Everything in ABAP

Only on SAP S/4HANA 2023 and 2025, on premise or private cloud: [SAP S/4HANA Cloud, Public Edition](external:sap-s4hana-cloud-public-edition) and the [SAP BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment) are listed as coming soon, and a 2023 system has to leave out `ZABAP_PRC_EVENTS_SE_2025`, whose event-based side effects rely on APIs released with S/4HANA 2025. Not for a system that already carries a copy, because object names are global and two versions cannot live side by side, and not for a productive system by way of the `ZABAP_PRC_DEMO*` packages, which the README states are not intended for one and whose init classes delete and rebuild their own tables on every run. While the major version is 0 the public API is not stable: minor bumps carry breaking changes with no deprecation period, so productive use means pinning a tag and reading the CHANGELOG before every upgrade.

There is nothing here for ABAP for Cloud: the requirements name Standard ABAP releases only, and a CDS/SADL based OData service for `ABAP for Cloud` compatibility stands under Limitations & Todo.

Not a system to run a business application on: there is no business application in it, and what it implements of the language, the dictionary and Gateway is a stated subset of each. It is a clean-room reimplementation of the `/IWBEP/` interfaces that bundles no SAP source and no standard DDIC, so a service that reads standard objects has nothing to read, and `ANORMALIES.md` records every place the runtime differs from SAP before any workaround is written.

The project states that until v1.0.0 is reached, breaking changes may occur without prior notice. Rule items do not chain: every rule operates on the original input string, so a format whose second step needs the result of the first needs a custom logic class. A REPLACE rule whose replacement produces the exact same string as the input is reported as `no match`, which the documentation records as a known limitation.

Stateful apps cannot be operated: a stateful session lives in one HTTP request and an MCP call is one request, so `app_start` refuses them. The repository carries no release yet and states the addon has not been run in production use, the 7.02 downport is lint-only with no 7.02 system having run it, and the ABAP Cloud HTTP service setup is written down but still to verify on your own system.

Not an end-user app: it reads from any table the user names and writes into tables of the Z/Y namespace, with no authorisation check of its own, so the README asks a project to add its own checks on `S_TABU_DIS`/`S_TABU_NAM` and to restrict who may run it before it is used beyond a development system. XLSX upload and download are not ready for ABAP Cloud yet, and of the upload apps only the JSON one writes the file's rows back to the database.

DataZoo GmbH calls the extension experimental and states that minimal testing and benchmarking were done. The Business Source License 1.1 it carries restricts offering the software to third parties on a hosted or embedded basis, so an embedding product needs a commercial licence. Telemetry is on by default and is switched off per session with `SET erpl_telemetry_enabled = false` or for the machine with `DATAZOO_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1`.

Not for a table whose contents matter, and not for one chosen at run time: the name of the table is fixed in the calling code, and the maintainer's own warning is "only hardcode the table name, don't use with important tables, use at own risk!"

The app writes to whatever table is passed in the URL parameter `table` and carries no authorisation check of its own, so past a development system it needs authorisation checks added and a restriction on who may run it.

Only on SAP S/4HANA 2023 and 2025, on premise or private cloud: [SAP S/4HANA Cloud, Public Edition](external:sap-s4hana-cloud-public-edition) and the [SAP BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment) are listed as coming soon, and a 2023 system has to leave out `ZABAP_PRC_EVENTS_SE_2025`, whose event-based side effects rely on APIs released with S/4HANA 2025. Not for a system that already carries a copy, because object names are global and two versions cannot live side by side, and not for a productive system by way of the `ZABAP_PRC_DEMO*` packages, which the README states are not intended for one and whose init classes delete and rebuild their own tables on every run. While the major version is 0 the public API is not stable: minor bumps carry breaking changes with no deprecation period, so productive use means pinning a tag and reading the CHANGELOG before every upgrade.

