Everything in ABAP

Every gate here runs off-system, so what the class does on a real system and what the view does on the oldest UI5 release it has to serve are what the `pitfalls` catalogues carry and no local run can see. It runs abap2UI5 app classes, so ABAP that is not one has nothing here to deploy into. In system mode the sandbox tools are not offered, and an `app_act` event runs on the system as the configured user.

A descendant rather than a distinct idea: if what you need is the ADT surface itself, its ancestors are entered here too and one of them may already be in your stack.

Written for Amazon Q Developer and Kiro, and the central deployment path is ECS Fargate — the further you are from AWS, the more of it is scaffolding you do not need. Python rather than the Node most of this group uses. Its README says the repository is no longer maintained and that the latest version of ABAP Accelerator is shared after registering with AWS for [Modernization Agents for SAP on AWS](https://github.com/aws-for-sap/Modernization-Agents-for-SAP-on-AWS).

A Python 3.10+ CLI, installed with pipx rather than through any SAP-provided package manager. Its own README lists what it does not do yet: where-used, syntax check and unit test runs — for those it says to reach for [ADT/Eclipse](external:eclipse) or an MCP server. First release, v0.1.0, and no standalone LICENSE file in the repository — the MIT grant is in the README and in pyproject.toml's project metadata rather than its own file.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

Commercial Its maker offers it commercially.

Functional boundary The MIT licence covers the connector only: connecting to SAP needs a licensed ABAPilot backend installed in your system, so this is a commercial decision wearing an open-source badge on one half. Its own published checks did not cover writes, activation, transports or authorisation boundaries.

A system that reports itself productive, or whose role the probe cannot prove non-productive, is write-locked with no override, so changing code in production is not something this does. The permission ladder constrains the package, object name and transport request the server itself passes on a write, and is not a sandbox around ABAP it executes: `abap_run`, `abap_test` and the opt-in `core.eval` run under the connected technical user's SAP authorisations, which is where the boundary actually sits. Data preview, dump variable contents and driving a transaction by batch input stay off in every mode, `admin` included, until each is named explicitly.

Not reachable Not reachable since 2026-10-20.

Functional boundary `run_class` executes code in your system — that is the point and it is also the risk.

Classic BOPF only: business objects of the ABAP Programming Model for SAP Fiori are not handled, and on [the BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment) or S/4HANA Public Cloud classic BOPF enhancements do not exist. It is version 0.1.0, verified on S/4HANA 2025 (SAP_BASIS 816) on-premise only, and [arc-1](artifact:arc-mcp-arc-1) still marks the plugin API it is built on as experimental. ARC-1 loads no extensions on its multi-target routes and offers none of these tools in its `hyperfocused` tool mode.

Single-tenant today, one technical user, with per-user principal propagation on the roadmap — so a shared deployment cannot yet act as the developer who asked. The sibling edition [ARC-1](artifact:arc-mcp-arc-1) speaks ADT directly if you would rather not depend on the language server.

The diff holds only while the object is inactive, since after activation the previous version is gone and a watched journal directory is what the maintainer points to instead. It adds no write path of its own: the IDE writes through SAP's extension, and the README states arc-1 can stay on `SAP_ALLOW_WRITES=false`. DDIC metadata files are skipped, because SAP's own stub for them says they are not supported in ABAP development tools for VS Code.

It lives inside Eclipse and inherits everything that implies — the session is a developer's, not a pipeline's. And it is version-bound: ADT 3.60 or newer for 0.5.1, with 0.3.x the path for ADT 3.58 and 3.59.

Its README says it plainly and so does this entry: this is not a simulation, every tool call reaches a live BW system, and write operations produce real changes. BW modelling objects are the definition of a warehouse — the blast radius of a wrong one is every report built on it.

Built and last touched in the same week of March 2026, so the maintenance reading is what it is — the authentication work is the reason to look, and a stalled repository is the reason to read it before depending on it.

Not for S/4HANA Public Cloud or [the BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment), where the README states there is no `SUBMIT`, NAST or SOAP-RFC; the floor elsewhere is SAP_BASIS 7.50, the `/sap/bc/soap/rfc` service active, and an SAP user with `S_RFC` on the kit's function group as well as the authorizations for the reports and the spool. Print output is NAST messages only, so S/4 Output Management through BRF+ or APOC is outside it, and editing covers SmartForms alone, with Adobe Forms and SAPscript previewable but not editable. A report that opens a popup, calls a screen or is a dialog transaction cannot be run at all.

Freestyle SQL and `abap_run` mean an agent can read data and execute code, which is well past reading source. Neither is something to grant on a system where the distinction between development tooling and business data matters.

