Everything in ABAP

Not a substitute for testing in a system: the README states that any class calling the database, classic BAPIs or HTTP is shimmed out and stays an on-stack ATC and ABAP Unit concern, and that an off-stack green is CI-grade provenance rather than an in-system pass. It also assumes a particular shape of project. The ABAP has to be abapGit-serialised into a Git repository, Node.js 22 or later has to be available locally and in CI, and the CI has to be GitHub Actions.

The embedded preview needs a system that accepts basic auth: the documentation states that pure SSO or SAML without a basic-auth fallback is not supported, and points at `external` mode, which opens the app in the normal browser with the existing SAP session. On the web only the language half runs; the preview with its proxy, traffic log and screenshot, Ctrl+F3 activation, the render gate, the workspace-wide check and the MCP servers are desktop-only. The agent app tools send nothing until `abap2ui5.agent.enableAppTools` is switched on in User settings, because an event they fire runs as the configured user and changes data on the system for real.

Every skill that touches ABAP needs [arc-1](artifact:arc-mcp-arc-1) itself connected to a real system; nothing else is universal. `modernize-ui5-app` and `convert-ui5-to-fiori-elements` specifically need [the UI5 MCP server](artifact:ui5-mcp-server) for TypeScript conversion guidance and the linter, `convert-ui5-to-fiori-elements` also needs [the Fiori MCP server](artifact:sap-ux-fiori-mcp-server) for its LROP scaffold, and `modernize-ui5-app` needs a browser MCP (Claude in Chrome or Claude's own Preview) for its final render-verification step, since an HTTP 200 alone does not catch a blank page. A skill file alone, without the servers a given skill needs, has nothing to act on.

Knowledge with no reach: without an MCP server connected it can tell an agent what to write and cannot let it read or run anything. The rules target the ABAP Cloud development model, so a classic on-premise codebase is not what they are written against.

Not for S/4HANA Public Cloud or [the BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment), where the README states there is no `SUBMIT`, NAST or SOAP-RFC; the floor elsewhere is SAP_BASIS 7.50, the `/sap/bc/soap/rfc` service active, and an SAP user with `S_RFC` on the kit's function group as well as the authorizations for the reports and the spool. Print output is NAST messages only, so S/4 Output Management through BRF+ or APOC is outside it, and editing covers SmartForms alone, with Adobe Forms and SAPscript previewable but not editable. A report that opens a popup, calls a screen or is a dialog transaction cannot be run at all.

Its maker offers it commercially.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

Host-specific: outside Kiro the automatic context activation is the part that does not come with it, and what remains is prose you would have to wire in yourself. Breadth over depth by design — thirty-five skills across six product areas is an orientation layer, not a substitute for the focused sets in each.

The commands it writes stop production systems, delete data and import transports, which is why execution is deliberately somebody else's decision. BTP and cloud operations are explicitly out of scope and planned as a separate plugin.

Its README calls it early-stage — the core workflows run end-to-end against real systems and packaging, documentation and polish are stated as still evolving. A Rust binary rather than an npm install, so the platform build matters.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

GPL-3.0, which is a licence to read before vendoring any of it into something you ship. Forty plugins is also a lot of always-available surface — the ledger is there because breadth and verification pull in opposite directions, and it does not resolve that so much as report it.

It is a plugin for one server — its own — so it is a stack rather than a component. And the guard is only as good as the profile labels: a production system registered as `DEV` is a production system with the safety off.

No published releases; repository quiet for 28 months.

Stateful apps cannot be operated: a stateful session lives in one HTTP request and an MCP call is one request, so `app_start` refuses them. The repository carries no release yet and states the addon has not been run in production use, the 7.02 downport is lint-only with no 7.02 system having run it, and the ABAP Cloud HTTP service setup is written down but still to verify on your own system.

No published releases; repository quiet for 34 months.

The declared repository is archived.

No published releases; repository quiet for 29 months.

Archived The declared repository is archived.

