Everything in the atlas

Alerting by mail is not telemetry — if you need traces and metrics correlated across handlers, that is a different layer. It also publishes no repository, so the package is the only thing to read.

The project states that until v1.0.0 is reached, breaking changes may occur without prior notice. Rule items do not chain: every rule operates on the original input string, so a format whose second step needs the result of the first needs a custom logic class. A REPLACE rule whose replacement produces the exact same string as the input is reported as `no match`, which the documentation records as a known limitation.

The metadata is inconsistent: the declared repository is github.com/acme/search-vocab and the README installs @acme/search-vocab, neither of which matches the published name. One release, November 2025.

Not an end-user app: it reads from any table the user names and writes into tables of the Z/Y namespace, with no authorisation check of its own, so the README asks a project to add its own checks on `S_TABU_DIS`/`S_TABU_NAM` and to restrict who may run it before it is used beyond a development system. XLSX upload and download are not ready for ABAP Cloud yet, and of the upload apps only the JSON one writes the file's rows back to the database.

When user-dependent responses are cached without user-aware or explicit operation keys, or translated responses share keys across locales. These cases require key isolation; locale-aware keys are off by default.

It changes what DELETE means for every client of the annotated projection, so anything that must actually remove a row — an erasure request, a retention job — has to go around it.

Where the release and programming model offer durable locks, as RAP draft handling does, the README states that those solve the problem at the kernel level and the lock manager is for where that is not an option. A running handler occupies one background work process for as long as any lock is held, and only generated `ENQUEUE_*` modules can be locked.

Not for a table whose contents matter, and not for one chosen at run time: the name of the table is fixed in the calling code, and the maintainer's own warning is "only hardcode the table name, don't use with important tables, use at own risk!"

The app writes to whatever table is passed in the URL parameter `table` and carries no authorisation check of its own, so past a development system it needs authorisation checks added and a restriction on who may run it.

Nothing about it is readable from outside the package: there is no repository, no issue tracker, and the npm page carries no readme, so the README, the examples and the changelog can be read only from the tarball or a CDN mirror, and a bug has nowhere to be filed. Provider URLs are called from the plugin with API keys taken from environment variables in a .env file, so on BTP no call resolves through a destination and the keys live in the environment. The npm line stops at 1.0.1 on 3 November 2025; the changelog shipped inside that version is headed v2.1, so the version npm shows and the version the author counts are not the same.

Design-time only: no message monitoring, no deployment, no runtime status. That is a different server in this same section, and the two do not overlap.

It deploys and undeploys, and it enumerates credentials, keystores and OAuth2 configurations. Listing security material is a read, and it is still a read of the thing that protects everything else the tenant talks to.

For an app that calls `client->set_session_stateful( )`, which needs the ICF session of the system it runs on; apps keeping their state in the draft table, the abap2UI5 default, work unchanged. For an app that reads a request header through the user exit on the source system, because the consumer forwards method, body, path, query string and status, not headers.

Inspection only, and it takes a host, a user and a password from the environment rather than a managed credential. PI and PO are also on their own end-of-maintenance path, which is the context any investment here sits in.

Every gate here runs off-system, so what the class does on a real system and what the view does on the oldest UI5 release it has to serve are what the `pitfalls` catalogues carry and no local run can see. It runs abap2UI5 app classes, so ABAP that is not one has nothing here to deploy into. In system mode the sandbox tools are not offered, and an `app_act` event runs on the system as the configured user.

It writes and it administers — ETL extraction and database user management are not read operations, and the same connection that profiles a column can move data out of the tenant. Masking is only as good as the configuration naming the fields, so an unlisted sensitive column is an unmasked one.

A descendant rather than a distinct idea: if what you need is the ADT surface itself, its ancestors are entered here too and one of them may already be in your stack.

Not a way to edit Office formats: the author states that access to a file does not automatically provide native editing of Word documents, spreadsheets or PDFs, and suggests starting with text-based content such as instructions, templates and reports. Not a control point either: a prompt telling the agent to ask for confirmation or to leave a template alone needs enforceable application controls where that is a business requirement, and the host application stays responsible for the authenticated request context and tenant isolation.

If your tool reads the open skill standard directly, install [capire/skills](artifact:capire-skills) and skip the wrapper.

Stateful apps cannot be operated: a stateful session lives in one HTTP request and an MCP call is one request, so `app_start` refuses them. The repository carries no release yet and states the addon has not been run in production use, the 7.02 downport is lint-only with no 7.02 system having run it, and the ABAP Cloud HTTP service setup is written down but still to verify on your own system.