In the Eclipse mode the server lives in a developer's IDE, binds to 127.0.0.1 and answers any request carrying an `Origin` header with HTTP 403, so a pipeline or a remote agent has nothing to reach; the standalone mode on the runtime of the ADT for VS Code extension is the documented route with no IDE open. A new connection starts in write mode, so the 11 write tools are live against a connected system until someone presses Toggle Read-Only. The dropins route for the two bundles is documented as untested.

A compiled binary rather than an npm package, shipped prebuilt per platform and through pip and uvx. It collects anonymous usage telemetry by default, switched off with `--no-telemetry` or `DATAZOO_DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1`. And the BW reach is what distinguishes it — if the work is plain ABAP, that half is weight you are not using.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

Two licences, by which package you install: the standalone server, `@mcp-abap-adt/core`, is AGPL-3.0-only, a licence to read before shipping anything built around it; the library, `@mcp-abap-adt/lib`, is Apache-2.0. The destination model also expects service keys sitting in a local directory, which is a secrets decision to make deliberately.

It runs on macOS only. Hammer Core Services, the part installed into the SAP system, needs that system on ABAP Platform 2023 or newer with SAP_BASIS 758 or newer, and installing it needs a user who can create development objects and run background jobs in that system.

Its maker offers it commercially.

Development and sandbox systems only: the README warns against pointing it at production. Transport release is never executed, since the tool exists to show the policy stopping it, and separation of duties is checked against the `identity.approvers` list in the policy file rather than against SAP authorisations, so it holds as far as that file does and no further. The write path has been tested with ABAP classes and other object types may need adjustments, there is deliberately no tool that creates or deletes an object, and one server instance serves one SAP system.

Its own README opens by calling the server experimental. It also writes: locking, editing and activating in a system an agent can reach is a permissions decision before it is a tooling one.

Every tool its README lists reads — Get and Search, nothing that writes. Locking, editing, activation and transports are the other server, [mcp-abap-abap-adt-api](artifact:mario-andreschak-mcp-abap-adt-api), and mixing the two is how you end up with two MCP servers pointed at one system.

There is nothing to clone here: "Access is provided through a registration page. Once registered, you will receive access to the GitHub repository containing the agents, deployment guides, and documentation", and that repository answers 404 to anyone who has not registered, so neither the agent code nor the deployment guides can be read before the form is filled in. AWS states the agents are published as an unsupported solution, with customers responsible for testing and securing the code before deploying in production, and that they are intended for non-production SAP environments rather than production systems. The documentation link in the README is still a placeholder.

Real SAP calls need the proprietary [SAP NetWeaver RFC SDK](external:sap-nw-rfc-sdk) and the `pyrfc==3.3.1` release the README calls archived and yanked, on Python 3.11, so without those only the demo backend answers. Not over HTTP as it stands: credentials are read from the environment for stdio, and the README says not to expose the server over HTTP without implementing the MCP authorization specification and deployment-level rate limiting. Multi-tenant auth and RBAC beyond the one server-wide policy, rate limiting, metrics and tracing, and deployment packaging are listed as not built. The result limits protect the client and not the system, since the README states they cannot reduce work already performed inside SAP, and the MCP tool annotations that describe read and write risk are advisory metadata rather than an authorisation boundary, so the service account's `S_RFC` and table authorisations are still what decides.

Its maker offers it commercially.

Reach is the reason to use it and the reason to be careful: reading cluster tables and spool output goes well past what a development tool is normally pointed at. Decide what an agent may reach before granting it, not after.

Read-only in practice, and the documentation is Korean; the tool names are English but the guidance around them is not.

Smart Form content cannot be read or written, and HR Forms (`PE51`) are not implemented. Installing it needs SAP GUI or WebGUI once, to register the OData services in `/IWFND/MAINT_SERVICE` and to redefine the write service in `SEGW`, and the extension is built against a locally linked ARC-1.

Every gate here runs off-system, so what the class does on a real system and what the view does on the oldest UI5 release it has to serve are what the `pitfalls` catalogues carry and no local run can see. It runs abap2UI5 app classes, so ABAP that is not one has nothing here to deploy into. In system mode the sandbox tools are not offered, and an `app_act` event runs on the system as the configured user.

The embedded preview needs a system that accepts basic auth: the documentation states that pure SSO or SAML without a basic-auth fallback is not supported, and points at `external` mode, which opens the app in the normal browser with the existing SAP session. On the web only the language half runs; the preview with its proxy, traffic log and screenshot, Ctrl+F3 activation, the render gate, the workspace-wide check and the MCP servers are desktop-only. The agent app tools send nothing until `abap2ui5.agent.enableAppTools` is switched on in User settings, because an event they fire runs as the configured user and changes data on the system for real.

