Everything in the atlas

Not a way to edit Office formats: the author states that access to a file does not automatically provide native editing of Word documents, spreadsheets or PDFs, and suggests starting with text-based content such as instructions, templates and reports. Not a control point either: a prompt telling the agent to ask for confirmation or to leave a template alone needs enforceable application controls where that is a business requirement, and the host application stays responsible for the authenticated request context and tenant isolation.

No public repository is declared on the package, so the README is the documentation.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

It is text processing, not an agent: there is no tool calling, no retrieval and no conversation. It needs SAP AI Core, and the backend half needs [@sap-ai-sdk/orchestration](artifact:sap-ai-sdk-orchestration) installed alongside it — an optional peer, so a frontend-only install stays lean.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

It calls the OpenAI API directly with a key in the environment. It was written in early 2023 and last touched in May 2023, which is before SAP AI Core and the CAP LLM plugins existed — so read it for the shape of the application, not for how a CAP service should reach a model today.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

Every CDS service in both samples is marked `@requires: 'any'` and left publicly accessible, which the README says simplifies the deployment process, and it asks for proper authentication mechanisms to be applied in their place.

Every CDS service in both samples is marked `@requires: 'any'` and left publicly accessible, which the README says simplifies the testing and deployment process, and it asks for proper authentication mechanisms to be applied in their place.

Every CDS service in both samples is marked `@requires: 'any'` and left publicly accessible, which the README says simplifies the testing and deployment process, and it asks for proper authentication mechanisms to be applied in their place.

Every CDS service in both samples is marked `@requires: 'any'` and left publicly accessible, which the README says simplifies the testing and deployment process, and it asks for proper authentication mechanisms to be applied in their place.

Every CDS service in both samples is marked `@requires: 'any'` and left publicly accessible, which the README says simplifies the testing and deployment process, and it asks for proper authentication mechanisms to be applied in their place.

Every CDS service in both samples is marked `@requires: 'any'` and left publicly accessible, which the README says simplifies the testing and deployment process, and it asks for proper authentication mechanisms to be applied in their place.

Every CDS service in both samples is marked `@requires: 'any'` and left publicly accessible, which the README says simplifies the testing and deployment process, and it asks for proper authentication mechanisms to be applied in their place.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

It reads a UI5 project and the framework's own documentation, not a running system or a backend: a question about the service behind the app is answered somewhere else. Node.js v20.17 or v22.9 and above.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

Every gate here runs off-system, so what the class does on a real system and what the view does on the oldest UI5 release it has to serve are what the `pitfalls` catalogues carry and no local run can see. It runs abap2UI5 app classes, so ABAP that is not one has nothing here to deploy into. In system mode the sandbox tools are not offered, and an `app_act` event runs on the system as the configured user.

A descendant rather than a distinct idea: if what you need is the ADT surface itself, its ancestors are entered here too and one of them may already be in your stack.

The embedded preview needs a system that accepts basic auth: the documentation states that pure SSO or SAML without a basic-auth fallback is not supported, and points at `external` mode, which opens the app in the normal browser with the existing SAP session. On the web only the language half runs; the preview with its proxy, traffic log and screenshot, Ctrl+F3 activation, the render gate, the workspace-wide check and the MCP servers are desktop-only. The agent app tools send nothing until `abap2ui5.agent.enableAppTools` is switched on in User settings, because an event they fire runs as the configured user and changes data on the system for real.

Commercial Its maker offers it commercially.

Functional boundary The MIT licence covers the connector only: connecting to SAP needs a licensed ABAPilot backend installed in your system, so this is a commercial decision wearing an open-source badge on one half. Its own published checks did not cover writes, activation, transports or authorisation boundaries.

A system that reports itself productive, or whose role the probe cannot prove non-productive, is write-locked with no override, so changing code in production is not something this does. The permission ladder constrains the package, object name and transport request the server itself passes on a write, and is not a sandbox around ABAP it executes: `abap_run`, `abap_test` and the opt-in `core.eval` run under the connected technical user's SAP authorisations, which is where the boundary actually sits. Data preview, dump variable contents and driving a transaction by batch input stay off in every mode, `admin` included, until each is named explicitly.

Single-tenant today, one technical user, with per-user principal propagation on the roadmap — so a shared deployment cannot yet act as the developer who asked. The sibling edition [ARC-1](artifact:arc-mcp-arc-1) speaks ADT directly if you would rather not depend on the language server.

Built and last touched in the same week of March 2026, so the maintenance reading is what it is — the authentication work is the reason to look, and a stalled repository is the reason to read it before depending on it.

Freestyle SQL and `abap_run` mean an agent can read data and execute code, which is well past reading source. Neither is something to grant on a system where the distinction between development tooling and business data matters.