Only on SAP S/4HANA 2023 and 2025, on premise or private cloud: [SAP S/4HANA Cloud, Public Edition](external:sap-s4hana-cloud-public-edition) and the [SAP BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment) are listed as coming soon, and a 2023 system has to leave out `ZABAP_PRC_EVENTS_SE_2025`, whose event-based side effects rely on APIs released with S/4HANA 2025. Not for a system that already carries a copy, because object names are global and two versions cannot live side by side, and not for a productive system by way of the `ZABAP_PRC_DEMO*` packages, which the README states are not intended for one and whose init classes delete and rebuild their own tables on every run. While the major version is 0 the public API is not stable: minor bumps carry breaking changes with no deprecation period, so productive use means pinning a tag and reading the CHANGELOG before every upgrade.

DataZoo GmbH calls the extension experimental and states that minimal testing and benchmarking were done. The Business Source License 1.1 it carries restricts offering the software to third parties on a hosted or embedded basis, so an embedding product needs a commercial licence. Telemetry is on by default and is switched off per session with `SET erpl_telemetry_enabled = false` or for the machine with `DATAZOO_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1`.

For an app that calls `client->set_session_stateful( )`, which needs the ICF session of the system it runs on; apps keeping their state in the draft table, the abap2UI5 default, work unchanged. For an app that reads a request header through the user exit on the source system, because the consumer forwards method, body, path, query string and status, not headers.

Every gate here runs off-system, so what the class does on a real system and what the view does on the oldest UI5 release it has to serve are what the `pitfalls` catalogues carry and no local run can see. It runs abap2UI5 app classes, so ABAP that is not one has nothing here to deploy into. In system mode the sandbox tools are not offered, and an `app_act` event runs on the system as the configured user.

A descendant rather than a distinct idea: if what you need is the ADT surface itself, its ancestors are entered here too and one of them may already be in your stack.

Written for Amazon Q Developer and Kiro, and the central deployment path is ECS Fargate — the further you are from AWS, the more of it is scaffolding you do not need. Python rather than the Node most of this group uses. Its README says the repository is no longer maintained and that the latest version of ABAP Accelerator is shared after registering with AWS for [Modernization Agents for SAP on AWS](https://github.com/aws-for-sap/Modernization-Agents-for-SAP-on-AWS).

A system that reports itself productive, or whose role the probe cannot prove non-productive, is write-locked with no override, so changing code in production is not something this does. The permission ladder constrains the package, object name and transport request the server itself passes on a write, and is not a sandbox around ABAP it executes: `abap_run`, `abap_test` and the opt-in `core.eval` run under the connected technical user's SAP authorisations, which is where the boundary actually sits. Data preview, dump variable contents and driving a transaction by batch input stay off in every mode, `admin` included, until each is named explicitly.

Classic BOPF only: business objects of the ABAP Programming Model for SAP Fiori are not handled, and on [the BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment) or S/4HANA Public Cloud classic BOPF enhancements do not exist. It is version 0.1.0, verified on S/4HANA 2025 (SAP_BASIS 816) on-premise only, and [arc-1](artifact:arc-mcp-arc-1) still marks the plugin API it is built on as experimental. ARC-1 loads no extensions on its multi-target routes and offers none of these tools in its `hyperfocused` tool mode.

Not for S/4HANA Public Cloud or [the BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment), where the README states there is no `SUBMIT`, NAST or SOAP-RFC; the floor elsewhere is SAP_BASIS 7.50, the `/sap/bc/soap/rfc` service active, and an SAP user with `S_RFC` on the kit's function group as well as the authorizations for the reports and the spool. Print output is NAST messages only, so S/4 Output Management through BRF+ or APOC is outside it, and editing covers SmartForms alone, with Adobe Forms and SAPscript previewable but not editable. A report that opens a popup, calls a screen or is a dialog transaction cannot be run at all.

Freestyle SQL and `abap_run` mean an agent can read data and execute code, which is well past reading source. Neither is something to grant on a system where the distinction between development tooling and business data matters.

A compiled binary rather than an npm package, shipped prebuilt per platform and through pip and uvx. It collects anonymous usage telemetry by default, switched off with `--no-telemetry` or `DATAZOO_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1`. And the BW reach is what distinguishes it — if the work is plain ABAP, that half is weight you are not using.