A system that reports itself productive, or whose role the probe cannot prove non-productive, is write-locked with no override, so changing code in production is not something this does. The permission ladder constrains the package, object name and transport request the server itself passes on a write, and is not a sandbox around ABAP it executes: `abap_run`, `abap_test` and the opt-in `core.eval` run under the connected technical user's SAP authorisations, which is where the boundary actually sits. Data preview, dump variable contents and driving a transaction by batch input stay off in every mode, `admin` included, until each is named explicitly.

It puts create, update and delete on business entities behind natural language. Whatever the destination's principal may change, an agent may change — and "create a new customer" is a sentence, not a form somebody signed off.

Its maker offers it commercially.

OData v2 only, and untouched since August 2025 — the same author's [Go port](artifact:oisee-odata-mcp-go) is where v4 support and the tool-explosion work went.

Universal mode trades discoverability for size: one generic tool is harder for a model to pick correctly than a named one, which is why it is not the default. On a small service, standard mode is the better answer.

Real SAP calls need the proprietary [SAP NetWeaver RFC SDK](external:sap-nw-rfc-sdk) and the `pyrfc==3.3.1` release the README calls archived and yanked, on Python 3.11, so without those only the demo backend answers. Not over HTTP as it stands: credentials are read from the environment for stdio, and the README says not to expose the server over HTTP without implementing the MCP authorization specification and deployment-level rate limiting. Multi-tenant auth and RBAC beyond the one server-wide policy, rate limiting, metrics and tracing, and deployment packaging are listed as not built. The result limits protect the client and not the system, since the README states they cannot reduce work already performed inside SAP, and the MCP tool annotations that describe read and write risk are advisory metadata rather than an authorisation boundary, so the service account's `S_RFC` and table authorisations are still what decides.

On ECC the S/4HANA `API_*` services that the three convenience readers default to do not exist, so each one has to be pointed at a Z service of your own or replaced by the RFC tools. `read_table` inherits `RFC_READ_TABLE`'s 512-byte row, so a wide table needs an explicit field list and some fields cannot be selected at all, and the bridge starts a Node process and a fresh logon per call, with no pooling. The audit log is one line per call that includes the call arguments, so every filter and WHERE clause sent to SAP is written to a file that then has to be handled as sensitive.

Read-only does not mean low-stakes: a complete picture of who can do what in an SAP system is exactly what an attacker would want, and the ready-made endpoint is the vendor's rather than yours — the README also documents running the server yourself. The authentication is careful; the question of what leaves your landscape is still yours.

Its maker offers it commercially.

Not a substitute for testing in a system: the README states that any class calling the database, classic BAPIs or HTTP is shimmed out and stays an on-stack ATC and ABAP Unit concern, and that an off-stack green is CI-grade provenance rather than an in-system pass. It also assumes a particular shape of project. The ABAP has to be abapGit-serialised into a Git repository, Node.js 22 or later has to be available locally and in CI, and the CI has to be GitHub Actions.

The embedded preview needs a system that accepts basic auth: the documentation states that pure SSO or SAML without a basic-auth fallback is not supported, and points at `external` mode, which opens the app in the normal browser with the existing SAP session. On the web only the language half runs; the preview with its proxy, traffic log and screenshot, Ctrl+F3 activation, the render gate, the workspace-wide check and the MCP servers are desktop-only. The agent app tools send nothing until `abap2ui5.agent.enableAppTools` is switched on in User settings, because an event they fire runs as the configured user and changes data on the system for real.

Every skill that touches ABAP needs [arc-1](artifact:arc-mcp-arc-1) itself connected to a real system; nothing else is universal. `modernize-ui5-app` and `convert-ui5-to-fiori-elements` specifically need [the UI5 MCP server](artifact:ui5-mcp-server) for TypeScript conversion guidance and the linter, `convert-ui5-to-fiori-elements` also needs [the Fiori MCP server](artifact:sap-ux-fiori-mcp-server) for its LROP scaffold, and `modernize-ui5-app` needs a browser MCP (Claude in Chrome or Claude's own Preview) for its final render-verification step, since an HTTP 200 alone does not catch a blank page. A skill file alone, without the servers a given skill needs, has nothing to act on.

Knowledge with no reach: without an MCP server connected it can tell an agent what to write and cannot let it read or run anything. The rules target the ABAP Cloud development model, so a classic on-premise codebase is not what they are written against.

