Everything in the atlas

The manifest calls it a dummy library exposing custom CDS annotations, but the published contents are a one-line README, a single exported barrier() whose body is throw Error("not yet implemented"), and no .cds file at all — there is nothing to import and nothing to annotate with. No repository, one release, May 2025.

Release and repository quiet for 39 months.

Tied to a specific training repository and last released August 2023. The repository the package declares has been deleted — verified against the GitHub API, not just a failed fetch. The package is still on npm, so it installs; the source it was published from is no longer readable, which is a harder thing to discover than a stale version number.

There is no repository and no README: what the eight commands do is only readable from the compiled dist that ships in the package. Three of them — npmrc, install, project — are written for "SimpleMDG" projects rather than for CAP generally, so the reusable part is bind-local, run-local and debug. Seven releases up to July 2026. Its binding step writes the resolved VCAP_SERVICES into default-env.json in the project, where [@sap/cds-dk](artifact:sap-cds-dk) keeps only the place the credentials can be fetched from, so a project using it needs that file kept out of version control.

Quiet Release and repository quiet for 27 months.

Functional boundary Not a test-data factory. It writes files at build time to seed a database, so it does not build fixtures inside a unit test. The declared peer range stops at cds 7 — nothing says it fails on 9, but nothing says it was tried either.

Last released April 2024.

Everything it checks is a name: a file name under `rootDir`, or an identifier a parser extracted from a file, so a convention that cannot be written as a regex over one name has no rule shape here. Content rules targeting `.hdbanalyticalprivilege` or `.hdbconstraint` return no results, which the README states as not yet implemented, so conventions centred on those two artifact types go unchecked.

The declared repository is github.com/your-username/urp-vocab, an unedited placeholder. Three releases, September 2025.

It targets the Application Frontend service only — not the HTML5 application repository — fixes authentication to IAS, and always creates new service instances, so reusing existing ones means editing the generated `mta.yaml` afterwards. Version 0.1.0 is the only release.

Release and repository quiet for 36 months.

Release and repository quiet for 66 months.

The version list comes from ui5.sap.com, so a build that cannot reach it has nothing to match the project's version against. It checks the version written in `ui5.yaml`; a framework version a deployed app loads from elsewhere is outside what it sees.

Release and repository quiet for 50 months.

Driving the GUI reaches whatever a user can reach, which is business data and not a development surface. Decide what an agent may do in a session before granting one, not after. Windows only. The HTTP transport is meant for team use but binds to localhost, and unattended multi-user operation is listed as not yet available — a limitation and also the safer default.

Not reachable Not reachable since 2026-10-20.

Functional boundary What it exposes is whatever somebody put in the configuration table, which moves the governance question inside the SAP system and out of the server — an advantage if that table is controlled and a hazard if it is not. The web management interface is a second surface to secure alongside the MCP one.

Real SAP calls need the proprietary [SAP NetWeaver RFC SDK](external:sap-nw-rfc-sdk) and the `pyrfc==3.3.1` release the README calls archived and yanked, on Python 3.11, so without those only the demo backend answers. Not over HTTP as it stands: credentials are read from the environment for stdio, and the README says not to expose the server over HTTP without implementing the MCP authorization specification and deployment-level rate limiting. Multi-tenant auth and RBAC beyond the one server-wide policy, rate limiting, metrics and tracing, and deployment packaging are listed as not built. The result limits protect the client and not the system, since the README states they cannot reduce work already performed inside SAP, and the MCP tool annotations that describe read and write risk are advisory metadata rather than an authorisation boundary, so the service account's `S_RFC` and table authorisations are still what decides.

On ECC the S/4HANA `API_*` services that the three convenience readers default to do not exist, so each one has to be pointed at a Z service of your own or replaced by the RFC tools. `read_table` inherits `RFC_READ_TABLE`'s 512-byte row, so a wide table needs an explicit field list and some fields cannot be selected at all, and the bridge starts a Node process and a fresh logon per call, with no pooling. The audit log is one line per call that includes the call arguments, so every filter and WHERE clause sent to SAP is written to a file that then has to be handled as sensitive.

Reach is the reason to use it and the reason to be careful: reading cluster tables and spool output goes well past what a development tool is normally pointed at. Decide what an agent may reach before granting it, not after.

It is not the framework and takes no framework fixes: those belong upstream in abap2UI5, and nothing under `src/`, `downport/`, `output/` and `build/` here is a source file. The build is frozen on pinned commits with no scheduled rebuild, so it does not show what abap2UI5 main does today, samples in subfolders of the samples repository are excluded because they require a real SAP system, and a known upstream transpiler issue leaves `check_on_init( )` always false, so backend-built view XML may not be returned.

Universal mode trades discoverability for size: one generic tool is harder for a model to pick correctly than a named one, which is why it is not the default. On a small service, standard mode is the better answer.