Two licences, by which package you install: the standalone server, `@mcp-abap-adt/core`, is AGPL-3.0-only, a licence to read before shipping anything built around it; the library, `@mcp-abap-adt/lib`, is Apache-2.0. The destination model also expects service keys sitting in a local directory, which is a secrets decision to make deliberately.

Development and sandbox systems only: the README warns against pointing it at production. Transport release is never executed, since the tool exists to show the policy stopping it, and separation of duties is checked against the `identity.approvers` list in the policy file rather than against SAP authorisations, so it holds as far as that file does and no further. The write path has been tested with ABAP classes and other object types may need adjustments, there is deliberately no tool that creates or deletes an object, and one server instance serves one SAP system.

Every tool its README lists reads — Get and Search, nothing that writes. Locking, editing, activation and transports are the other server, [mcp-abap-abap-adt-api](artifact:mario-andreschak-mcp-abap-adt-api), and mixing the two is how you end up with two MCP servers pointed at one system.

There is nothing to clone here: "Access is provided through a registration page. Once registered, you will receive access to the GitHub repository containing the agents, deployment guides, and documentation", and that repository answers 404 to anyone who has not registered, so neither the agent code nor the deployment guides can be read before the form is filled in. AWS states the agents are published as an unsupported solution, with customers responsible for testing and securing the code before deploying in production, and that they are intended for non-production SAP environments rather than production systems. The documentation link in the README is still a placeholder.

Real SAP calls need the proprietary [SAP NetWeaver RFC SDK](external:sap-nw-rfc-sdk) and the `pyrfc==3.3.1` release the README calls archived and yanked, on Python 3.11, so without those only the demo backend answers. Not over HTTP as it stands: credentials are read from the environment for stdio, and the README says not to expose the server over HTTP without implementing the MCP authorization specification and deployment-level rate limiting. Multi-tenant auth and RBAC beyond the one server-wide policy, rate limiting, metrics and tracing, and deployment packaging are listed as not built. The result limits protect the client and not the system, since the README states they cannot reduce work already performed inside SAP, and the MCP tool annotations that describe read and write risk are advisory metadata rather than an authorisation boundary, so the service account's `S_RFC` and table authorisations are still what decides.

Reach is the reason to use it and the reason to be careful: reading cluster tables and spool output goes well past what a development tool is normally pointed at. Decide what an agent may reach before granting it, not after.

Smart Form content cannot be read or written, and HR Forms (`PE51`) are not implemented. Installing it needs SAP GUI or WebGUI once, to register the OData services in `/IWFND/MAINT_SERVICE` and to redefine the write service in `SEGW`, and the extension is built against a locally linked ARC-1.

No license Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

Functional boundary It consumes the `@experimental` public API, which the README says may break in any release. The RFC tool dials as one shared technical user with its own credentials, so SAP's log records that user and not the person behind the agent.

Every gate here runs off-system, so what the class does on a real system and what the view does on the oldest UI5 release it has to serve are what the `pitfalls` catalogues carry and no local run can see. It runs abap2UI5 app classes, so ABAP that is not one has nothing here to deploy into. In system mode the sandbox tools are not offered, and an `app_act` event runs on the system as the configured user.

The embedded preview needs a system that accepts basic auth: the documentation states that pure SSO or SAML without a basic-auth fallback is not supported, and points at `external` mode, which opens the app in the normal browser with the existing SAP session. On the web only the language half runs; the preview with its proxy, traffic log and screenshot, Ctrl+F3 activation, the render gate, the workspace-wide check and the MCP servers are desktop-only. The agent app tools send nothing until `abap2ui5.agent.enableAppTools` is switched on in User settings, because an event they fire runs as the configured user and changes data on the system for real.

A system that reports itself productive, or whose role the probe cannot prove non-productive, is write-locked with no override, so changing code in production is not something this does. The permission ladder constrains the package, object name and transport request the server itself passes on a write, and is not a sandbox around ABAP it executes: `abap_run`, `abap_test` and the opt-in `core.eval` run under the connected technical user's SAP authorisations, which is where the boundary actually sits. Data preview, dump variable contents and driving a transaction by batch input stay off in every mode, `admin` included, until each is named explicitly.

