SAP Authorization and Trust Management service
The OAuth server behind a BTP application: issues the JWT the app checks, holds the scopes and role collections it checks against, and brokers trust to an identity provider. Bound, never installed.
Where it sits
What it declares
Every artifact
- Type
- Service
- Origin
- By SAP
As a service
- Plans
- 4
- Regions
- 46
- Support component
- BC-CP-CF-SEC-IAM
Connections
Establishing who is calling and making that identity available
Deciding who may read or change what, down to instance level
SAP's Node.js application router in front of business applications
Token validation and security context for XSUAA and IAS
UI5 app and CAP service copying role collections between subaccounts
MCP server with read tools over the SAP Cloud ALM APIs
Identity Authentication and Identity Provisioning as one tenant
XSUAA authentication stack for an MCP server on SAP BTP
OAuth2 token fetcher for a Cloud Foundry app's XSUAA binding
CAP services and a UI for trying role restrictions with mock users
UI5 app and CAP service copying role collections between subaccounts
MTA projects sharing a role collection across role templates
CAP bookshop with Fiori elements UI deployed whole to Cloud Foundry
Cloud Foundry V3 API on SAP BTP as MCP tools
LangGraph agent and UI5 chat screen over four BTP MCP servers
CAP agent writing reports into a shared SDM document workspace
CAP and React dashboard for SAP AI Core capacity unit consumption
Python agent alerting on SAP AI Core capacity unit consumption
App monitoring SAP BTP credit consumption with alerts on increases
MCP server over the ADT REST API for ABAP objects
MCP server with read tools over the SAP Cloud ALM APIs
ABAP MCP server with full CRUD on on-premise and ABAP Cloud
MCP server for reading and writing ABAP object translations
MCP server answering whether SAP objects are released for ABAP Cloud
Samples for the six extension types of SAP Digital Manufacturing
Skills for building an A2A agent for Joule and deploying it to CF
Terminal UI running Bruno collections against a CAP service
SAP's Node.js application router in front of business applications
Token validation and security context for XSUAA and IAS
CAP microservice on XSUAA managing users and authorizations
CAP Java service calling role collection APIs via a generated client
OAuth2 token validation from XSUAA and SAP Cloud Identity Services
Download
Learn more
- Effective from June 30th 2026 - XSUAA Deprecation of GET Method for OAuth Token RetrievalEffective from June 30th 2026 - XSUAA Deprecation of GET Method for OAuth Token RetrievalEffective June 30th 2026, the SAP Authorization and Trust Management service (XSUAA) deprecates the HTTP GET method for retrieving an OAuth access token from its /oauth/token endpoint, leaving only POST supported in line with RFC 6749. A client still requesting a token via GET with grant_type and credentials in the query string stops working after the cutover and must switch to a POST request with form-encoded body parameters.Yogananda, published 2026-06-14Yogananda, SAP Community
- SAP Business Technology Platform: Authorization and Trust Management ServiceSAP Business Technology Platform: Authorization and Trust Management ServiceWalks through how the SAP Authorization and Trust Management service secures a BTP application: scopes, attributes and role templates in the security descriptor, and the OAuth 2.0 resource-owner, client and resource-server roles it builds on. Covers the XSUAA microservice as the OAuth 2.0 authorization server bound to each application through its service broker, the signed JSON Web Token it issues after authentication, and the App Router's place in front of the resource apps as the gateway that starts authentication and checks for cross-site request forgery.SekhuteTK, published 2022-09-09SekhuteTK, SAP Community
What’s New
from SAP Help Portal, readDeactivation of Default Identity Provider
Custom Platform Identity Provider Support for Chinese SAP BTP Universe
Critical Security Authorizations Now Marked in Role Collections
SameSite=None Cookie Support Now Required
Deprecate GET Method for Token Retrieval
