Everything in the atlas

Its README says it plainly and so does this entry: this is not a simulation, every tool call reaches a live BW system, and write operations produce real changes. BW modelling objects are the definition of a warehouse — the blast radius of a wrong one is every report built on it.

Ninety tools is a large surface to put in front of a model at once, and client-credentials OAuth means the tenant sees one identity rather than the person asking. Content transport and user management sit in the same tool list as reading a story.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

For deployed environments, the [README](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cap-java/cds-feature-attachments/302f61c8bb76a0f54f43482ad91d89bf7dc5540f/README.md) excludes the cds-feature-attachments-fs file-system target, which is intended only for local development and testing.

If document versions are required, the [documented restrictions](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cap-java/sdm/673769f24ef66fd97daa6a6be41262d45065d3fe/README.md) exclude versioned repositories.

It is a bundle, not a plugin with one job. Depending on it for one feature brings the rest.

When user-dependent responses are cached without user-aware or explicit operation keys, or translated responses share keys across locales. These cases require key isolation; locale-aware keys are off by default.

The maintainer marks this under active development; public APIs, annotation names and OData contracts may still change.

It is a bundle, not a plugin with one job. Depending on it for one feature brings the rest.

The README is one line and the package carries no licence field. Last released July 2023. The repository the package declares has been deleted — verified against the GitHub API, not just a failed fetch. The package is still on npm, so it installs; the source it was published from is no longer readable, which is a harder thing to discover than a stale version number.

The maintainer marks this early development; expect the contract to move.

It declares no peer range on [@sap/cds](artifact:sap-cds) and publishes no repository, so there is nothing to read but the package itself and no CI to look at.

The declared repository is archived.

Its own feature comparison marks connection pooling, automatic reconnect, active-active reads, client-side data encryption, statement distribution, Kerberos authentication, the hdbuserstore, promises and TypeScript types as [@sap/hana-client](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@sap/hana-client) only, so a service that wants a pool or a promise API writes both itself over a callback interface. OpenSSL is its one security provider where the other driver lists SAP CommonCryptoLib, OpenSSL and MSCrypto, and it runs on Node.js 18 or later.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

Its README says it plainly and so does this entry: this is not a simulation, every tool call reaches a live BW system, and write operations produce real changes. BW modelling objects are the definition of a warehouse — the blast radius of a wrong one is every report built on it.

Ninety tools is a large surface to put in front of a model at once, and client-credentials OAuth means the tenant sees one identity rather than the person asking. Content transport and user management sit in the same tool list as reading a story.

Nothing about it is readable from outside the package: there is no repository, no issue tracker, and the npm page carries no readme, so the README, the examples and the changelog can be read only from the tarball or a CDN mirror, and a bug has nowhere to be filed. Provider URLs are called from the plugin with API keys taken from environment variables in a .env file, so on BTP no call resolves through a destination and the keys live in the environment. The npm line stops at 1.0.1 on 3 November 2025; the changelog shipped inside that version is headed v2.1, so the version npm shows and the version the author counts are not the same.

It is a bundle, not a plugin with one job. Depending on it for one feature brings the rest.

Archived The declared repository is archived.

Functional boundary The repository is archived, so nothing here will move again. Fine to keep where it already runs; anything new should start from what the current cds deploy leaves open rather than from this.

The metadata is inconsistent: the declared repository is github.com/acme/search-vocab and the README installs @acme/search-vocab, neither of which matches the published name. One release, November 2025.

No license Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

Functional boundary The Maven coordinate its README gives, io.github.miyasuta:cds-feature-softdelete:1.0.0, does not resolve on Maven Central as of 2026-09-07 — you build and install it from source.

It changes what DELETE means for every client of the annotated projection, so anything that must actually remove a row — an erasure request, a retention job — has to go around it.

Not reachable Not reachable since 2026-10-20.

Functional boundary The Level A–D grade merges SAP's two published files in the tool's own engine: it is an orientation rather than an ATC result and is left out of the signed audit pack, and the repository documents state by state where the grade is expected to differ from what the clean core ATC check reports. Nothing here runs ABAP Unit — on the RAP track that result is recorded from your own SAP system, and generated CAP tests run against mocks in an isolated runner rather than in a real SAP S/4HANA system. Tenants, organisation accounts, single sign-on, a self-hosted edition and write access through an API are deliberately not built, and one account has five analysis runs before a Gemini API key of its own is needed.