Real SAP calls need the proprietary [SAP NetWeaver RFC SDK](external:sap-nw-rfc-sdk) and the `pyrfc==3.3.1` release the README calls archived and yanked, on Python 3.11, so without those only the demo backend answers. Not over HTTP as it stands: credentials are read from the environment for stdio, and the README says not to expose the server over HTTP without implementing the MCP authorization specification and deployment-level rate limiting. Multi-tenant auth and RBAC beyond the one server-wide policy, rate limiting, metrics and tracing, and deployment packaging are listed as not built. The result limits protect the client and not the system, since the README states they cannot reduce work already performed inside SAP, and the MCP tool annotations that describe read and write risk are advisory metadata rather than an authorisation boundary, so the service account's `S_RFC` and table authorisations are still what decides.

On ECC the S/4HANA `API_*` services that the three convenience readers default to do not exist, so each one has to be pointed at a Z service of your own or replaced by the RFC tools. `read_table` inherits `RFC_READ_TABLE`'s 512-byte row, so a wide table needs an explicit field list and some fields cannot be selected at all, and the bridge starts a Node process and a fresh logon per call, with no pooling. The audit log is one line per call that includes the call arguments, so every filter and WHERE clause sent to SAP is written to a file that then has to be handled as sensitive.

The embedded preview needs a system that accepts basic auth: the documentation states that pure SSO or SAML without a basic-auth fallback is not supported, and points at `external` mode, which opens the app in the normal browser with the existing SAP session. On the web only the language half runs; the preview with its proxy, traffic log and screenshot, Ctrl+F3 activation, the render gate, the workspace-wide check and the MCP servers are desktop-only. The agent app tools send nothing until `abap2ui5.agent.enableAppTools` is switched on in User settings, because an event they fire runs as the configured user and changes data on the system for real.

Every skill that touches ABAP needs [arc-1](artifact:arc-mcp-arc-1) itself connected to a real system; nothing else is universal. `modernize-ui5-app` and `convert-ui5-to-fiori-elements` specifically need [the UI5 MCP server](artifact:ui5-mcp-server) for TypeScript conversion guidance and the linter, `convert-ui5-to-fiori-elements` also needs [the Fiori MCP server](artifact:sap-ux-fiori-mcp-server) for its LROP scaffold, and `modernize-ui5-app` needs a browser MCP (Claude in Chrome or Claude's own Preview) for its final render-verification step, since an HTTP 200 alone does not catch a blank page. A skill file alone, without the servers a given skill needs, has nothing to act on.

Not for S/4HANA Public Cloud or [the BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment), where the README states there is no `SUBMIT`, NAST or SOAP-RFC; the floor elsewhere is SAP_BASIS 7.50, the `/sap/bc/soap/rfc` service active, and an SAP user with `S_RFC` on the kit's function group as well as the authorizations for the reports and the spool. Print output is NAST messages only, so S/4 Output Management through BRF+ or APOC is outside it, and editing covers SmartForms alone, with Adobe Forms and SAPscript previewable but not editable. A report that opens a popup, calls a screen or is a dialog transaction cannot be run at all.

The commands it writes stop production systems, delete data and import transports, which is why execution is deliberately somebody else's decision. BTP and cloud operations are explicitly out of scope and planned as a separate plugin.

It is a plugin for one server — its own — so it is a stack rather than a component. And the guard is only as good as the profile labels: a production system registered as `DEV` is a production system with the safety off.

Stateful apps cannot be operated: a stateful session lives in one HTTP request and an MCP call is one request, so `app_start` refuses them. The repository carries no release yet and states the addon has not been run in production use, the 7.02 downport is lint-only with no 7.02 system having run it, and the ABAP Cloud HTTP service setup is written down but still to verify on your own system.

Development and sandbox systems only: the README warns against pointing it at production. Transport release is never executed, since the tool exists to show the policy stopping it, and separation of duties is checked against the `identity.approvers` list in the policy file rather than against SAP authorisations, so it holds as far as that file does and no further. The write path has been tested with ABAP classes and other object types may need adjustments, there is deliberately no tool that creates or deletes an object, and one server instance serves one SAP system.

