Everything in the atlas

The generated files are copied or deployed into the ABAP system by hand, the fourth step of its own usage list, so nothing keeps an activated service in step with the model it was generated from. Its peer dependency is `@sap/cds` ^9.8, so it does not install into a project on an earlier CAP release.

No published releases; repository quiet for 97 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 81 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 66 months.

The maintainer marks this early development; expect the contract to move.

It declares no peer range on [@sap/cds](artifact:sap-cds) and publishes no repository, so there is nothing to read but the package itself and no CI to look at.

If you need sub-second fan-out to external consumers this is the wrong layer — reach for [Event Mesh](artifact:btp-event-mesh) or Kafka. Without [Redis](external:redis), periodic processing still works but instant dispatch degrades to polling.

Release and repository quiet for 24 months.

Node below 22, or [@sap/cds](artifact:sap-cds) below 9: the package declares the first in engines and the second as a peer dependency. Any mail path other than Microsoft Graph, until a provider is written for it: graph is the only kind that sends, and basic, the kind configured by default, is the base class such a provider extends.

Reach for the original unless you know why you are not. This is a republished copy rather than a fork with a direction of its own: the README points at cap-js/notifications for the details, and nothing here says what was changed or why.

Input arrives only as JSON, or as plain XML if the ABAP built-in transformation is switched on, whatever the output format is set to. Cross-site calls are limited to JSONP: the maintainer lists CORS support as planned.

Last released December 2022. Nothing says it fails on current cds, but nothing says it was tried either. The repository the package declares has been deleted — verified against the GitHub API, not just a failed fetch. The package is still on npm, so it installs; the source it was published from is no longer readable, which is a harder thing to discover than a stale version number.

No published releases; repository quiet for 57 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 64 months.

The maintainer states 0.x is beta with no production SLA, and scopes support deliberately narrowly: direct application-server transport, classic serialization and password authentication on S/4HANA 2023 and NetWeaver 7.50. Anything outside that is untested rather than unsupported.

No published releases; repository quiet for 93 months.

The repository the package declares has been deleted — verified against the GitHub API, not just a failed fetch. The package is still on npm, so it installs; the source it was published from is no longer readable, which is a harder thing to discover than a stale version number.

No public repository is declared on the package, so the README is the documentation.

Not a substitute for testing in a system: the README states that any class calling the database, classic BAPIs or HTTP is shimmed out and stays an on-stack ATC and ABAP Unit concern, and that an off-stack green is CI-grade provenance rather than an in-system pass. It also assumes a particular shape of project. The ABAP has to be abapGit-serialised into a Git repository, Node.js 22 or later has to be available locally and in CI, and the CI has to be GitHub Actions.

No published releases; repository quiet for 34 months.

Not where the agent is reached over anything other than A2A: the README states the plugin does not speak anything other than A2A as @cap-js/agents serves it. Not where an upgrade has to be uneventful either — it pins @cap-js/agents to exactly 0.9.1, calls that package pre-1.0 and days old at the time of writing, and says this plugin inherits that instability and to expect breakage on upgrade.

Not where the records sit anywhere but [SAP HANA Cloud](artifact:btp-hana-cloud): the similarity search and the single retrieval method are both written against its vector engine, and the embeddings and the chat call go through [SAP AI Core](artifact:btp-ai-core), so a project without both has nothing here to call. Not where the dependency has to be an SAP-supported one either: the README states that the plugin is not an official SAP product and is published as a community contribution.

Not published to npm. Install from source.

Local scaffolding only. Its own Out of Scope list names deployment to Cloud Foundry or Kyma, XSUAA and IAS configuration or any other BTP service binding, the SaaS Registry and subscription flow to real tenants, and automatic migration from the legacy `@sap/cds-mtx`. For the concepts rather than the scaffolding step, the README points at the `multitenancy` skill in [skillOverflow](artifact:dankromp-skilloverflow) by [Daniel Krompaß](actor:dankromp), which covers the MTX sidecar, `xs-security.json`, tenant lifecycle hooks and the deployment path and runs no commands at all.

Knowledge with no reach: without an MCP server connected it can tell an agent what to write and cannot let it read or run anything. The rules target the ABAP Cloud development model, so a classic on-premise codebase is not what they are written against.

In the Eclipse mode the server lives in a developer's IDE, binds to 127.0.0.1 and answers any request carrying an `Origin` header with HTTP 403, so a pipeline or a remote agent has nothing to reach; the standalone mode on the runtime of the ADT for VS Code extension is the documented route with no IDE open. A new connection starts in write mode, so the 11 write tools are live against a connected system until someone presses Toggle Read-Only. The dropins route for the two bundles is documented as untested.