Not for S/4HANA Public Cloud or [the BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment), where the README states there is no `SUBMIT`, NAST or SOAP-RFC; the floor elsewhere is SAP_BASIS 7.50, the `/sap/bc/soap/rfc` service active, and an SAP user with `S_RFC` on the kit's function group as well as the authorizations for the reports and the spool. Print output is NAST messages only, so S/4 Output Management through BRF+ or APOC is outside it, and editing covers SmartForms alone, with Adobe Forms and SAPscript previewable but not editable. A report that opens a popup, calls a screen or is a dialog transaction cannot be run at all.

Its maker offers it commercially.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

Host-specific: outside Kiro the automatic context activation is the part that does not come with it, and what remains is prose you would have to wire in yourself. Breadth over depth by design — thirty-five skills across six product areas is an orientation layer, not a substitute for the focused sets in each.

The commands it writes stop production systems, delete data and import transports, which is why execution is deliberately somebody else's decision. BTP and cloud operations are explicitly out of scope and planned as a separate plugin.

Its README calls it early-stage — the core workflows run end-to-end against real systems and packaging, documentation and polish are stated as still evolving. A Rust binary rather than an npm install, so the platform build matters.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

GPL-3.0, which is a licence to read before vendoring any of it into something you ship. Forty plugins is also a lot of always-available surface — the ledger is there because breadth and verification pull in opposite directions, and it does not resolve that so much as report it.

It is a plugin for one server — its own — so it is a stack rather than a component. And the guard is only as good as the profile labels: a production system registered as `DEV` is a production system with the safety off.

No published releases; repository quiet for 28 months.

Stateful apps cannot be operated: a stateful session lives in one HTTP request and an MCP call is one request, so `app_start` refuses them. The repository carries no release yet and states the addon has not been run in production use, the 7.02 downport is lint-only with no 7.02 system having run it, and the ABAP Cloud HTTP service setup is written down but still to verify on your own system.

No published releases; repository quiet for 34 months.

The declared repository is archived.

No published releases; repository quiet for 29 months.

Archived The declared repository is archived.

Functional boundary With one SAP system the README says to point the client at that arc-1 directly. Version 1 exchanges tokens within a single subaccount, so backends spread across subaccounts are out; it keeps its session map in memory, so more than one instance needs sticky sessions or a shared store. It routes deterministically and runs no model, which is a different thing from an assistant that reasons across systems. The `/all` endpoint drops the per-connection isolation, and the maintainer's answer to that is a PROD backend set read-only at the SAP end rather than a tool surface that hides the writes.

Its README says it plainly and so does this entry: this is not a simulation, every tool call reaches a live BW system, and write operations produce real changes. BW modelling objects are the definition of a warehouse — the blast radius of a wrong one is every report built on it.

Development and sandbox systems only: the README warns against pointing it at production. Transport release is never executed, since the tool exists to show the policy stopping it, and separation of duties is checked against the `identity.approvers` list in the policy file rather than against SAP authorisations, so it holds as far as that file does and no further. The write path has been tested with ABAP classes and other object types may need adjustments, there is deliberately no tool that creates or deletes an object, and one server instance serves one SAP system.

Real SAP calls need the proprietary [SAP NetWeaver RFC SDK](external:sap-nw-rfc-sdk) and the `pyrfc==3.3.1` release the README calls archived and yanked, on Python 3.11, so without those only the demo backend answers. Not over HTTP as it stands: credentials are read from the environment for stdio, and the README says not to expose the server over HTTP without implementing the MCP authorization specification and deployment-level rate limiting. Multi-tenant auth and RBAC beyond the one server-wide policy, rate limiting, metrics and tracing, and deployment packaging are listed as not built. The result limits protect the client and not the system, since the README states they cannot reduce work already performed inside SAP, and the MCP tool annotations that describe read and write risk are advisory metadata rather than an authorisation boundary, so the service account's `S_RFC` and table authorisations are still what decides.

It says so itself, in bold, and the atlas repeats it: not legal advice and not a compliance decision. Only SAP, your contract, or SAP support can answer bindingly, and the skill routes legal, commercial and roadmap questions there rather than guessing at them. Treat the output as evidence gathered, not as a verdict.

It is a plugin for one server — its own — so it is a stack rather than a component. And the guard is only as good as the profile labels: a production system registered as `DEV` is a production system with the safety off.

A system below ABAP 7.50: some of the classes it uses are only available from 7.50, and the maintainer states that downward compatibility to 7.40 in a single branch is currently not possible without resorting to dynamic programming.

