Everything in the atlas

Its README says it plainly and so does this entry: this is not a simulation, every tool call reaches a live BW system, and write operations produce real changes. BW modelling objects are the definition of a warehouse — the blast radius of a wrong one is every report built on it.

Ninety tools is a large surface to put in front of a model at once, and client-credentials OAuth means the tenant sees one identity rather than the person asking. Content transport and user management sit in the same tool list as reading a story.

Its own feature comparison marks connection pooling, automatic reconnect, active-active reads, client-side data encryption, statement distribution, Kerberos authentication, the hdbuserstore, promises and TypeScript types as [@sap/hana-client](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@sap/hana-client) only, so a service that wants a pool or a promise API writes both itself over a callback interface. OpenSSL is its one security provider where the other driver lists SAP CommonCryptoLib, OpenSSL and MSCrypto, and it runs on Node.js 18 or later.

Its README says it plainly and so does this entry: this is not a simulation, every tool call reaches a live BW system, and write operations produce real changes. BW modelling objects are the definition of a warehouse — the blast radius of a wrong one is every report built on it.

Ninety tools is a large surface to put in front of a model at once, and client-credentials OAuth means the tenant sees one identity rather than the person asking. Content transport and user management sit in the same tool list as reading a story.

It expects a real landscape, not just a project: a `.service.metadata` file naming the Mobile Services app, endpoint and destination, the Cloud Foundry CLI, and access to a BTP Cloud Foundry environment. From 0.4.0 macOS support is ARM64 only — Intel Macs are not supported — alongside Linux and Windows on x64 and ARM64.

Its README says it plainly and so does this entry: this is not a simulation, every tool call reaches a live BW system, and write operations produce real changes. BW modelling objects are the definition of a warehouse — the blast radius of a wrong one is every report built on it.

It administers a live Cloud Foundry landscape: `Apps`, `Organizations`, `Spaces`, `ServiceInstances` and `SecurityGroups` all carry create, update and delete alongside list and get. What a caller can reach is set by the role they hold, and the three templates in `xs-security.json` are MCPViewer for read, MCPEditor for read and write, and MCPAdmin for full administrative access.

It puts create, update and delete on business entities behind natural language. Whatever the destination's principal may change, an agent may change — and "create a new customer" is a sentence, not a form somebody signed off.

This is the database, not an application in front of it, so what an agent can read is whatever the connection user can read — the guardrails bound the shape of a query, not the sensitivity of what it returns. Grant the connection the rights you would grant a person.

Not for production: the README states local and development instances only, and the server refuses a HAC URL whose host is not private unless `HAC_ALLOW_REMOTE=true` overrides that guard. Masking applies to `config_get` only, so `logs_tail` and `monitoring_info` output, thread dumps included, is unmasked and may carry sensitive data, and whatever a tool returns goes to the MCP client and its model. Certificate checks are disabled whenever `HAC_INSECURE_TLS=true` is set, which the README names as typical for local HAC.

Universal mode trades discoverability for size: one generic tool is harder for a model to pick correctly than a named one, which is why it is not the default. On a small service, standard mode is the better answer.

It fronts APIs you already have; nothing here reads a system's source or model, and a config file is only as good as the entity sets somebody wrote into it. OData V2 is the query surface it names.

Ninety tools is a large surface to put in front of a model at once, and client-credentials OAuth means the tenant sees one identity rather than the person asking. Content transport and user management sit in the same tool list as reading a story.

Any run nobody is watching: the drawing tools work only while the draw.io canvas at `http://localhost:3000/` is open and connected, so there is no diagram to produce on a build agent or a server. Nothing checks the result either, because the maintainer keeps a diagram linter on the [roadmap](https://github.com/etosin/arc-draw#-roadmap) rather than in the release. The maintainer marks the status early at v0.x, installs it from source, and records testing with Claude Code alone.

Archived The declared repository is archived.

Functional boundary With one SAP system the README says to point the client at that arc-1 directly. Version 1 exchanges tokens within a single subaccount, so backends spread across subaccounts are out; it keeps its session map in memory, so more than one instance needs sticky sessions or a shared store. It routes deterministically and runs no model, which is a different thing from an assistant that reasons across systems. The `/all` endpoint drops the per-connection isolation, and the maintainer's answer to that is a PROD backend set read-only at the SAP end rather than a tool surface that hides the writes.

Its README says it plainly and so does this entry: this is not a simulation, every tool call reaches a live BW system, and write operations produce real changes. BW modelling objects are the definition of a warehouse — the blast radius of a wrong one is every report built on it.

It stops at the `AuthInfo` and the raw bearer token, and the README lists what stays with the consuming server: rate limiting, the scope and tool policy, the MCP transport, the SAP HTTP client's headers, and helmet-style hardening. The one piece of hardening it constrains rather than defers is the cross-origin opener policy, which it deliberately leaves unset because popup-based OAuth breaks under it. It is ESM-only on Node 22 or later and shares the host's Express and MCP SDK instances as peer dependencies, so a server on Express 4 cannot take it.

The maintainer states it is unofficial, not endorsed by SAP, and that it automates authenticated SAP web endpoints and browser session cookies in ways SAP's terms of service or an organisation's own policies may restrict. Password login is confined to `accounts.sap.com` and the standard SAP Cloud Identity Services tenant domains: a custom IAS domain, or a login that conditional authentication delegates to a corporate identity provider, fails closed before the password is filled and has to be completed through an interactive login instead.

A library a VS Code extension calls, not something installed and run on its own; there is no documented standalone CLI. No public repository either, so what it does is read from its own README rather than checked against source.

Specific to MDK metadata projects — nothing here builds or deploys a CAP service or a plain Fiori app. Closed-source, under SAP's own developer licence rather than a public repository.

Any run nobody is watching: the drawing tools work only while the draw.io canvas at `http://localhost:3000/` is open and connected, so there is no diagram to produce on a build agent or a server. Nothing checks the result either, because the maintainer keeps a diagram linter on the [roadmap](https://github.com/etosin/arc-draw#-roadmap) rather than in the release. The maintainer marks the status early at v0.x, installs it from source, and records testing with Claude Code alone.

The maintainer states it is unofficial, not endorsed by SAP, and that it uses authenticated Hub web and catalogue endpoints and browser session cookies in ways SAP's terms of service, SAP account terms or an organisation's own policies may restrict. The same README asks the reader not to use it for production, broad distribution or shared access without explicit approval, and says that installing it grants no permission to automate SAP services.

It needs an S-user with SAP Support Portal access, so there is nothing to search without a support contract behind the login. The maintainer states it uses private SAP APIs behind authentication, asks the reader to check whether that use breaches SAP's terms of service, and disclaims both liability and any guarantee that it keeps working. MFA is handled only by typing the code into a visible browser, so a headless deployment cannot complete a login that demands one.

What it returns is planning material, not a commitment, and the monorepo labels the server's role "future/planned features (planning only)". The maintainer also states it is unofficial, not endorsed by SAP, and that it uses authenticated Road Map Explorer web endpoints and browser session cookies in ways SAP's terms of service or an organisation's policies may restrict, with production, broad distribution and shared access called out as needing explicit approval. An account that requires MFA has to be bootstrapped once through a visible browser.