Everything in the atlas

Only on SAP S/4HANA 2023 and 2025, on premise or private cloud: [SAP S/4HANA Cloud, Public Edition](external:sap-s4hana-cloud-public-edition) and the [SAP BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment) are listed as coming soon, and a 2023 system has to leave out `ZABAP_PRC_EVENTS_SE_2025`, whose event-based side effects rely on APIs released with S/4HANA 2025. Not for a system that already carries a copy, because object names are global and two versions cannot live side by side, and not for a productive system by way of the `ZABAP_PRC_DEMO*` packages, which the README states are not intended for one and whose init classes delete and rebuild their own tables on every run. While the major version is 0 the public API is not stable: minor bumps carry breaking changes with no deprecation period, so productive use means pinning a tag and reading the CHANGELOG before every upgrade.

Alerting by mail is not telemetry — if you need traces and metrics correlated across handlers, that is a different layer. It also publishes no repository, so the package is the only thing to read.

It is a bundle, not a plugin with one job. Depending on it for one feature brings the rest.

The generated files are copied or deployed into the ABAP system by hand, the fourth step of its own usage list, so nothing keeps an activated service in step with the model it was generated from. Its peer dependency is `@sap/cds` ^9.8, so it does not install into a project on an earlier CAP release.

There is nothing here for ABAP for Cloud: the requirements name Standard ABAP releases only, and a CDS/SADL based OData service for `ABAP for Cloud` compatibility stands under Limitations & Todo.

Not a system to run a business application on: there is no business application in it, and what it implements of the language, the dictionary and Gateway is a stated subset of each. It is a clean-room reimplementation of the `/IWBEP/` interfaces that bundles no SAP source and no standard DDIC, so a service that reads standard objects has nothing to read, and `ANORMALIES.md` records every place the runtime differs from SAP before any workaround is written.

The project states that until v1.0.0 is reached, breaking changes may occur without prior notice. Rule items do not chain: every rule operates on the original input string, so a format whose second step needs the result of the first needs a custom logic class. A REPLACE rule whose replacement produces the exact same string as the input is reported as `no match`, which the documentation records as a known limitation.

SAP prohibits gateway/proxy use for SAP Application APIs; the Atlas applies that prohibition to CAP wrappers around those APIs. Data changes require application-defined unbound actions, and the adapter supplies no rate limiting, agent-action audit logging, approval workflows or policy enforcement. In beta, with nine releases in the six weeks after the first, so pin it.

The repository the package declares has been deleted — verified against the GitHub API, not just a failed fetch. The package is still on npm, so it installs; the source it was published from is no longer readable, which is a harder thing to discover than a stale version number.

Stateful apps cannot be operated: a stateful session lives in one HTTP request and an MCP call is one request, so `app_start` refuses them. The repository carries no release yet and states the addon has not been run in production use, the 7.02 downport is lint-only with no 7.02 system having run it, and the ABAP Cloud HTTP service setup is written down but still to verify on your own system.

Server side only, and deliberately: the author states there is no realistic way to support the SSE streaming a client needs, so there are no notifications, no `listChanged`, no `subscribe` and no logging. It is also frozen — protocol versions up to 2025-11-25 and no further, with everything after that in a separate V2 SDK, so starting here today is starting on a closed branch.

Stateless by design: with no `Mcp-Session-Id` and no SSE, notifications of any kind, `resources/subscribe` and stream-close cancellation are excluded, which the author states are protocol-level impossibilities on stateless ICF rather than gaps to be filled later within this design. ABAP Cloud is not supported and not planned, the stated reason being SAP pushing its own MCP strategy and features in BTP; the first iteration targets 7.5x classic, with 7.02 to 7.4x served from a separate generated downport repository. No authorization object and no default auth check are delivered, so a user who may call the ICF node may call every `AREA`/`SERVER` registered under it until `check_authorization` is redefined.

Not published to npm. Install from source.

Not reachable Not reachable since 2026-10-20.

Functional boundary What it exposes is whatever somebody put in the configuration table, which moves the governance question inside the SAP system and out of the server — an advantage if that table is controlled and a hazard if it is not. The web management interface is a second surface to secure alongside the MCP one.

It writes and it administers — ETL extraction and database user management are not read operations, and the same connection that profiles a column can move data out of the tenant. Masking is only as good as the configuration naming the fields, so an unlisted sensitive column is an unmasked one.

Its README says it plainly and so does this entry: this is not a simulation, every tool call reaches a live BW system, and write operations produce real changes. BW modelling objects are the definition of a warehouse — the blast radius of a wrong one is every report built on it.

It reaches a data warehouse, so what an agent can see is business data by definition — the SQL sanitisation and PII filtering in the server are there because of that, not instead of a decision about it. And the guidance is Datasphere-shaped: nothing here transfers to a HANA Cloud database used directly.

Ninety tools is a large surface to put in front of a model at once, and client-credentials OAuth means the tenant sees one identity rather than the person asking. Content transport and user management sit in the same tool list as reading a story.