Real SAP calls need the proprietary [SAP NetWeaver RFC SDK](external:sap-nw-rfc-sdk) and the `pyrfc==3.3.1` release the README calls archived and yanked, on Python 3.11, so without those only the demo backend answers. Not over HTTP as it stands: credentials are read from the environment for stdio, and the README says not to expose the server over HTTP without implementing the MCP authorization specification and deployment-level rate limiting. Multi-tenant auth and RBAC beyond the one server-wide policy, rate limiting, metrics and tracing, and deployment packaging are listed as not built. The result limits protect the client and not the system, since the README states they cannot reduce work already performed inside SAP, and the MCP tool annotations that describe read and write risk are advisory metadata rather than an authorisation boundary, so the service account's `S_RFC` and table authorisations are still what decides.

It is a plugin for one server — its own — so it is a stack rather than a component. And the guard is only as good as the profile labels: a production system registered as `DEV` is a production system with the safety off.

Not for anything important, which is the maintainer's own instruction: the README's Warning section calls it stupid to write your own encryption or PGP library, says abapPGP will most certainly contain severe bugs, and points instead at established PGP software such as [OpenPGP](http://openpgp.org/). Signing is the only scope it states.

Not a way to run existing reports unchanged: a report is rewritten as a class, and `CALL SCREEN`, dynpro modules, batch input, `SUBMIT` and native SQL are refused by the converter rather than mapped. Not an SAP GUI in the browser either: the programming model is classic and the screens are UI5, and the README points at abap2UI5-addons/sapgui for SE16N or SM37. Output has gaps the README names — ALV cells show dates and times as the model carries them rather than in the user's format, print is a text file because ABAP Cloud has no spool, and value tables for F4 are read on premise only.

It is a catalogue of SAP's objects and not a reading of your code: it states that an object is not released, never that you used it, and the finding is the ATC check's. For SAP Cloud ERP Private the files exist for feature pack stack releases only, with no update per support package, so a system between two stacks is checked against its stack's file.

There is nothing to clone here: "Access is provided through a registration page. Once registered, you will receive access to the GitHub repository containing the agents, deployment guides, and documentation", and that repository answers 404 to anyone who has not registered, so neither the agent code nor the deployment guides can be read before the form is filled in. AWS states the agents are published as an unsupported solution, with customers responsible for testing and securing the code before deploying in production, and that they are intended for non-production SAP environments rather than production systems. The documentation link in the README is still a placeholder.

It answers about the object catalogue, not about your code: nothing here reads your system, so it will tell you a table is not released and not that you used it. That check is ATC's, and this is what makes ATC's answer actionable.

`APP_TITLE` is not applied by the exit: the `title` field was removed from `z2ui5_if_ui5_exit=>ty_s_http_config` in abap2UI5 1.145.0, so an app that wants it as its browser tab title sets it while it runs. The live theme preview runs the frontend action `THEMING` / `setTheme` and needs UI5 1.118 or later; on an older release a saved theme applies with the next page load. The code is written for ABAP 7.50 and the README states there is no downported 7.02 version, no 702 branch and no workflow that builds one.

Anything below SAP S/4HANA 2023 FPS03 (ABAP 7.58), and any system not running the ABAP Cloud development model: those two are the prerequisites the README names, and it states that the framework targets ABAP Cloud exclusively.

Only on SAP S/4HANA 2023 and 2025, on premise or private cloud: [SAP S/4HANA Cloud, Public Edition](external:sap-s4hana-cloud-public-edition) and the [SAP BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment) are listed as coming soon, and a 2023 system has to leave out `ZABAP_PRC_EVENTS_SE_2025`, whose event-based side effects rely on APIs released with S/4HANA 2025. Not for a system that already carries a copy, because object names are global and two versions cannot live side by side, and not for a productive system by way of the `ZABAP_PRC_DEMO*` packages, which the README states are not intended for one and whose init classes delete and rebuild their own tables on every run. While the major version is 0 the public API is not stable: minor bumps carry breaking changes with no deprecation period, so productive use means pinning a tag and reading the CHANGELOG before every upgrade.