It answers about the object catalogue, not about your code: nothing here reads your system, so it will tell you a table is not released and not that you used it. That check is ATC's, and this is what makes ATC's answer actionable.

An Eclipse installation older than the 2026-03 release, or a Java below 21, cannot take it: both are listed prerequisites, and 2026-03 is named as the oldest release the current ADT installs on. The tenant, region, client ID and client secret are entered per installation in Eclipse preferences, so each developer configures the Cloud ALM connection in their own IDE.

In the Eclipse mode the server lives in a developer's IDE, binds to 127.0.0.1 and answers any request carrying an `Origin` header with HTTP 403, so a pipeline or a remote agent has nothing to reach; the standalone mode on the runtime of the ADT for VS Code extension is the documented route with no IDE open. A new connection starts in write mode, so the 11 write tools are live against a connected system until someone presses Toggle Read-Only. The dropins route for the two bundles is documented as untested.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

No license Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

Functional boundary Not a descriptor to deploy as it stands: the approuter's `sessionSecret` is written out in `mta.yaml`.

A library a VS Code extension calls, not something installed and run on its own; there is no documented standalone CLI. No public repository either, so what it does is read from its own README rather than checked against source.

Specific to MDK metadata projects — nothing here builds or deploys a CAP service or a plain Fiori app. Closed-source, under SAP's own developer licence rather than a public repository.

Last released June 2022 at 0.0.6, and no repository is declared on the package.

If you need sub-second fan-out to external consumers this is the wrong layer — reach for [Event Mesh](artifact:btp-event-mesh) or Kafka. Without [Redis](external:redis), periodic processing still works but instant dispatch degrades to polling.

When user-dependent responses are cached without user-aware or explicit operation keys, or translated responses share keys across locales. These cases require key isolation; locale-aware keys are off by default.

The declared repository is on SAP's internal GitHub (github.tools.sap) and is not publicly reachable, so npm is the only place to read anything about it.

Any run nobody is watching: the drawing tools work only while the draw.io canvas at `http://localhost:3000/` is open and connected, so there is no diagram to produce on a build agent or a server. Nothing checks the result either, because the maintainer keeps a diagram linter on the [roadmap](https://github.com/etosin/arc-draw#-roadmap) rather than in the release. The maintainer marks the status early at v0.x, installs it from source, and records testing with Claude Code alone.

The declared repository is archived.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

It audits through npm: a project that resolves its dependencies with another package manager, or has no `package.json`, has nothing for it to run. What it reports is what `npm audit` knows, so a vulnerability outside the npm advisory data is not in its table.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

No published releases; repository quiet for 45 months.

A system that reports itself productive, or whose role the probe cannot prove non-productive, is write-locked with no override, so changing code in production is not something this does. The permission ladder constrains the package, object name and transport request the server itself passes on a write, and is not a sandbox around ABAP it executes: `abap_run`, `abap_test` and the opt-in `core.eval` run under the connected technical user's SAP authorisations, which is where the boundary actually sits. Data preview, dump variable contents and driving a transaction by batch input stay off in every mode, `admin` included, until each is named explicitly.

What adt-ls cannot do headless the maintainer puts out of scope, so a consumer that needs an ADT call the language server does not expose is back to speaking ADT itself. The README states the current runtime compatibility as verified on macOS arm64, against adt-ls 1.1.2 as the minimum and `1.1.2.202608131517` as the version tested. An Eclipse installation does not supply that runtime: SAP versions the two separately, so the VS Code extension has to be installed even where nobody opens VS Code.

Not a tool a developer runs: it is a library to build one with, and it ships no editor, command line or interface of its own. Its sample connects with a plain HTTP URL, a user and a password, so a system that does not expose the adt ICF service that way is out of reach.

The embedded preview needs a system that accepts basic auth: the documentation states that pure SSO or SAML without a basic-auth fallback is not supported, and points at `external` mode, which opens the app in the normal browser with the existing SAP session. On the web only the language half runs; the preview with its proxy, traffic log and screenshot, Ctrl+F3 activation, the render gate, the workspace-wide check and the MCP servers are desktop-only. The agent app tools send nothing until `abap2ui5.agent.enableAppTools` is switched on in User settings, because an event they fire runs as the configured user and changes data on the system for real.