If document versions are required, [@cap-js/sdm](artifact:cap-js-sdm) excludes versioned repositories in its [documented restrictions](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cap-js/sdm/ad13b61f21816ebead2d08264a74521cfb75846c/README.md).

Not where the UI library itself is expected to bind data: the documentation leaves binding a component's content and events to the host framework. Not from a CDN script tag: the project publishes none, so it assumes a build step.

For deployed environments, the [README](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cap-java/cds-feature-attachments/302f61c8bb76a0f54f43482ad91d89bf7dc5540f/README.md) excludes the cds-feature-attachments-fs file-system target, which is intended only for local development and testing.

If document versions are required, the [documented restrictions](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cap-java/sdm/673769f24ef66fd97daa6a6be41262d45065d3fe/README.md) exclude versioned repositories.

It is a bundle, not a plugin with one job. Depending on it for one feature brings the rest.

When user-dependent responses are cached without user-aware or explicit operation keys, or translated responses share keys across locales. These cases require key isolation; locale-aware keys are off by default.

It writes and it administers — ETL extraction and database user management are not read operations, and the same connection that profiles a column can move data out of the tenant. Masking is only as good as the configuration naming the fields, so an unlisted sensitive column is an unmasked one.

Business Source License 1.1, which is source-available rather than open source: reading and evaluating are fine, and production use is restricted until the licence's change date. That is a procurement question, not a technical one, and it is the thing to settle first. Read-only also means read-only — no modelling, no loads.

It reaches a data warehouse, so what an agent can see is business data by definition — the SQL sanitisation and PII filtering in the server are there because of that, not instead of a decision about it. And the guidance is Datasphere-shaped: nothing here transfers to a HANA Cloud database used directly.

Business Source License 1.1: source-available, with production use restricted until the change date — settle that before anything technical. And the governed execution path in v0.2 does act on data, which is a different grant from the discovery the v0.1 baseline offered.

The maintainer marks this under active development; public APIs, annotation names and OData contracts may still change.

Where the release and programming model offer durable locks, as RAP draft handling does, the README states that those solve the problem at the kernel level and the lock manager is for where that is not an option. A running handler occupies one background work process for as long as any lock is held, and only generated `ENQUEUE_*` modules can be locked.

It is a bundle, not a plugin with one job. Depending on it for one feature brings the rest.

When your adoption policy excludes experimental dependencies: the [maintainer’s README](https://github.com/cap-js/cds-federation-synonyms#about-this-project) explicitly labels this plugin experimental.

The maintainer marks this early development; expect the contract to move.

It declares no peer range on [@sap/cds](artifact:sap-cds) and publishes no repository, so there is nothing to read but the package itself and no CI to look at.

Its own feature comparison marks connection pooling, automatic reconnect, active-active reads, client-side data encryption, statement distribution, Kerberos authentication, the hdbuserstore, promises and TypeScript types as [@sap/hana-client](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@sap/hana-client) only, so a service that wants a pool or a promise API writes both itself over a callback interface. OpenSSL is its one security provider where the other driver lists SAP CommonCryptoLib, OpenSSL and MSCrypto, and it runs on Node.js 18 or later.

Not an end-user app: it reads from any table the user names and writes into tables of the Z/Y namespace, with no authorisation check of its own, so the README asks a project to add its own checks on `S_TABU_DIS`/`S_TABU_NAM` and to restrict who may run it before it is used beyond a development system. XLSX upload and download are not ready for ABAP Cloud yet, and of the upload apps only the JSON one writes the file's rows back to the database.

Not where SAP's own Google Workspace integration already applies: the README opens by announcing a native integration between Google Workspace and [SAP S/4HANA](external:sap-s4hana), whose first set of features is included in SAP S/4HANA Cloud 2208 and SAP S/4HANA 2022 and needs an additional licence for the SAP Document Management Service. Not where end users cannot each hold a regular Google account, since there is no way to use an enterprise account or to log on to Google Drive through single sign-on, and not where the redirect URL Google calls cannot reach a public top-level domain server. No SAP standard support is provided for it.

It writes and it administers — ETL extraction and database user management are not read operations, and the same connection that profiles a column can move data out of the tenant. Masking is only as good as the configuration naming the fields, so an unlisted sensitive column is an unmasked one.

Its README says it plainly and so does this entry: this is not a simulation, every tool call reaches a live BW system, and write operations produce real changes. BW modelling objects are the definition of a warehouse — the blast radius of a wrong one is every report built on it.

Ninety tools is a large surface to put in front of a model at once, and client-credentials OAuth means the tenant sees one identity rather than the person asking. Content transport and user management sit in the same tool list as reading a story.

Nothing about it is readable from outside the package: there is no repository, no issue tracker, and the npm page carries no readme, so the README, the examples and the changelog can be read only from the tarball or a CDN mirror, and a bug has nowhere to be filed. Provider URLs are called from the plugin with API keys taken from environment variables in a .env file, so on BTP no call resolves through a destination and the keys live in the environment. The npm line stops at 1.0.1 on 3 November 2025; the changelog shipped inside that version is headed v2.1, so the version npm shows and the version the author counts are not the same.