published the same day, both starting from capire's list of authentication kinds and then going end to end on XSUAA. This is the managed approuter route, where the platform runs the router and the application supplies configuration rather than a module.rahul_rajagopal, published 2023-09-25
XSUAA Based Authentication - Using Managed Approuter
Authorization has changed twice since this was published, most recently in CAP Java 3.7.1, 2025-01-30. Affects A recipe.
XSUAA Based Authentication - Using Standalone ApprouterXSUAA Based Authentication - Using Standalone ApprouterThe other half: the same end-to-end XSUAA setup with an approuter you deploy and own. Published alongside the managed version, and the two are worth reading together because the difference between them is the whole decision.rahul_rajagopal, published 2023-09-25
[Part - 1] Enrich CAP based Services with Behaviors using Annotations[Part - 1] Enrich CAP based Services with Behaviors using AnnotationsWalks through CDS annotations that add behaviour beyond CRUD: @readonly and @insertonly take away write, update or delete on an entity or element, each shown with the OData metadata it generates. @mandatory, @assert.unique, @assert.integrity, @assert.format and @assert.range then enforce input checks that @sap/cds runs on write, with the SQL or HANA constraint @assert.unique compiles to and the error code each rejection returns. It names @restrict and @requires but defers them, calling authorization too large a topic for this post.published 2023-01-28
SAP Job Scheduling Service + Cloud Application Programming Model application (CAP) + SAP Authorization and Trust Management Service (XSUAA)SAP Job Scheduling Service + Cloud Application Programming Model application (CAP) + SAP Authorization and Trust Management Service (XSUAA)Calling an unsecured endpoint on a schedule is trivial; this is the same thing once the endpoint is protected. The interesting part is the caller — the Job Scheduling Service is not a person, so CAP's pseudo-roles are where the post spends its time, and $XSSERVICENAME has to match the scheduler's own instance name.former_member412792, published 2022-12-12
Useful CAP CDS and Fiori Commands to Accelerate Development and DeploymentUseful CAP CDS and Fiori Commands to Accelerate Development and DeploymentA command-by-command walkthrough of @sap/cds-dk's cds add and fiori add generators: cds add xsuaa writes an XSUAA security configuration from the CDS model's authorization annotations, and cds add hana together with cds deploy --to hana switches persistence from the default SQLite database to SAP HANA Cloud. cds add mta and fiori add deploy-config, from @sap/generator-fiori, build the Cloud Foundry deployment descriptor together, adding a destination-service block and an xs-app.json that routes the Fiori app's calls through a named destination.TiaXu, published 2022-10-19
Qualtrics integration with domain based authorization in CAP project on HANA cloudQualtrics integration with domain based authorization in CAP project on HANA cloudSurveys pulled from Qualtrics into a CAP application in real time, with the twist in the title: authorisation decided by the user's domain rather than by a role collection. A pattern that comes up whenever the audience is wider than the tenant.former_member69893, published 2022-09-30
Qualtrics integration with domain based authorization in CAP project on HANA cloud
Authorization has changed twice since this was published, most recently in CAP Java 3.7.1, 2025-01-30. Affects Runnable code.
An approach to secure multiple integrated SAP CAP java applications with a common XSUAA service instanceAn approach to secure multiple integrated SAP CAP java applications with a common XSUAA service instanceOne XSUAA instance across several CAP Java applications that call each other, rather than one per application. Short, and written from inside SAP Labs as something the author tried — the value is the shape of the arrangement, not a walkthrough.sreanik_dhanyakumar2, published 2022-09-14
SAP Business Technology Platform: Authorization and Trust Management ServiceSAP Business Technology Platform: Authorization and Trust Management ServiceWalks through how the SAP Authorization and Trust Management service secures a BTP application: scopes, attributes and role templates in the security descriptor, and the OAuth 2.0 resource-owner, client and resource-server roles it builds on. Covers the XSUAA microservice as the OAuth 2.0 authorization server bound to each application through its service broker, the signed JSON Web Token it issues after authentication, and the App Router's place in front of the resource apps as the gateway that starts authentication and checks for cross-site request forgery.SekhuteTK, published 2022-09-09
How to get authenticated user information with CAP in three different ways – Using the XSUAA APIHow to get authenticated user information with CAP in three different ways – Using the XSUAA APIThe third of three approaches the author sets out, and the one that returns the most: going to the XSUAA API directly rather than reading what CAP already put on the request. Depends on an earlier post for the project setup, so it starts mid-stream on purpose.ale_biagi, published 2022-07-18
Why developers should care about credential-types for xsuaa?Why developers should care about credential-types for xsuaa?Rotating secrets, argued from a habit rather than a feature: the author names the practice implicit in many beginner tutorials — lifting a secret out of a binding to use it elsewhere — and notes CAP has features that make it unnecessary in development. Then the three credential types side by side, configured on a CAP application's uaa resource in mta.yaml and through a deployment extension.former_member2839, published 2022-07-05
Why developers should care about credential-types for xsuaa?