Server side only, and deliberately: the author states there is no realistic way to support the SSE streaming a client needs, so there are no notifications, no `listChanged`, no `subscribe` and no logging. It is also frozen — protocol versions up to 2025-11-25 and no further, with everything after that in a separate V2 SDK, so starting here today is starting on a closed branch.

Stateless by design: with no `Mcp-Session-Id` and no SSE, notifications of any kind, `resources/subscribe` and stream-close cancellation are excluded, which the author states are protocol-level impossibilities on stateless ICF rather than gaps to be filled later within this design. ABAP Cloud is not supported and not planned, the stated reason being SAP pushing its own MCP strategy and features in BTP; the first iteration targets 7.5x classic, with 7.02 to 7.4x served from a separate generated downport repository. No authorization object and no default auth check are delivered, so a user who may call the ICF node may call every `AREA`/`SERVER` registered under it until `check_authorization` is redefined.

Commercial Its maker offers it commercially.

Functional boundary The MIT licence covers the connector only: connecting to SAP needs a licensed ABAPilot backend installed in your system, so this is a commercial decision wearing an open-source badge on one half. Its own published checks did not cover writes, activation, transports or authorisation boundaries.

A system that reports itself productive, or whose role the probe cannot prove non-productive, is write-locked with no override, so changing code in production is not something this does. The permission ladder constrains the package, object name and transport request the server itself passes on a write, and is not a sandbox around ABAP it executes: `abap_run`, `abap_test` and the opt-in `core.eval` run under the connected technical user's SAP authorisations, which is where the boundary actually sits. Data preview, dump variable contents and driving a transaction by batch input stay off in every mode, `admin` included, until each is named explicitly.

Configuration over an API you must already have entitled and provisioned; and the smallest of these repositories, so what it covers is what its config file happens to name.

Every skill that touches ABAP needs [arc-1](artifact:arc-mcp-arc-1) itself connected to a real system; nothing else is universal. `modernize-ui5-app` and `convert-ui5-to-fiori-elements` specifically need [the UI5 MCP server](artifact:ui5-mcp-server) for TypeScript conversion guidance and the linter, `convert-ui5-to-fiori-elements` also needs [the Fiori MCP server](artifact:sap-ux-fiori-mcp-server) for its LROP scaffold, and `modernize-ui5-app` needs a browser MCP (Claude in Chrome or Claude's own Preview) for its final render-verification step, since an HTTP 200 alone does not catch a blank page. A skill file alone, without the servers a given skill needs, has nothing to act on.

Classic BOPF only: business objects of the ABAP Programming Model for SAP Fiori are not handled, and on [the BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment) or S/4HANA Public Cloud classic BOPF enhancements do not exist. It is version 0.1.0, verified on S/4HANA 2025 (SAP_BASIS 816) on-premise only, and [arc-1](artifact:arc-mcp-arc-1) still marks the plugin API it is built on as experimental. ARC-1 loads no extensions on its multi-target routes and offers none of these tools in its `hyperfocused` tool mode.

Single-tenant today, one technical user, with per-user principal propagation on the roadmap — so a shared deployment cannot yet act as the developer who asked. The sibling edition [ARC-1](artifact:arc-mcp-arc-1) speaks ADT directly if you would rather not depend on the language server.

Archived The declared repository is archived.

Functional boundary With one SAP system the README says to point the client at that arc-1 directly. Version 1 exchanges tokens within a single subaccount, so backends spread across subaccounts are out; it keeps its session map in memory, so more than one instance needs sticky sessions or a shared store. It routes deterministically and runs no model, which is a different thing from an assistant that reasons across systems. The `/all` endpoint drops the per-connection isolation, and the maintainer's answer to that is a PROD backend set read-only at the SAP end rather than a tool surface that hides the writes.

It lives inside Eclipse and inherits everything that implies — the session is a developer's, not a pipeline's. And it is version-bound: ADT 3.60 or newer for 0.5.1, with 0.3.x the path for ADT 3.58 and 3.59.

It administers a live Cloud Foundry landscape: `Apps`, `Organizations`, `Spaces`, `ServiceInstances` and `SecurityGroups` all carry create, update and delete alongside list and get. What a caller can reach is set by the role they hold, and the three templates in `xs-security.json` are MCPViewer for read, MCPEditor for read and write, and MCPAdmin for full administrative access.

It administers a real account through Core Services, so what it can change is what the caller can change. And the UI half depends on hosts that render mcp-ui or MCP Apps resources; elsewhere those five tools return markup nobody displays.

It puts create, update and delete on business entities behind natural language. Whatever the destination's principal may change, an agent may change — and "create a new customer" is a sentence, not a form somebody signed off.

Its README says it plainly and so does this entry: this is not a simulation, every tool call reaches a live BW system, and write operations produce real changes. BW modelling objects are the definition of a warehouse — the blast radius of a wrong one is every report built on it.