It runs on macOS only. Hammer Core Services, the part installed into the SAP system, needs that system on ABAP Platform 2023 or newer with SAP_BASIS 758 or newer, and installing it needs a user who can create development objects and run background jobs in that system.

Not on ABAP Cloud: the system tables and the classic Workbench APIs the screens use are not released for the ABAP Cloud language version, and there is no 7.02 version below the 7.50 floor either. Not where the full original function is needed, since only the listed transactions exist and about 300 buttons and fields are shown disabled. The authorization checks are rebuilt rather than the originals, which is why the README asks that the screens be tried with a restricted user on a sandbox before the ICF service is opened to more people.

Not as it stands on a system past development: it reads the contents of any table the user names without an authorisation check of its own, so access is bounded only by whatever restrictions exist on the underlying handler or service. The README asks for your own checks first, naming `AUTHORITY-CHECK` on `S_TABU_DIS`/`S_TABU_NAM`, and for a restriction on who may run the app. There is no 7.02 downport either, because the selection-screen dependency has no `702` branch.

It runs whatever SQL a user types without an authorisation check of its own, and the native path additionally uses ADBC, which bypasses ABAP authorisations and client separation; the README asks anyone running it beyond a development system to add authorisation checks and restrict who may start the app. The native console needs Standard ABAP, so on ABAP Cloud only the Open SQL console is available.

Quiet No published releases; repository quiet for 136 months.

No license Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

A `SELECT` from a business table has nothing to select from: the database in the page holds the framework's own tables, and nothing can reach outside the browser, so an app that reads a system's data cannot be tried here. Only the UI5 libraries built in are available and a control from anywhere else will not load; what the transpiler cannot compile is reported in the output panel rather than run. State lives in the tab — a reload, and a press of Run, starts over on a fresh database.

No published releases; repository quiet for 45 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 43 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 63 months.

Not below SAP_BASIS 7.40 SP08, and not on [SAP S/4HANA Cloud Public Edition](external:sap-s4hana-cloud-public-edition) or [the SAP BTP ABAP environment](artifact:btp-abap-environment), where the classic transport check, the report and job calls and the cluster table `INDX` it rests on do not exist and the maintainer names gCTS as the answer instead. Only on a development system where every developer is trusted: each developer's GitHub token is kept in a cluster table encrypted with a key held in the same table, so anybody who can run ABAP on that system can read both, and the separation between author and reviewer holds only as far as that trust does. Not where the gate has to be unconditional — `#NOREVIEW` in a request's short text skips the check for that request, `ZTR_DISABLED` switches it off for a system, a check that cannot reach GitHub lets the release go on, and nothing checks who writes the marker.

No published releases; repository quiet for 31 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 38 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 97 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 67 months.

A system that reports itself productive, or whose role the probe cannot prove non-productive, is write-locked with no override, so changing code in production is not something this does. The permission ladder constrains the package, object name and transport request the server itself passes on a write, and is not a sandbox around ABAP it executes: `abap_run`, `abap_test` and the opt-in `core.eval` run under the connected technical user's SAP authorisations, which is where the boundary actually sits. Data preview, dump variable contents and driving a transaction by batch input stay off in every mode, `admin` included, until each is named explicitly.

No published releases; repository quiet for 57 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 69 months.

No published releases; repository quiet for 62 months.

Not reachable since 2026-10-20.

Driving the GUI reaches whatever a user can reach, which is business data and not a development surface. Decide what an agent may do in a session before granting one, not after. Windows only. The HTTP transport is meant for team use but binds to localhost, and unattended multi-user operation is listed as not yet available — a limitation and also the safer default.

Driving the GUI reaches whatever a user can reach, which is business data and not a development surface. Decide what an agent may do in a session before granting one, not after. It has also not been touched since February 2025, which the maintenance reading states — the three later entries here are where the CI, the Web GUI and the testing framing went.

Not reachable Not reachable since 2026-10-20.

Functional boundary Driving the GUI reaches whatever a user can reach, which is business data and not a development surface. Decide what an agent may do in a session before granting one, not after. And a UI test is slower and more brittle than the layer below it: this is for what only the screen can answer.

Neither the package manifest nor the repository tree declares a licence.

What adt-ls cannot do headless the maintainer puts out of scope, so a consumer that needs an ADT call the language server does not expose is back to speaking ADT itself. The README states the current runtime compatibility as verified on macOS arm64, against adt-ls 1.1.2 as the minimum and `1.1.2.202608131517` as the version tested. An Eclipse installation does not supply that runtime: SAP versions the two separately, so the VS Code extension has to be installed even where nobody opens VS Code.