Everything in the atlas

Not below SAP_BASIS 7.40 SP08, and not on [SAP S/4HANA Cloud Public Edition](external:sap-s4hana-cloud-public-edition) or [the SAP BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment), where the classic transport check, the report and job calls and the cluster table `INDX` it rests on do not exist and the maintainer names gCTS as the answer instead. Only on a development system where every developer is trusted: each developer's GitHub token is kept in a cluster table encrypted with a key held in the same table, so anybody who can run ABAP on that system can read both, and the separation between author and reviewer holds only as far as that trust does. Not where the gate has to be unconditional — `#NOREVIEW` in a request's short text skips the check for that request, `ZTR_DISABLED` switches it off for a system, a check that cannot reach GitHub lets the release go on, and nothing checks who writes the marker.

Not an end-user app: it reads from any table the user names and writes into tables of the Z/Y namespace, with no authorisation check of its own, so the README asks a project to add its own checks on `S_TABU_DIS`/`S_TABU_NAM` and to restrict who may run it before it is used beyond a development system. XLSX upload and download are not ready for ABAP Cloud yet, and of the upload apps only the JSON one writes the file's rows back to the database.

It sees [abap2UI5](artifact:abap2ui5-abap2ui5) only: the figures come from the framework's HTTP handler, its monitor hook and its draft table, so nothing outside abap2UI5 appears in them. The usage, error and performance tabs stay empty until the handler line is in place or the user exit sets `check_monitor_active`. Recording which employee used which application, when and how fast, is subject to works council co-determination in Germany (§ 87 (1) no. 6 BetrVG); user tracking is `HASH` by default, `NAME` stores user names, and the request recorder keeps the complete request and response of every roundtrip for two days by default.

Not on the [SAP BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment) or another cloud ABAP system: the maintainer states the tool is not cloud ready, because the data sources and system tables it reads CDS metadata from are not released for cloud development. It is designed for SAP S/4HANA on-premise or private cloud, and the shipped Fiori application is configured for A4H and developer systems.

`APP_TITLE` is not applied by the exit: the `title` field was removed from `z2ui5_if_ui5_exit=>ty_s_http_config` in abap2UI5 1.145.0, so an app that wants it as its browser tab title sets it while it runs. The live theme preview runs the frontend action `THEMING` / `setTheme` and needs UI5 1.118 or later; on an older release a saved theme applies with the next page load. The code is written for ABAP 7.50 and the README states there is no downported 7.02 version, no 702 branch and no workflow that builds one.

Stateful apps do not work through it: an app calling `client->set_session_stateful( )` needs the ICF session of the system it runs on, and the consumer opens a new HTTP connection per request without forwarding the `sap-contextid` header that addresses that session. Request headers do not cross either, and a user exit on the source system sees the path of the node `/sap/bc/z2ui5_http_srv` rather than the consumer's. For ABAP Cloud there is only the `cloud` branch, which the README describes as an unmaintained prototype from 2025-11, consumer side only and with no CI.

There is nothing to clone here: "Access is provided through a registration page. Once registered, you will receive access to the GitHub repository containing the agents, deployment guides, and documentation", and that repository answers 404 to anyone who has not registered, so neither the agent code nor the deployment guides can be read before the form is filled in. AWS states the agents are published as an unsupported solution, with customers responsible for testing and securing the code before deploying in production, and that they are intended for non-production SAP environments rather than production systems. The documentation link in the README is still a placeholder.

Not a system to run a business application on: there is no business application in it, and what it implements of the language, the dictionary and Gateway is a stated subset of each. It is a clean-room reimplementation of the `/IWBEP/` interfaces that bundles no SAP source and no standard DDIC, so a service that reads standard objects has nothing to read, and `ANORMALIES.md` records every place the runtime differs from SAP before any workaround is written.

For an app that calls `client->set_session_stateful( )`, which needs the ICF session of the system it runs on; apps keeping their state in the draft table, the abap2UI5 default, work unchanged. For an app that reads a request header through the user exit on the source system, because the consumer forwards method, body, path, query string and status, not headers.

Not on ABAP Cloud: the system tables and the classic Workbench APIs the screens use are not released for the ABAP Cloud language version, and there is no 7.02 version below the 7.50 floor either. Not where the full original function is needed, since only the listed transactions exist and about 300 buttons and fields are shown disabled. The authorization checks are rebuilt rather than the originals, which is why the README asks that the screens be tried with a restricted user on a sandbox before the ICF service is opened to more people.

Not as it stands on a system past development: it reads the contents of any table the user names without an authorisation check of its own, so access is bounded only by whatever restrictions exist on the underlying handler or service. The README asks for your own checks first, naming `AUTHORITY-CHECK` on `S_TABU_DIS`/`S_TABU_NAM`, and for a restriction on who may run the app. There is no 7.02 downport either, because the selection-screen dependency has no `702` branch.

It runs whatever SQL a user types without an authorisation check of its own, and the native path additionally uses ADBC, which bypasses ABAP authorisations and client separation; the README asks anyone running it beyond a development system to add authorisation checks and restrict who may start the app. The native console needs Standard ABAP, so on ABAP Cloud only the Open SQL console is available.

The app writes to whatever table is passed in the URL parameter `table` and carries no authorisation check of its own, so past a development system it needs authorisation checks added and a restriction on who may run it.

Where abapGit itself is not installed in the system, since every tool here acts on its repositories.