Built and last touched in the same week of March 2026, so the maintenance reading is what it is — the authentication work is the reason to look, and a stalled repository is the reason to read it before depending on it.

A thin declaration over CPI's APIs: it reaches what those APIs expose and nothing else, and it inherits whatever the tenant's own authorisations allow.

Not for S/4HANA Public Cloud or [the BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment), where the README states there is no `SUBMIT`, NAST or SOAP-RFC; the floor elsewhere is SAP_BASIS 7.50, the `/sap/bc/soap/rfc` service active, and an SAP user with `S_RFC` on the kit's function group as well as the authorizations for the reports and the spool. Print output is NAST messages only, so S/4 Output Management through BRF+ or APOC is outside it, and editing covers SmartForms alone, with Adobe Forms and SAPscript previewable but not editable. A report that opens a popup, calls a screen or is a dialog transaction cannot be run at all.

Freestyle SQL and `abap_run` mean an agent can read data and execute code, which is well past reading source. Neither is something to grant on a system where the distinction between development tooling and business data matters.

This is the database, not an application in front of it, so what an agent can read is whatever the connection user can read — the guardrails bound the shape of a query, not the sensitivity of what it returns. Grant the connection the rights you would grant a person.

Not for production: the README states local and development instances only, and the server refuses a HAC URL whose host is not private unless `HAC_ALLOW_REMOTE=true` overrides that guard. Masking applies to `config_get` only, so `logs_tail` and `monitoring_info` output, thread dumps included, is unmasked and may carry sensitive data, and whatever a tool returns goes to the MCP client and its model. Certificate checks are disabled whenever `HAC_INSECURE_TLS=true` is set, which the README names as typical for local HAC.

LISA does the translation step only: it does not discover objects or manage transports, and its README pairs it with [an ADT MCP server](artifact:sap-adt-mcp-server) for those. Every write needs a transport request, and which object types it can write differs between public cloud or [the SAP BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment) and on-premise or private cloud, and by release. Running it locally is meant for development and testing, not production.

Development and sandbox systems only: the README warns against pointing it at production. Transport release is never executed, since the tool exists to show the policy stopping it, and separation of duties is checked against the `identity.approvers` list in the policy file rather than against SAP authorisations, so it holds as far as that file does and no further. The write path has been tested with ABAP classes and other object types may need adjustments, there is deliberately no tool that creates or deletes an object, and one server instance serves one SAP system.

Not reachable Not reachable since 2026-10-20.

Functional boundary What it exposes is whatever somebody put in the configuration table, which moves the governance question inside the SAP system and out of the server — an advantage if that table is controlled and a hazard if it is not. The web management interface is a second surface to secure alongside the MCP one.

Its own README opens by calling the server experimental. It also writes: locking, editing and activating in a system an agent can reach is a permissions decision before it is a tooling one.

Every tool its README lists reads — Get and Search, nothing that writes. Locking, editing, activation and transports are the other server, [mcp-abap-abap-adt-api](artifact:mario-andreschak-mcp-abap-adt-api), and mixing the two is how you end up with two MCP servers pointed at one system.

There is nothing to clone here: "Access is provided through a registration page. Once registered, you will receive access to the GitHub repository containing the agents, deployment guides, and documentation", and that repository answers 404 to anyone who has not registered, so neither the agent code nor the deployment guides can be read before the form is filled in. AWS states the agents are published as an unsupported solution, with customers responsible for testing and securing the code before deploying in production, and that they are intended for non-production SAP environments rather than production systems. The documentation link in the README is still a placeholder.

Universal mode trades discoverability for size: one generic tool is harder for a model to pick correctly than a named one, which is why it is not the default. On a small service, standard mode is the better answer.

It fronts APIs you already have; nothing here reads a system's source or model, and a config file is only as good as the entity sets somebody wrote into it. OData V2 is the query surface it names.

A requirement that needs code: the skill generates configuration and states that it says so instead of faking it. Dialog and container targets have no verified enter event, so a dashboard placed there loads only through its Refresh button. Production Processes are outside it — it wires PODs to them and does not design them.

Real SAP calls need the proprietary [SAP NetWeaver RFC SDK](external:sap-nw-rfc-sdk) and the `pyrfc==3.3.1` release the README calls archived and yanked, on Python 3.11, so without those only the demo backend answers. Not over HTTP as it stands: credentials are read from the environment for stdio, and the README says not to expose the server over HTTP without implementing the MCP authorization specification and deployment-level rate limiting. Multi-tenant auth and RBAC beyond the one server-wide policy, rate limiting, metrics and tracing, and deployment packaging are listed as not built. The result limits protect the client and not the system, since the README states they cannot reduce work already performed inside SAP, and the MCP tool annotations that describe read and write risk are advisory metadata rather than an authorisation boundary, so the service account's `S_RFC` and table authorisations are still what decides.