Authorization has changed twice since this was published, most recently in CAP Java 3.7.1, 2025-01-30. Affects A recipe, Runnable code.
Insights of Cloud SDK, CAP, XSUAA, SSH and other BTP topics from 2021Insights of Cloud SDK, CAP, XSUAA, SSH and other BTP topics from 2021A year in review, and one section in it is the reason it is here: "CAP isn't the solution for everything" — the author's point being that a pure UI5 or Fiori application does not need a CAP service wrapped around it, and that an approuter or the HTML5 Application Repository may be the better answer. The XSUAA section is a complaint about complexity rather than a guide, which is also worth having on the record.dr_vup, published 2021-12-30
Developing Business Services with Cloud Application Programming(CAP) Model in SAP Business StudioDeveloping Business Services with Cloud Application Programming(CAP) Model in SAP Business StudioA step-by-step build of a CAP Node.js service in SAP Business Application Studio: a CDS schema for banks, customers, accounts and transactions using compositions, associations, enumerated types and the @assert.unique constraint, followed by authorization layered on with @restrict and @requires annotations and mock users assigned the authenticated-user and Manager roles in .cdsrc.json. Custom event handlers registered through @sap/cds (srv.before/srv.after) and sample HTTP requests round out the example.Ranjith, published 2020-05-27
Understanding security approaches in SAP CAP using XSUAA in node.js flavor and MTA.Understanding security approaches in SAP CAP using XSUAA in node.js flavor and MTA.The long version, from the MTA project outward: what the deployment descriptor has to contain, how the authentication flow actually runs, and then the npm modules doing the work — @sap/xssec and @sap/xsenv named and explained rather than left as dependencies. Old, and the module names have moved on, but the flow it draws has not.balbinosoares, published 2020-03-16
Understanding security approaches in SAP CAP using XSUAA in node.js flavor and MTA.
Authorization has changed twice since this was published, most recently in CAP Java 3.7.1, 2025-01-30. Affects A recipe, Runnable code.
Using Postman for API Testing with XSUAAUsing Postman for API Testing with XSUAAA way to get a JWT without routing traffic through the approuter and picking the token out of it. The author walks the alternatives first — redirect through the router, intercept the token — and says what is wrong with each, before requesting the token from the service directly.mariusobert, published 2020-03-02
How SAP secures enterprise AI agents with identity propagationHow SAP secures enterprise AI agents with identity propagationCloud Identity Services as the identity layer for AI agents as well as people: the abstract states that both are managed in one directory, that user context is propagated by token exchange, and that authorisation is enforced at every hop, so no agent holds back-end credentials. Agents from Microsoft, Google and partners take the same flow through the agent gateway. Token exchange across a hop is the authentication side and the per-hop check the authorisation side; what the agent gateway is, and whether it is a product, the abstract does not say. A TechEd 2026 session (Wednesday 28 October, Berlin), presented by Gunnar Kosche and Sebastian Ries, written here from SAP's abstract; the recording is not yet published.