A compiled binary rather than an npm package, shipped prebuilt per platform and through pip and uvx. It collects anonymous usage telemetry by default, switched off with `--no-telemetry` or `DATAZOO_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1`. And the BW reach is what distinguishes it — if the work is plain ABAP, that half is weight you are not using.

Two licences, by which package you install: the standalone server, `@mcp-abap-adt/core`, is AGPL-3.0-only, a licence to read before shipping anything built around it; the library, `@mcp-abap-adt/lib`, is Apache-2.0. The destination model also expects service keys sitting in a local directory, which is a secrets decision to make deliberately.

It reads documentation, never a system: nothing in it opens a package.json, a CDS model or an ABAP client, so a question about what your own project does has to be answered elsewhere. The offline half is only as fresh as the submodules the last build pinned, and the index answers where something is written down rather than which of two packages fits a task.

The maintainer states it is unofficial, not endorsed by SAP, and that it uses authenticated Hub web and catalogue endpoints and browser session cookies in ways SAP's terms of service, SAP account terms or an organisation's own policies may restrict. The same README asks the reader not to use it for production, broad distribution or shared access without explicit approval, and says that installing it grants no permission to automate SAP services.

It needs an S-user with SAP Support Portal access, so there is nothing to search without a support contract behind the login. The maintainer states it uses private SAP APIs behind authentication, asks the reader to check whether that use breaches SAP's terms of service, and disclaims both liability and any guarantee that it keeps working. MFA is handled only by typing the code into a visible browser, so a headless deployment cannot complete a login that demands one.

What it returns is planning material, not a commitment, and the monorepo labels the server's role "future/planned features (planning only)". The maintainer also states it is unofficial, not endorsed by SAP, and that it uses authenticated Road Map Explorer web endpoints and browser session cookies in ways SAP's terms of service or an organisation's policies may restrict, with production, broad distribution and shared access called out as needing explicit approval. An account that requires MFA has to be bootstrapped once through a visible browser.

It is text processing, not an agent: there is no tool calling, no retrieval and no conversation. It needs SAP AI Core, and the backend half needs [@sap-ai-sdk/orchestration](artifact:sap-ai-sdk-orchestration) installed alongside it — an optional peer, so a frontend-only install stays lean.

Smart Form content cannot be read or written, and HR Forms (`PE51`) are not implemented. Installing it needs SAP GUI or WebGUI once, to register the OData services in `/IWFND/MAINT_SERVICE` and to redefine the write service in `SEGW`, and the extension is built against a locally linked ARC-1.

It calls the OpenAI API directly with a key in the environment. It was written in early 2023 and last touched in May 2023, which is before SAP AI Core and the CAP LLM plugins existed — so read it for the shape of the application, not for how a CAP service should reach a model today.

The maintainer states it is unofficial, not endorsed by SAP, and that it automates authenticated SAP web endpoints and browser session cookies in ways SAP's terms of service or an organisation's own policies may restrict. Password login is confined to `accounts.sap.com` and the standard SAP Cloud Identity Services tenant domains: a custom IAS domain, or a login that conditional authentication delegates to a corporate identity provider, fails closed before the password is filled and has to be completed through an interactive login instead.

No published releases; repository quiet for 97 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 27 months.

Last released April 2022 at 0.0.2, and no repository is declared on the package.

Quiet Release and repository quiet for 25 months.

Functional boundary It performs no authentication flow of its own. The app must already be protected by Entra ID OAuth 2.0 at the App Service level; this only maps the resulting claims. It is explicitly not intended to run locally.

No published releases; repository quiet for 83 months.

Read-only does not mean low-stakes: a complete picture of who can do what in an SAP system is exactly what an attacker would want, and the ready-made endpoint is the vendor's rather than yours — the README also documents running the server yourself. The authentication is careful; the question of what leaves your landscape is still yours.

It is a bundle, not a plugin with one job. Depending on it for one feature brings the rest.

Last released June 2022 at 0.0.6, and no repository is declared on the package.

Last released January 2024 at 0.0.6. The repository the package declares has been deleted — verified against the GitHub API, not just a failed fetch. The package is still on npm, so it installs; the source it was published from is no longer readable, which is a harder thing to discover than a stale version number.

It reads the landscape inventory, not the systems in it — nothing here reaches a running application, and nothing here changes anything. A landscape description is also commercially sensitive in its own right: versions and hosts are what a targeting exercise starts from.