Resilience Improvement for Retrieval of Authorized Accounts
Replacement of Library for the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
Change Priority of Security Recommendation BTP-UAA-0003 to Critical
Automatic Signing Key Rotation for Access Tokens as Default
End-of-Life for Synchronous Creation or Update of Service Instances
End-of-Life for Instance Secret Credential Type
End-of-Life for Service Plans
New and Existing Custom Trusts for Business Users Changed to Token-Based Authentication
Replacement of Library for JSON Web Tokens (JWT)
Principal propagation from SAP BTP to an On-Premise Cloud Connector with a Token From a Corporate Identity Provider
Automatic Signing Key Rotation for Access Tokens
Existing Custom Trusts for Platform Users Changed to Token-Based Authentication
New Custom Trusts for Platform Users Changed to Token-Based Authentication
Update Security Recommendation BTP-UAA-0003 for Default Credential Types for Bindings
Increased Priority of Security Recommendation BTP -UAA-0008 for Custom Identity Providers
Deprecation of the xsenableasyncservice Element for Service Instances
Deprecation of the instance-secret Credential Type for Service Instances
Security Hardening for Redirect URIs
Trust Configuration (New)
Existing Custom Trusts for Business Users Changed to Token-Based Authentication
New Custom Trusts for Business Users Changed to Token-Based Authentication
Delay Between Operations for Token Signing Keys Increased
Deprecation of SAML for User-Interactive Authentication in Customer-Owned Accounts
No Default Values for Redirect URIs in New Cloud Foundry Landscapes
Change of Default Credential Type to binding-secret
Creation and Update of xsuaa Service Instances Becomes Asynchronous by Default
Changed Behavior When Multitenant Applications Remove Predefined Role Collections
Provisioning of Members in the Cloud Foundry Environment (Organizations and and Spaces) Using SAP Cloud Identity Services - Identity Provisioning
Removal of Security Recommendation BTP-UAA-0009
Preservation of Case for Shadow Users in New Subaccounts
Deprecation of Third-Party Cookies
Deprecation of Service Plans
Deprecation of /check_token Endpoint for Online Token Validation
Own Origin Key at Creation of Trust (OpenID Connect) for Subaccounts
Pattern for Naming Application When Establishing Trust for Subaccounts
Management of API Credentials for Calling REST APIs of SAP Authorization and Trust Management Service
OpenID Connect Authentication
Limits for Roles, Role Collections, Trust, and Service Broker Instances
Limits for the Application Security Descriptor and Service Broker Bindings
Update Security Recommendation BTP-UAA-0005
Changed Behavior of Token Requests
Application Login Using a Custom Domain of the Identity Authentication Tenant
Migrate SAML-Based Trust of Custom Identity Provider to OpenID Connect
Custom Identity Provider Trust with an Identity Authentication Tenant for Multiple Customer IDs
Discontinue Support of jwt Format for Refresh Tokens
Restriction in the Validity of Access and Refresh Tokens
Include Tokens from a Trusted Identity Provider in Tokens of the SAP Authorization and Trust Management Service
Update Security Recommendation BTP-UAA-0015
Security Recommendation for Access to REST APIs
Security Recommendation for Application User Logoff
Application Login Using a Custom Domain of the Identity Authentication Tenant
Sharing and Unsharing Service Instances
Update of Planned Restriction in the Validity of Access and Refresh Tokens
Planned Restriction in the Validity of Access and Refresh Tokens
Creating Service Instances for API Access Supports Custom Identity Providers for Platform Users
Issuer Change in X.509 Certificates Managed by the Service
Improvement of Cockpit Roles
Rate Limiting Extended
Documentation of Token Support
Others providing
- Cloud Identity ServicesCloud Identity ServicesIdentity Authentication and Identity Provisioning as one tenant: the login, the user store or the federation to a corporate identity provider, and the provisioning of users into whatever sits behind it.sap official, btpIdentity Authentication and Identity Provisioning as one tenant