Functional boundary With one SAP system the README says to point the client at that arc-1 directly. Version 1 exchanges tokens within a single subaccount, so backends spread across subaccounts are out; it keeps its session map in memory, so more than one instance needs sticky sessions or a shared store. It routes deterministically and runs no model, which is a different thing from an assistant that reasons across systems. The `/all` endpoint drops the per-connection isolation, and the maintainer's answer to that is a PROD backend set read-only at the SAP end rather than a tool surface that hides the writes.

Its README says it plainly and so does this entry: this is not a simulation, every tool call reaches a live BW system, and write operations produce real changes. BW modelling objects are the definition of a warehouse — the blast radius of a wrong one is every report built on it.

Development and sandbox systems only: the README warns against pointing it at production. Transport release is never executed, since the tool exists to show the policy stopping it, and separation of duties is checked against the `identity.approvers` list in the policy file rather than against SAP authorisations, so it holds as far as that file does and no further. The write path has been tested with ABAP classes and other object types may need adjustments, there is deliberately no tool that creates or deletes an object, and one server instance serves one SAP system.

Real SAP calls need the proprietary [SAP NetWeaver RFC SDK](external:sap-nw-rfc-sdk) and the `pyrfc==3.3.1` release the README calls archived and yanked, on Python 3.11, so without those only the demo backend answers. Not over HTTP as it stands: credentials are read from the environment for stdio, and the README says not to expose the server over HTTP without implementing the MCP authorization specification and deployment-level rate limiting. Multi-tenant auth and RBAC beyond the one server-wide policy, rate limiting, metrics and tracing, and deployment packaging are listed as not built. The result limits protect the client and not the system, since the README states they cannot reduce work already performed inside SAP, and the MCP tool annotations that describe read and write risk are advisory metadata rather than an authorisation boundary, so the service account's `S_RFC` and table authorisations are still what decides.

It says so itself, in bold, and the atlas repeats it: not legal advice and not a compliance decision. Only SAP, your contract, or SAP support can answer bindingly, and the skill routes legal, commercial and roadmap questions there rather than guessing at them. Treat the output as evidence gathered, not as a verdict.

It is a plugin for one server — its own — so it is a stack rather than a component. And the guard is only as good as the profile labels: a production system registered as `DEV` is a production system with the safety off.

No published releases; repository quiet for 68 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 58 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 97 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 27 months.

Not where the system must not trust whatever the source trusts: the README states that you must trust the source, currently Mozilla, because the system can then reach every website holding a certificate generated by a root CA that source supplies. It installs those root CAs automatically, and the maintainer marks the tool use at own risk.

Not for anything important, which is the maintainer's own instruction: the README's Warning section calls it stupid to write your own encryption or PGP library, says abapPGP will most certainly contain severe bugs, and points instead at established PGP software such as [OpenPGP](http://openpgp.org/). Signing is the only scope it states.

No published releases; repository quiet for 83 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 40 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 54 months.

In beta by its own page's account, where conversion bugs may occur and not all functions and variants are supported yet. The shapes named as not yet supported are sub selects, FOR ALL ENTRIES, functions such as count and sum, and the IN operator with a value list, so a statement built on one of those is outside what the converter sets out to do.

Not a way to run existing reports unchanged: a report is rewritten as a class, and `CALL SCREEN`, dynpro modules, batch input, `SUBMIT` and native SQL are refused by the converter rather than mapped. Not an SAP GUI in the browser either: the programming model is classic and the screens are UI5, and the README points at abap2UI5-addons/sapgui for SE16N or SM37. Output has gaps the README names — ALV cells show dates and times as the model carries them rather than in the user's format, print is a text file because ABAP Cloud has no spool, and value tables for F4 are read on premise only.

Not reachable Not reachable since 2026-10-20.

Functional boundary The Level A–D grade merges SAP's two published files in the tool's own engine: it is an orientation rather than an ATC result and is left out of the signed audit pack, and the repository documents state by state where the grade is expected to differ from what the clean core ATC check reports. Nothing here runs ABAP Unit — on the RAP track that result is recorded from your own SAP system, and generated CAP tests run against mocks in an isolated runner rather than in a real SAP S/4HANA system. Tenants, organisation accounts, single sign-on, a self-hosted edition and write access through an API are deliberately not built, and one account has five analysis runs before a Gemini API key of its own is needed.