Agentic Engineering for SAP BTP ExtensionsAgentic Engineering for SAP BTP ExtensionsAn agent harness coordinates code generation across isolated Git worktrees, using a skills registry, SAP CAP MCP Server, Fiori MCP Server and UI5 Web Components MCP Server for development context. The diagram shows LiteLLM as a model proxy in front of SAP AI Core, while automated checks and review gate the generated changes. The worked scenario is CAP-based extensions on BTP, with specifications written before generation and reusable skills governed across teams.
Third-Party MCP Server Access to SAP Solutions on BTPThird-Party MCP Server Access to SAP Solutions on BTPDescribes external MCP servers and custom servers on BTP, assigning their operators responsibility for authentication, scoped identity, API limits, logging and lifecycle. The permitted use remains conditional on the SAP API Policy, while SAP Integration Suite and Joule Studio are described as SAP-provided paths. Hosting a server on BTP does not automatically supply its governance controls.Dhawal Joshi, Harut Ter-Minasyan, Mirko Günther
Agentic AI Security & GovernanceAgentic AI Security & GovernanceNames seven threat categories agentic AI introduces beyond ordinary application security: prompt injection, excessive agency, supply-chain and model-integrity compromise, memory poisoning, improper output handling, resource abuse and agent-to-agent communication poisoning. Its answer is a defence-in-depth structure of security controls, input validation, privilege management, supply-chain checks, memory segmentation, output validation, execution quotas, secure communication, paired with governance and oversight: audit logging, explainability, human-in-the-loop review, fairness assessment and continuous monitoring. States the reason plainly: an agent decides, chains actions across turns, keeps memory between them and can act on real systems, a different risk profile from a single request-response call. That is the authorisation and audit-trail question tool governance is named for.
OData entity as a governed query surface for agents, not a toolOData entity as a governed query surface for agents, not a toolAn OData entity, generated from the annotations a service already carries, as the surface an agent queries over SAP data: filterable, selectable and sortable fields, authorisation injected on the server side, and a bound query cost, instead of the entity as a tool. SAP's abstract sets this against the MCP gateway in SAP Integration Suite, where exposing an API is the easy part and getting an agent to pick the right one is not, which is the tool governance concern read through OData. A TechEd 2026 session (Wednesday 28 October, Berlin), presented by Aleksandr Ivanov and Evgenii Shirokikh, written here from SAP's abstract; the recording is not yet published.
Govern AI-supported actions across enterprise systemsGovern AI-supported actions across enterprise systemsGoverning what an AI agent may do once it takes business actions across enterprise systems, which is the Tool governance concern, with SAP Integration Suite as the place it is enforced. The abstract lists the mechanisms, scoped APIs, event-driven workflows, runtime policy enforcement, exception handling and observability across SAP and third-party systems, and names no Integration Suite feature behind any of them. A TechEd 2026 session (Tuesday 27 October, Berlin; also IN200V, virtual), presented by Finny Babu and Piyush Gakhar, written here from SAP's abstract; the recording is not yet published.
Model context protocol (MCP) unlocked: Enable governed access to AI agentsModel context protocol (MCP) unlocked: Enable governed access to AI agentsThe MCP Gateway in SAP Integration Suite: the place policy, security and analytics are applied to a curated set of MCP tools before an AI agent reaches enterprise tools and APIs through it, tool governance done in the integration layer and agent access to your systems routed through one gateway. The abstract names the gateway and its three functions and does not say how tools are curated, which policies exist or how the agent authenticates. A TechEd 2026 session (Tuesday 27 October, Berlin), presented by Bruno Renzo, Emily Mui, Markus Winter and Sunny Kapoor, written here from SAP's abstract; the recording is not yet published.
Intelligent, governed, and agentic integrations with SAP Integration SuiteIntelligent, governed, and agentic integrations with SAP Integration SuiteSAP Integration Suite positioned as the control plane that connects and governs agentic workflows across SAP and third-party systems, set against the abstract's claim that exposing back ends directly to AI brings security, compliance and cost risks. That governing role is the Tool governance concern; the abstract promises recent innovations and names none. A TechEd 2026 session (Wednesday 28 October, Berlin), presented by Finny Babu and Piyush Gakhar, written here from SAP's abstract; the recording is not yet published.
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Authorizationcapability, core and community
Tool governancecapability, core and community
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