- com.sap.cds:cds-feature-identitycom.sap.cds:cds-feature-identityThe CAP Java feature that validates OAuth2 tokens from XSUAA and SAP Cloud Identity Services and builds the request's security context from them.sap official, capOAuth2 token validation from XSUAA and SAP Cloud Identity Services
- com.sap.cds:cds-feature-xsuaacom.sap.cds:cds-feature-xsuaaThe CAP Java feature that validated XSUAA-issued JWTs, published up to 2.10.7 before CAP Java 3.0 removed it in favour of com.sap.cds:cds-feature-identity.sap official, capFormer XSUAA JWT validation for CAP Java, removed in CAP Java 3.0
- @sap/cds@sap/cdsThe CAP Node.js runtime, which compiles the CDS model, serves the services declared in it, answers generic requests before any handler runs, and loads every cds-plugin.sap official, capCAP Node.js runtime
- @sap/xssec@sap/xssecToken validation and security context for XSUAA and IAS.sap official, capToken validation and security context for XSUAA and IAS
- cds-azure-adcds-azure-adAzure AD and Azure AD B2C as a custom-defined authentication strategy for CAP through passport-azure-ad, implementing the hook capire documents so the application does not validate tokens itself.independent, capAzure AD and Azure AD B2C authentication strategy for CAP
- cds-common-jwt-supportcds-common-jwt-supportJWT authentication for CAP without xsuaa or xssec, validating tokens with jose instead, for a service that authenticates against an identity provider other than XSUAA; last released in April 2022.independent, capJWT authentication for CAP without xsuaa or xssec
- com.sap.cds:cds-services-bomcom.sap.cds:cds-services-bomThe Maven bill of materials for CAP Java, pinning every com.sap.cds module in a release, from the API and core runtime to the Spring Boot starters and the CQN engine, to the same version.sap official, capMaven bill of materials pinning CAP Java module versions
- cap-toolkitcap-toolkitA utility bundle for CAP handlers, with a chainable HandlerBuilder, role checks, validation rules and query helpers, collecting boilerplate that otherwise repeats across projects into one dependency.independent, capUtility bundle for CAP handlers: builder, roles, validation, queries
- @sap/ams-dev@sap/ams-devCompiles the DCL authorization policies of SAP's Authorization Management Service to DCN, so an AMS-secured application runs and is tested on a laptop.sap official, capCompiler from AMS DCL policies to DCN for local runs and tests
- @sap/ams@sap/amsDecides what a signed-in user may do in a Node.js application that authenticates through SAP Cloud Identity Services, from policies written in DCL.sap official, capAuthorization from DCL policies for Node.js apps on SAP Cloud Identity
- @sap/cds@sap/cdsThe CAP Node.js runtime, which compiles the CDS model, serves the services declared in it, answers generic requests before any handler runs, and loads every cds-plugin.sap official, capCAP Node.js runtime
- cds-entra-idcds-entra-idA CAP plugin that maps Microsoft Entra ID groups and app roles onto cds.User roles, so @requires and @restrict keep working for a CAP app hosted on Azure App Services.independent, capMaps Microsoft Entra ID groups and app roles onto cds.User roles
Details
Sources
Sources are graph entities: the same page may back several entries, and an unreachable source flags every row that rests on it.
Compatibility and provenance
History in the atlas
- what it does, sources, two properties
- The second reader read the connects batch of 2026-09-19 on 2026-09-22, after its acceptance, and found: neither quote names this service, and only one names Cloud Identity Services, so the page's title, which names both parties, is quoted beside them.
- The two security services had no edge between them, although most BTP diagrams draw one. SAP's administration guide states the trust and the protocol it is established with.
- The same as Cloud Identity Services: ABAP's authorisation model is not XSUAA's, and a UI5 frontend does not validate the JWT — the router and the service do.
- First seen.
For your agent
- Ref
artifact:btp-authorization-and-trust-management- JSON
- /artifacts/btp-authorization-and-trust-management.json
- MCP
- Connecting an agent