Two licences, by which package you install: the standalone server, `@mcp-abap-adt/core`, is AGPL-3.0-only, a licence to read before shipping anything built around it; the library, `@mcp-abap-adt/lib`, is Apache-2.0. The destination model also expects service keys sitting in a local directory, which is a secrets decision to make deliberately.

Development and sandbox systems only: the README warns against pointing it at production. Transport release is never executed, since the tool exists to show the policy stopping it, and separation of duties is checked against the `identity.approvers` list in the policy file rather than against SAP authorisations, so it holds as far as that file does and no further. The write path has been tested with ABAP classes and other object types may need adjustments, there is deliberately no tool that creates or deletes an object, and one server instance serves one SAP system.

Its own README opens by calling the server experimental. It also writes: locking, editing and activating in a system an agent can reach is a permissions decision before it is a tooling one.

Every tool its README lists reads — Get and Search, nothing that writes. Locking, editing, activation and transports are the other server, [mcp-abap-abap-adt-api](artifact:mario-andreschak-mcp-abap-adt-api), and mixing the two is how you end up with two MCP servers pointed at one system.

Read-only in practice, and the documentation is Korean; the tool names are English but the guidance around them is not.

It expects a real landscape, not just a project: a `.service.metadata` file naming the Mobile Services app, endpoint and destination, the Cloud Foundry CLI, and access to a BTP Cloud Foundry environment. From 0.4.0 macOS support is ARM64 only — Intel Macs are not supported — alongside Linux and Windows on x64 and ARM64.

Any run nobody is watching: the drawing tools work only while the draw.io canvas at `http://localhost:3000/` is open and connected, so there is no diagram to produce on a build agent or a server. Nothing checks the result either, because the maintainer keeps a diagram linter on the [roadmap](https://github.com/etosin/arc-draw#-roadmap) rather than in the release. The maintainer marks the status early at v0.x, installs it from source, and records testing with Claude Code alone.

Archived The declared repository is archived.

Functional boundary With one SAP system the README says to point the client at that arc-1 directly. Version 1 exchanges tokens within a single subaccount, so backends spread across subaccounts are out; it keeps its session map in memory, so more than one instance needs sticky sessions or a shared store. It routes deterministically and runs no model, which is a different thing from an assistant that reasons across systems. The `/all` endpoint drops the per-connection isolation, and the maintainer's answer to that is a PROD backend set read-only at the SAP end rather than a tool surface that hides the writes.

It administers a live Cloud Foundry landscape: `Apps`, `Organizations`, `Spaces`, `ServiceInstances` and `SecurityGroups` all carry create, update and delete alongside list and get. What a caller can reach is set by the role they hold, and the three templates in `xs-security.json` are MCPViewer for read, MCPEditor for read and write, and MCPAdmin for full administrative access.

It puts create, update and delete on business entities behind natural language. Whatever the destination's principal may change, an agent may change — and "create a new customer" is a sentence, not a form somebody signed off.

Its README says it plainly and so does this entry: this is not a simulation, every tool call reaches a live BW system, and write operations produce real changes. BW modelling objects are the definition of a warehouse — the blast radius of a wrong one is every report built on it.

This is the database, not an application in front of it, so what an agent can read is whatever the connection user can read — the guardrails bound the shape of a query, not the sensitivity of what it returns. Grant the connection the rights you would grant a person.

It fronts APIs you already have; nothing here reads a system's source or model, and a config file is only as good as the entity sets somebody wrote into it. OData V2 is the query surface it names.

Ninety tools is a large surface to put in front of a model at once, and client-credentials OAuth means the tenant sees one identity rather than the person asking. Content transport and user management sit in the same tool list as reading a story.

Not for production: the README states local and development instances only, and the server refuses a HAC URL whose host is not private unless `HAC_ALLOW_REMOTE=true` overrides that guard. Masking applies to `config_get` only, so `logs_tail` and `monitoring_info` output, thread dumps included, is unmasked and may carry sensitive data, and whatever a tool returns goes to the MCP client and its model. Certificate checks are disabled whenever `HAC_INSECURE_TLS=true` is set, which the README names as typical for local HAC.

A requirement that needs code: the skill generates configuration and states that it says so instead of faking it. Dialog and container targets have no verified enter event, so a dashboard placed there loads only through its Refresh button. Production Processes are outside it — it wires PODs to them and does not design them.

Three of its five reference corpora are not shipped: without an api.sap.com key and session cookie, a tenant bearer token and a local SAPUI5 fetch, the REST, MDO and UI5 tools return a message naming the preparation step that is missing. The HTTP transport has no authentication until `MCP_AUTH_TOKEN` is set, so anything past localhost needs that or an authenticating reverse proxy. Packing the ZIP, uploading it through Manage POD 2.0 Extensions and placing the widget in the POD Designer stay manual steps outside the agent, and the SAPUI5 fetch defaults to the SDK's newest version, which the README says is not the version a tenant runs. Node.js 22 or newer.