Not for an automated check: the answer arrives as a page in a browser, so a rule that has to run over a codebase, or an agent mid-task, needs the repository as data rather than as a form.

There is nothing to clone here: "Access is provided through a registration page. Once registered, you will receive access to the GitHub repository containing the agents, deployment guides, and documentation", and that repository answers 404 to anyone who has not registered, so neither the agent code nor the deployment guides can be read before the form is filled in. AWS states the agents are published as an unsupported solution, with customers responsible for testing and securing the code before deploying in production, and that they are intended for non-production SAP environments rather than production systems. The documentation link in the README is still a placeholder.

It answers about the object catalogue, not about your code: nothing here reads your system, so it will tell you a table is not released and not that you used it. That check is ATC's, and this is what makes ATC's answer actionable.

Quiet No published releases; repository quiet for 41 months.

Functional boundary Not in a production environment yet: the maintainer puts abaK in beta, says its API can still change and more tests are needed, and asks that a non-beta release be waited for.

No published releases; repository quiet for 33 months.

`APP_TITLE` is not applied by the exit: the `title` field was removed from `z2ui5_if_ui5_exit=>ty_s_http_config` in abap2UI5 1.145.0, so an app that wants it as its browser tab title sets it while it runs. The live theme preview runs the frontend action `THEMING` / `setTheme` and needs UI5 1.118 or later; on an older release a saved theme applies with the next page load. The code is written for ABAP 7.50 and the README states there is no downported 7.02 version, no 702 branch and no workflow that builds one.

Anything below SAP S/4HANA 2023 FPS03 (ABAP 7.58), and any system not running the ABAP Cloud development model: those two are the prerequisites the README names, and it states that the framework targets ABAP Cloud exclusively.

Quiet No published releases; repository quiet for 101 months.

Functional boundary Not where a toggle is meant to be switched on in a production system: the maintainer warns that features should never be enabled in a production system.

No published releases; repository quiet for 96 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 36 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 41 months.

Only on SAP S/4HANA 2023 and 2025, on premise or private cloud: [SAP S/4HANA Cloud, Public Edition](external:sap-s4hana-cloud-public-edition) and the [SAP BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment) are listed as coming soon, and a 2023 system has to leave out `ZABAP_PRC_EVENTS_SE_2025`, whose event-based side effects rely on APIs released with S/4HANA 2025. Not for a system that already carries a copy, because object names are global and two versions cannot live side by side, and not for a productive system by way of the `ZABAP_PRC_DEMO*` packages, which the README states are not intended for one and whose init classes delete and rebuild their own tables on every run. While the major version is 0 the public API is not stable: minor bumps carry breaking changes with no deprecation period, so productive use means pinning a tag and reading the CHANGELOG before every upgrade.

No published releases; repository quiet for 36 months.

Quiet No published releases; repository quiet for 57 months.

Functional boundary The maintainer states the current state has never been used in real-world scenarios: the demo reports in package ZAPS_DEMO and the unit tests are the only runs reported, and the release table marks SAP_BASIS 740 unclear, 754 as the release it was developed on, and 750 to 756 as expected to work.

No published releases; repository quiet for 26 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 74 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 37 months.

The declared repository is archived.

No published releases; repository quiet for 39 months.

It sees [abap2UI5](artifact:abap2ui5-abap2ui5) only: the figures come from the framework's HTTP handler, its monitor hook and its draft table, so nothing outside abap2UI5 appears in them. The usage, error and performance tabs stay empty until the handler line is in place or the user exit sets `check_monitor_active`. Recording which employee used which application, when and how fast, is subject to works council co-determination in Germany (§ 87 (1) no. 6 BetrVG); user tracking is `HASH` by default, `NAME` stores user names, and the request recorder keeps the complete request and response of every roundtrip for two days by default.

