Everything in the atlas
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Group by: Capability
Value-help recommendations and SAP AI Core as a CAP service
LangChain vector store on SAP AI Core Document Grounding
LangChain vector store with CDS entities for embeddings
CAP Node.js runtime
CAP service kind putting eleven model providers behind one API
Vector storage and similarity search on SAP HANA from CAP
Generative AI in CAP with fields anonymised through SAP HANA
Not where the records sit anywhere but [SAP HANA Cloud](artifact:btp-hana-cloud): the similarity search and the single retrieval method are both written against its vector engine, and the embeddings and the chat call go through [SAP AI Core](artifact:btp-ai-core), so a project without both has nothing here to call. Not where the dependency has to be an SAP-supported one either: the README states that the plugin is not an official SAP product and is published as a community contribution.
AI runtime on BTP with the Generative AI Hub
Managed SAP HANA database service on BTP
Provisioned per plan and per component, so capacity and cost are decisions taken before any model exists. And it is the database, not a warehouse — modelling, loading and cataloguing are the products above it, and reaching it directly bypasses every semantic they add.
Python library turning OData or HANA records into chunked documents
An early alpha release whose README says to pin the version and test recipes against non-production data first. HANA synchronisation is snapshot-only and does not reconcile deleted rows, so a document for a row deleted in the source stays in the index. A recipe's field allow-list does not decide what the service account may read: the README states that field allow-listing does not replace SAP authorization, and that the package infers no SAP module semantics, authorization scope or safe fields from table names. Only Business Partner has a built-in recipe, every other dataset needs a `KnowledgeRecipe` written for it, and [Qdrant](external:qdrant) local mode is stated to be for development and smaller indexes.
Vector database implemented in ABAP for document chunk retrieval
Event-driven RAG app with CAP, Cloud Integration and SAP HANA Cloud
Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.
CAP service computing embeddings with HANA Cloud vector_embedding
VECTOR_EMBEDDING in a CDS entity for FAQ similarity search
Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.
CAP samples embedding CSV rows into the SAP HANA Cloud vector store
Every CDS service in both samples is marked `@requires: 'any'` and left publicly accessible, which the README says simplifies the testing and deployment process, and it asks for proper authentication mechanisms to be applied in their place.
CAP samples running RAG similarity queries over SAP HANA Cloud vectors
Every CDS service in both samples is marked `@requires: 'any'` and left publicly accessible, which the README says simplifies the testing and deployment process, and it asks for proper authentication mechanisms to be applied in their place.
Sample implementations for AI-powered applications on SAP BTP
Workshop on HANA Cloud vector engine, Generative AI Hub and LangChain
CAP reference app for GenAI email support with RAG on HANA Cloud
CAP sample for semantic search with Generative AI Hub and HANA Cloud
CodeJam deploying an LLM on Generative AI Hub and building RAG
TechEd 2025 workshop on SAP HANA Cloud's AI capabilities
Exposes an annotated CDS service as an Agent-to-Agent agent
No public repository is declared on the package, so the README is the documentation.
API proxies with security and traffic policies and Developer Hub
Hub on SAP BTP putting several arc-1 instances behind one login
Archived The declared repository is archived.
Functional boundary With one SAP system the README says to point the client at that arc-1 directly. Version 1 exchanges tokens within a single subaccount, so backends spread across subaccounts are out; it keeps its session map in memory, so more than one instance needs sticky sessions or a shared store. It routes deterministically and runs no model, which is a different thing from an assistant that reasons across systems. The `/all` endpoint drops the per-connection isolation, and the maintainer's answer to that is a PROD backend set read-only at the SAP end rather than a tool surface that hides the writes.
MCP server for BW/4HANA modelling objects
Its README says it plainly and so does this entry: this is not a simulation, every tool call reaches a live BW system, and write operations produce real changes. BW modelling objects are the definition of a warehouse — the blast radius of a wrong one is every report built on it.
Toolkit turning a CAP service into tools for agent frameworks
Policy-checked MCP server for ABAP development over ADT
Development and sandbox systems only: the README warns against pointing it at production. Transport release is never executed, since the tool exists to show the policy stopping it, and separation of duties is checked against the `identity.approvers` list in the policy file rather than against SAP authorisations, so it holds as far as that file does and no further. The write path has been tested with ABAP classes and other object types may need adjustments, there is deliberately no tool that creates or deletes an object, and one server instance serves one SAP system.
MCP server calling RFC-enabled function modules behind an allowlist
Real SAP calls need the proprietary [SAP NetWeaver RFC SDK](external:sap-nw-rfc-sdk) and the `pyrfc==3.3.1` release the README calls archived and yanked, on Python 3.11, so without those only the demo backend answers. Not over HTTP as it stands: credentials are read from the environment for stdio, and the README says not to expose the server over HTTP without implementing the MCP authorization specification and deployment-level rate limiting. Multi-tenant auth and RBAC beyond the one server-wide policy, rate limiting, metrics and tracing, and deployment packaging are listed as not built. The result limits protect the client and not the system, since the README states they cannot reduce work already performed inside SAP, and the MCP tool annotations that describe read and write risk are advisory metadata rather than an authorisation boundary, so the service account's `S_RFC` and table authorisations are still what decides.
Skill assessing API usage against the SAP API Policy
It says so itself, in bold, and the atlas repeats it: not legal advice and not a compliance decision. Only SAP, your contract, or SAP support can answer bindingly, and the skill routes legal, commercial and roadmap questions there rather than guessing at them. Treat the output as evidence gathered, not as a verdict.
Claude Code plugin with an ABAP MCP server and write guards
It is a plugin for one server — its own — so it is a stack rather than a component. And the guard is only as good as the profile labels: a production system registered as `DEV` is a production system with the safety off.
Business data graph queried with OData V4 or GraphQL
LangGraph agent and UI5 chat screen over four BTP MCP servers
Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.
CAP agent writing reports into a shared SDM document workspace
SaaS front end over SAP AI Core
Integration service on BTP with Cloud Integration and API Management
Docker Compose IoT edge stack that connects to SAP BTP