It sees [abap2UI5](artifact:abap2ui5-abap2ui5) only: the figures come from the framework's HTTP handler, its monitor hook and its draft table, so nothing outside abap2UI5 appears in them. The usage, error and performance tabs stay empty until the handler line is in place or the user exit sets `check_monitor_active`. Recording which employee used which application, when and how fast, is subject to works council co-determination in Germany (§ 87 (1) no. 6 BetrVG); user tracking is `HASH` by default, `NAME` stores user names, and the request recorder keeps the complete request and response of every roundtrip for two days by default.

An Eclipse installation older than the 2026-03 release, or a Java below 21, cannot take it: both are listed prerequisites, and 2026-03 is named as the oldest release the current ADT installs on. The tenant, region, client ID and client secret are entered per installation in Eclipse preferences, so each developer configures the Cloud ALM connection in their own IDE.

Not on ABAP Cloud: the system tables and the classic Workbench APIs the screens use are not released for the ABAP Cloud language version, and there is no 7.02 version below the 7.50 floor either. Not where the full original function is needed, since only the listed transactions exist and about 300 buttons and fields are shown disabled. The authorization checks are rebuilt rather than the originals, which is why the README asks that the screens be tried with a restricted user on a sandbox before the ICF service is opened to more people.

Not as it stands on a system past development: it reads the contents of any table the user names without an authorisation check of its own, so access is bounded only by whatever restrictions exist on the underlying handler or service. The README asks for your own checks first, naming `AUTHORITY-CHECK` on `S_TABU_DIS`/`S_TABU_NAM`, and for a restriction on who may run the app. There is no 7.02 downport either, because the selection-screen dependency has no `702` branch.

It runs whatever SQL a user types without an authorisation check of its own, and the native path additionally uses ADBC, which bypasses ABAP authorisations and client separation; the README asks anyone running it beyond a development system to add authorisation checks and restrict who may start the app. The native console needs Standard ABAP, so on ABAP Cloud only the Open SQL console is available.

A `SELECT` from a business table has nothing to select from: the database in the page holds the framework's own tables, and nothing can reach outside the browser, so an app that reads a system's data cannot be tried here. Only the UI5 libraries built in are available and a control from anywhere else will not load; what the transpiler cannot compile is reported in the output panel rather than run. State lives in the tab — a reload, and a press of Run, starts over on a fresh database.

Not below SAP_BASIS 7.40 SP08, and not on [SAP S/4HANA Cloud Public Edition](external:sap-s4hana-cloud-public-edition) or [the SAP BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment), where the classic transport check, the report and job calls and the cluster table `INDX` it rests on do not exist and the maintainer names gCTS as the answer instead. Only on a development system where every developer is trusted: each developer's GitHub token is kept in a cluster table encrypted with a key held in the same table, so anybody who can run ABAP on that system can read both, and the separation between author and reviewer holds only as far as that trust does. Not where the gate has to be unconditional — `#NOREVIEW` in a request's short text skips the check for that request, `ZTR_DISABLED` switches it off for a system, a check that cannot reach GitHub lets the release go on, and nothing checks who writes the marker.

A system that reports itself productive, or whose role the probe cannot prove non-productive, is write-locked with no override, so changing code in production is not something this does. The permission ladder constrains the package, object name and transport request the server itself passes on a write, and is not a sandbox around ABAP it executes: `abap_run`, `abap_test` and the opt-in `core.eval` run under the connected technical user's SAP authorisations, which is where the boundary actually sits. Data preview, dump variable contents and driving a transaction by batch input stay off in every mode, `admin` included, until each is named explicitly.

Driving the GUI reaches whatever a user can reach, which is business data and not a development surface. Decide what an agent may do in a session before granting one, not after. Windows only. The HTTP transport is meant for team use but binds to localhost, and unattended multi-user operation is listed as not yet available — a limitation and also the safer default.

What adt-ls cannot do headless the maintainer puts out of scope, so a consumer that needs an ADT call the language server does not expose is back to speaking ADT itself. The README states the current runtime compatibility as verified on macOS arm64, against adt-ls 1.1.2 as the minimum and `1.1.2.202608131517` as the version tested. An Eclipse installation does not supply that runtime: SAP versions the two separately, so the VS Code extension has to be installed even where nobody opens VS Code.