It answers about the object catalogue, not about your code: nothing here reads your system, so it will tell you a table is not released and not that you used it. That check is ATC's, and this is what makes ATC's answer actionable.

It says so itself, in bold, and the atlas repeats it: not legal advice and not a compliance decision. Only SAP, your contract, or SAP support can answer bindingly, and the skill routes legal, commercial and roadmap questions there rather than guessing at them. Treat the output as evidence gathered, not as a verdict.

It reaches a data warehouse, so what an agent can see is business data by definition — the SQL sanitisation and PII filtering in the server are there because of that, not instead of a decision about it. And the guidance is Datasphere-shaped: nothing here transfers to a HANA Cloud database used directly.

Ninety tools is a large surface to put in front of a model at once, and client-credentials OAuth means the tenant sees one identity rather than the person asking. Content transport and user management sit in the same tool list as reading a story.

It stops before the artifact: in the README's own words it does not generate or deploy complete iFlow artifacts, so building and shipping the integration flows themselves stays with a person and a tenant. Knowledge beside the work rather than a generator, and it reads nothing from a running tenant.

Not for a project below the 2211-jdk21.1 baseline: older releases and the JSP Accelerator are covered only as explicitly marked legacy material, so a JSP storefront or a pre-JDK-21 platform is outside what the guides are written against. Knowledge with reach only through one script — it can tell an agent what to write and, apart from `query-items.sh`, cannot let it read what a given system contains.

Three of its five reference corpora are not shipped: without an api.sap.com key and session cookie, a tenant bearer token and a local SAPUI5 fetch, the REST, MDO and UI5 tools return a message naming the preparation step that is missing. The HTTP transport has no authentication until `MCP_AUTH_TOKEN` is set, so anything past localhost needs that or an authenticating reverse proxy. Packing the ZIP, uploading it through Manage POD 2.0 Extensions and placing the widget in the POD Designer stay manual steps outside the agent, and the SAPUI5 fetch defaults to the SDK's newest version, which the README says is not the version a tenant runs. Node.js 22 or newer.

An early alpha release whose README says to pin the version and test recipes against non-production data first. HANA synchronisation is snapshot-only and does not reconcile deleted rows, so a document for a row deleted in the source stays in the index. A recipe's field allow-list does not decide what the service account may read: the README states that field allow-listing does not replace SAP authorization, and that the package infers no SAP module semantics, authorization scope or safe fields from table names. Only Business Partner has a built-in recipe, every other dataset needs a `KnowledgeRecipe` written for it, and [Qdrant](external:qdrant) local mode is stated to be for development and smaller indexes.

On ECC the S/4HANA `API_*` services that the three convenience readers default to do not exist, so each one has to be pointed at a Z service of your own or replaced by the RFC tools. `read_table` inherits `RFC_READ_TABLE`'s 512-byte row, so a wide table needs an explicit field list and some fields cannot be selected at all, and the bridge starts a Node process and a fresh logon per call, with no pooling. The audit log is one line per call that includes the call arguments, so every filter and WHERE clause sent to SAP is written to a file that then has to be handled as sensitive.

It is a plugin for one server — its own — so it is a stack rather than a component. And the guard is only as good as the profile labels: a production system registered as `DEV` is a production system with the safety off.

Reach is the reason to use it and the reason to be careful: reading cluster tables and spool output goes well past what a development tool is normally pointed at. Decide what an agent may reach before granting it, not after.

Read-only in practice, and the documentation is Korean; the tool names are English but the guidance around them is not.

It stops at the `AuthInfo` and the raw bearer token, and the README lists what stays with the consuming server: rate limiting, the scope and tool policy, the MCP transport, the SAP HTTP client's headers, and helmet-style hardening. The one piece of hardening it constrains rather than defers is the cross-origin opener policy, which it deliberately leaves unset because popup-based OAuth breaks under it. It is ESM-only on Node 22 or later and shares the host's Express and MCP SDK instances as peer dependencies, so a server on Express 4 cannot take it.

Not for anything important, which is the maintainer's own instruction: the README's Warning section calls it stupid to write your own encryption or PGP library, says abapPGP will most certainly contain severe bugs, and points instead at established PGP software such as [OpenPGP](http://openpgp.org/). Signing is the only scope it states.

It audits through npm: a project that resolves its dependencies with another package manager, or has no `package.json`, has nothing for it to run. What it reports is what `npm audit` knows, so a vulnerability outside the npm advisory data is not in its table.