A Python 3.10+ CLI, installed with pipx rather than through any SAP-provided package manager. Its own README lists what it does not do yet: where-used, syntax check and unit test runs — for those it says to reach for [ADT/Eclipse](external:eclipse) or an MCP server. First release, v0.1.0, and no standalone LICENSE file in the repository — the MIT grant is in the README and in pyproject.toml's project metadata rather than its own file.

An Eclipse installation older than the 2026-03 release, or a Java below 21, cannot take it: both are listed prerequisites, and 2026-03 is named as the oldest release the current ADT installs on. The tenant, region, client ID and client secret are entered per installation in Eclipse preferences, so each developer configures the Cloud ALM connection in their own IDE.

In the Eclipse mode the server lives in a developer's IDE, binds to 127.0.0.1 and answers any request carrying an `Origin` header with HTTP 403, so a pipeline or a remote agent has nothing to reach; the standalone mode on the runtime of the ADT for VS Code extension is the documented route with no IDE open. A new connection starts in write mode, so the 11 write tools are live against a connected system until someone presses Toggle Read-Only. The dropins route for the two bundles is documented as untested.

It runs on macOS only. Hammer Core Services, the part installed into the SAP system, needs that system on ABAP Platform 2023 or newer with SAP_BASIS 758 or newer, and installing it needs a user who can create development objects and run background jobs in that system.

Its maker offers it commercially.

Release and repository quiet for 50 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 42 months.

A system below ABAP 7.50: some of the classes it uses are only available from 7.50, and the maintainer states that downward compatibility to 7.40 in a single branch is currently not possible without resorting to dynamic programming.

It runs on macOS only. Hammer Core Services, the part installed into the SAP system, needs that system on ABAP Platform 2023 or newer with SAP_BASIS 758 or newer, and installing it needs a user who can create development objects and run background jobs in that system.

Not on ABAP Cloud: the system tables and the classic Workbench APIs the screens use are not released for the ABAP Cloud language version, and there is no 7.02 version below the 7.50 floor either. Not where the full original function is needed, since only the listed transactions exist and about 300 buttons and fields are shown disabled. The authorization checks are rebuilt rather than the originals, which is why the README asks that the screens be tried with a restricted user on a sandbox before the ICF service is opened to more people.

Not as it stands on a system past development: it reads the contents of any table the user names without an authorisation check of its own, so access is bounded only by whatever restrictions exist on the underlying handler or service. The README asks for your own checks first, naming `AUTHORITY-CHECK` on `S_TABU_DIS`/`S_TABU_NAM`, and for a restriction on who may run the app. There is no 7.02 downport either, because the selection-screen dependency has no `702` branch.

It runs whatever SQL a user types without an authorisation check of its own, and the native path additionally uses ADBC, which bypasses ABAP authorisations and client separation; the README asks anyone running it beyond a development system to add authorisation checks and restrict who may start the app. The native console needs Standard ABAP, so on ABAP Cloud only the Open SQL console is available.

Quiet No published releases; repository quiet for 136 months.

No license Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

A `SELECT` from a business table has nothing to select from: the database in the page holds the framework's own tables, and nothing can reach outside the browser, so an app that reads a system's data cannot be tried here. Only the UI5 libraries built in are available and a control from anywhere else will not load; what the transpiler cannot compile is reported in the output panel rather than run. State lives in the tab — a reload, and a press of Run, starts over on a fresh database.

No published releases; repository quiet for 45 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 43 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 63 months.

Not below SAP_BASIS 7.40 SP08, and not on [SAP S/4HANA Cloud Public Edition](external:sap-s4hana-cloud-public-edition) or [the SAP BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment), where the classic transport check, the report and job calls and the cluster table `INDX` it rests on do not exist and the maintainer names gCTS as the answer instead. Only on a development system where every developer is trusted: each developer's GitHub token is kept in a cluster table encrypted with a key held in the same table, so anybody who can run ABAP on that system can read both, and the separation between author and reviewer holds only as far as that trust does. Not where the gate has to be unconditional — `#NOREVIEW` in a request's short text skips the check for that request, `ZTR_DISABLED` switches it off for a system, a check that cannot reach GitHub lets the release go on, and nothing checks who writes the marker.

No published releases; repository quiet for 31 months.