Not a tool a developer runs: it is a library to build one with, and it ships no editor, command line or interface of its own. Its sample connects with a plain HTTP URL, a user and a password, so a system that does not expose the adt ICF service that way is out of reach.

The embedded preview needs a system that accepts basic auth: the documentation states that pure SSO or SAML without a basic-auth fallback is not supported, and points at `external` mode, which opens the app in the normal browser with the existing SAP session. On the web only the language half runs; the preview with its proxy, traffic log and screenshot, Ctrl+F3 activation, the render gate, the workspace-wide check and the MCP servers are desktop-only. The agent app tools send nothing until `abap2ui5.agent.enableAppTools` is switched on in User settings, because an event they fire runs as the configured user and changes data on the system for real.

A `SELECT` from a business table has nothing to select from: the database in the page holds the framework's own tables, and nothing can reach outside the browser, so an app that reads a system's data cannot be tried here. Only the UI5 libraries built in are available and a control from anywhere else will not load; what the transpiler cannot compile is reported in the output panel rather than run. State lives in the tab — a reload, and a press of Run, starts over on a fresh database.

An Eclipse installation older than the 2026-03 release, or a Java below 21, cannot take it: both are listed prerequisites, and 2026-03 is named as the oldest release the current ADT installs on. The tenant, region, client ID and client secret are entered per installation in Eclipse preferences, so each developer configures the Cloud ALM connection in their own IDE.

Not on ABAP Cloud: the system tables and the classic Workbench APIs the screens use are not released for the ABAP Cloud language version, and there is no 7.02 version below the 7.50 floor either. Not where the full original function is needed, since only the listed transactions exist and about 300 buttons and fields are shown disabled. The authorization checks are rebuilt rather than the originals, which is why the README asks that the screens be tried with a restricted user on a sandbox before the ICF service is opened to more people.

The class has to be moved by hand: an abapGit pull of the exported ZIP, or a paste into ADT or SE24. The palette is held to the 121 controls of UI5 1.71, and a control inserted by its class name instead comes from whatever UI5 the canvas has loaded, with nothing checking it against 1.71 - *Checks* reports that. An app class that builds no view, or more than one, is refused.

Windows only, with PowerShell 7 (`pwsh`) installed; the run needs access to `download.eclipse.org`, `tools.hana.ondemand.com`, `eclipse.devepos.com` and the update site of every plugin selected, from the machine it installs on. A plugin outside the catalog is installed only after someone adds its update site and feature group id to `catalog.json`.

A `SELECT` from a business table has nothing to select from: the database in the page holds the framework's own tables, and nothing can reach outside the browser, so an app that reads a system's data cannot be tried here. Only the UI5 libraries built in are available and a control from anywhere else will not load; what the transpiler cannot compile is reported in the output panel rather than run. State lives in the tab — a reload, and a press of Run, starts over on a fresh database.

Not a system to run a business application on: there is no business application in it, and what it implements of the language, the dictionary and Gateway is a stated subset of each. It is a clean-room reimplementation of the `/IWBEP/` interfaces that bundles no SAP source and no standard DDIC, so a service that reads standard objects has nothing to read, and `ANORMALIES.md` records every place the runtime differs from SAP before any workaround is written.

It is not the framework and takes no framework fixes: those belong upstream in abap2UI5, and nothing under `src/`, `downport/`, `output/` and `build/` here is a source file. The build is frozen on pinned commits with no scheduled rebuild, so it does not show what abap2UI5 main does today, samples in subfolders of the samples repository are excluded because they require a real SAP system, and a known upstream transpiler issue leaves `check_on_init( )` always false, so backend-built view XML may not be returned.

Not on ABAP Cloud: the system tables and the classic Workbench APIs the screens use are not released for the ABAP Cloud language version, and there is no 7.02 version below the 7.50 floor either. Not where the full original function is needed, since only the listed transactions exist and about 300 buttons and fields are shown disabled. The authorization checks are rebuilt rather than the originals, which is why the README asks that the screens be tried with a restricted user on a sandbox before the ICF service is opened to more people.